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I'm flying far away to be really free  
Tried hard to build myself independently 
It's hard to always do what you expect from me 
Saying come home 
Come home 
[…] 
You're holding back the tears when you kiss me 
Smile smile when I'm back again as you see me 
When years are passing by and you miss me 
You're saying come home 
[…] 
My turn to understand what you lived through 
Today I only feel how I miss you so it's only fair, when it's hard to bear  
and you ask if I, I try to come home 
Come home 
Yael Naim, Come Home 
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Abstract 
Deconstructing Materiality: a Phenomenological Ethnography of Darśan and Indian 
Story-Telling Scrolls in Western Museums 
by Valentina Gamberi 
This study investigates Western curatorial practices towards the darśan, the visual contact 
established between the Hindu worshipper and the deity who is believed to give life to its material 
representation, expressed by two sets of Indian storytelling scrolls, the Bengali pats and the 
Rajasthani paṛs. Whilst the scrolls, especially the Rajasthani ones, are believed to be the temples 
and the icons of the deity depicted, Western curators appreciate them either as examples of 
ethnographic theories, or as pure art works. On the one hand, materiality is thus animistically 
empowered (see Faure, 1998), and, consequently, is treated as an anthropomorphic entity or fetish. 
On the other hand, materiality is considered as a reified idea, an objectification of a social 
structure, or of an ideal of beauty. Latour (2010) calls this phenomenon of reification a factish 
concept, which is revered in a semi-spiritual or post-secular way. Modernity, according to Latour, 
is characterised by this opposition between self-evident, abstract and intellectual notions –e.g. the 
categories of the sacred and of the profane –and the concrete and irrational reality. 
The differentiation between reality and ideas recalls the broader boundary between the human 
and the nonhuman. According to Merleau-Ponty (2003 [c. 1956]), materiality coincides with nature, 
one of the fundamental criteria of the categorisation of human/nonhuman. While human 
characteristics are highly rational, materiality, along with animality, is confined within the 
irrational realm and is considered as a passive actor, except for Gell’s (1998) theorisation of 
material agency. However, his conceptualisation depends upon an anthropomorphisation of the 
artefact by invoking the particular example of children’s play with toys. The present thesis 
explores the contribution of phenomenology, as the study of embodiments and incarnations, in 
problematising the role of materiality in its relationships with humans, and so the boundaries 
between the human and the nonhuman. On the one hand, the study employs phenomenology as a 
methodological tool, according to which the researcher’s body reveals a particular and 
intersubjective appraisal of materiality. On the other hand, phenomenology, corroborated by 
posthumanist studies, is the theoretical approach by which the duality object/subject is 
problematised. By this logic, phenomenology challenges the ontological idea of the I or human as 
separated from the Other or the nonhuman, by replacing it with a hybridism and a fusion between 
the perceiving and the perceived. 
Fieldwork data problematises this anthropomorphisation of materiality. In fact, visitors’ responses 
escape from the curators’ control and reveal how museum artefacts possess an agency 
independent from any human projection. In addition, data emphasises the irreconciliability 
between epistemic categories and the empiric reality. For instance, the Durkheimian notions of the 
sacred and of the profane become inapt to describe the phenomenon of the recreation of religious 




The problem of materiality 
 
This thesis argues that the concept of materiality as dependent on human beings must be 
problematised. Social sciences, particularly the branches of anthropology of art and material 
culture studies, have developed their concepts of material agency from the notion of personhood. 
By this logic, the material artefacts could affect social relationships only because they mimic 
human interactions and human beings decide so, e.g. a little girl decides that a doll is alive (see 
section 1.4). Phenomenology, as the study of the symbiosis between the perceiver and the 
perceived during perception, shows that, on the contrary, materiality escapes from human control, 
so that the borders between the human and the nonhuman overlap. The thesis suggests, then, that 
phenomenology can enrich the approach of social sciences to materiality, through a focus on the 
hybridism between human and nonhuman actors, rather than on the establishing of a 
differentiation of them into categories or hierarchies, according to which the nonhuman is 
subordinated to the human. In so doing, the present thesis utilises research, which took place from 
January to October 2014. The research comprised fieldwork as well as interviews conducted in 
nine museums and two temporary exhibitions in Europe and in the UK, and one museum in the 
U.S.A., where Indian storytelling scrolls from West Bengal (pats) and from Rajasthan (paṛs) and, 
more generally, other storytelling devices used by bards, are presented, exhibited or preserved in 
the museums’ storage rooms. In addition, scholars, members of cultural associations or 
institutions, and art gallery owners who have come in contact with the Indian storytelling context 
were interviewed as well.  
Indian painted scrolls used for storytelling ‘can be traced back through literary evidence to at 
least the second century BC and are known to have existed almost all over the subcontinent’ (Jain, 
1998, 8) and currently exist in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Bengal, Bihar and also in Deccan (Jain, 1998, 8). 
The scrolls’ stories are usually hagiographies, chronicles of ancestors and other deceased persons 
(cfr. Jain, 1998). Furthermore, it is believed that the audience can spiritually benefit from the 
process of storytelling. For instance, the Garoda storytellers’ wandering from village to village is 
called jatra, which means pilgrimage (Jain, 1998, 76). The ritual dimension of storytelling is further 
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strengthened by the fact that storytellers often have sorcerer-like1 or priestly roles and names 
through their storytelling performances. More importantly, the painted scrolls are considered 
shrines of the deities because of the concept of darśan. This is both a theoretical knowledge and an 
individual experience (Grimes, 2004, 531), as either a religious practice (contact with the divine) or 
an essential part of the pūjā or the worship of deities by means of offerings (Scheifinger, 2009, 277). 
Consequently, the material representation of the deity is considered as its incarnation, and so it is 
treated as a human being. In the past, in the region of Deccan, ‘When an old scroll was badly 
damaged, it was cremated and immersed in a river like a dead person, and all the Hindu death 
ceremonies were observed’ (Mittal, 1998, 58). 
With this research I wanted to explore the curatorial practices towards these types of scrolls, 
especially how darśan, the visual contact established between the Hindu worshipper and the deity 
who is believed to give life to its materiality, expressed by the scrolls, is perceived within museum 
spaces and re-elaborated by museum curators. I decided to focus research on these two scrolls, as 
they adapt their contents in several contexts in India, not necessarily or explicitly linked to that of 
the ritual. For instance, Bengali scrolls are used nowadays as means of political propaganda or of 
ethical education. In addition, the scrolls are elaborated by the publishing house Tara Books and 
turned into graphic novels of heterogeneous themes and cultural traditions (see for instance Sita’s 
Ramayana (Arni & Chitrakar, 2011), I see the promised land, centred on Martin Luther King’s 
biography (Flowers & Chitrakar, 2010), Patua Pinocchio, a folk rereading of the Italian fable of 
Pinocchio (Collodi & Chitrakar, 2014)). Paṛs are simplified and miniaturised for tourists, even 
though it is an extemporaneous and quite recent phenomenon. The broader chitrakath a tradition, 
as chapter three (section 3.2.3) will show, has been adopted by the comic books Amar Chitra Katha 
in order to bestow a national cult of the hero and of Hinduism, more generally. Darśan occurs, 
thus, in disparate ways, which demonstrate the overlapping of the sacred and of the profane, as 
well as the resistance of religious materiality to the change of contexts. 
Darśan allows thinking about materiality in terms of agency, since storytelling scrolls and 
other divine representations are considered capable of affecting humans. The primary goal of this 
research, therefore, has been analysing how Western culture, represented in museum practices, 
approaches the idea that material objects possess a distinct agency and can be the principal actors 
in their relationship with humans. As Gell (1998) states, treating materiality, that is to say the 
                                                          
1 Bhopa, the Rajasthani storyteller, means ‘sorcerer’ (McLain, 2009, 54). Nevertheless, some scholars contest 
this term as the bhopa has minor priestly functions and does not fall into trances. 
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world of objects, of things, as persons is considered by the majority as an absurdity. In modern 
Western culture, artefacts are seen as the opposite of subjectivities imbued by agency. Things are 
used by actors and not vice versa. Materiality is, thus, identified with passivity. A similar process 
is experienced by other entities which have come to be considered, or not, as fully entitled as 
persons, such as animals, children, female humans, physically and mentally impaired, non-
Western populations. In each case, their agencies would depend or would have been dependent 
upon Western, male humans, perfect prototypes of the notion of citizen. Citizenship coincides with 
the faculty of using the passive Other in order to reach individual purposes, hence the idea of 
private property. With the fights won by civil rights, the notion of citizenship and the similar idea 
of personhood has been progressively expanded and nowadays, with the animal rights 
movements, the rise of post-humanist studies and the new ethics of vegetarianism and veganism, 
even animals and plants have been problematised and deconstructed as nonhuman categories. 
Passage to a life fully acknowledged has developed from rejecting the belief that animals can be 
used to the advantage of humans in the same way as artefacts are. The ability of objects to conduct 
an independent and autonomous life is still underestimated as they are understood as passive, 
silent, and inert. Materiality is still viewed as a human projection, even in scholarly works, such as 
Gell’s, where non-Western or animistic belief in objects’ active role in the relationships with 
humans is at the centre of the argumentations.  
In the attribution of personal qualities to the material artefacts, Gell confirms the general 
humanistic paradigm, even though he introduces for the first time the thought that objects can be 
the performers of a social action. In this new intersubjective turn of anthropology, objects become 
metaphors for an existential state, that of the neglected or the deprived of agency. This 
predominance of the human is evident in the work of other authors, such as Jackson, one of the 
most important exponents of phenomenological anthropology. In his concept of intersubjectivity, 
the human transcends the borders of personhood to absorb nonhuman actors, nonetheless the 
separation between an active agent and a passive entity has never been challenged. Jackson (1998, 
7) singles out three useful features of intersubjectivity. First, this notion assists in the description of 
non-Western societies, where individuals develop from the relationships with the nonhuman and 
the Other-than-I, instead of being the result of an ontological category. Second, intersubjectivity 
becomes useful in approaching ‘preliterate thought’, where the ‘extrapsychic’ coincides with the 
‘intrapsychic’, such as for instance the unconscious which is located in a border zone between 
individuality and sociality, instead of being perceived as belonging to the inner state. Third, 
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intersubjectivity highlights two different and intertwining aspects of the subject, the empirical 
person, on the one hand, and abstract ideas, such as society, class, gender, and so on. By 
concurring with Sartre, Jackson (1998, 8) stresses how the single subject internalises and 
simultaneously transcends the collective set of cultural values temporally situated or ‘her epoch’. 
The ‘field of intersubjectivity’ (Jackson, 1998, 9), thus, unifies human and nonhuman and shows 
their existential interdependency, as the dyadic structure of intersubjectivity ‘is usually mediated 
by something outside of and alien to itself –a third party, a shared idea, a common goal’ (Jackson, 1998, 
9). By following Merleau-Ponty’s ontological disintegration of the I during perception, as in the 
example of the touching touched hands, Jackson’s intersubjectivity is characterised by a 
fundamental ambiguity and instability:  
the way our awareness continually drifts or oscillates between a retracted, substantive, 
and ontologically secure sense of self and a comparatively expanded and unstable sense of self 
in which one is sometimes fulfilled in being with another, at other times overwhelmed and 
engulfed (Jackson, 1998, 10). 
The Other and the Self, thus, are the outcomes of intersubjectivity, instead of being given 
essences (Jackson, 1998, 11). 
The field of intersubjectivity inescapably involves an ongoing reciprocal movement in 
consciousness between a sense of being a subject for oneself and being an object for others. 
A rejoinder to this point of view would be to admit that we often liken persons to things 
and things to persons, but that this should not be taken to imply that we confuse them. It is a 
matter of metaphor, so to speak, not a reflection of how we think things really are. 
[…]  
Thus while gifts and sacrifices serve to clear channels of communication, fetishes serve to 
monitor and reinforce boundaries where uncontrolled traffic jeopardizes a person’s sense of 
autonomy and threatens his or her security. The difference between fetish and gift is that the 
fetish withholds or prevents communication, sealing self off from other, while the gift opens 
and mediates communication (Jackson, 1998, 77-78). 
Authors such as Gell and Jackson, therefore, even though they acknowledge that human and 
nonhuman cannot be ontologically determined but, rather, are the result of a continually changing 
and mutual relationship, do not delete that dichotomy: the human and the nonhuman continue to 
be clearly distinguished and material agency’s meaning derives precisely from its acting as a 
person. 
To develop further the cognitive challenge opened by darśan, what is at stake in this research 
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is the question of whether materiality can escape from human intellectual and practical usage and, 
conversely, the reasons behind the anthropomorphisation of materiality by humans. The museum 
context is even more relevant for this purpose, as museum spaces are at the junction between 
linguistic, symbolic culture and material culture, between intellectual abduction from artefacts and 
sensuous (even though restricted to the visual) appreciation of them. By reviewing and 
theoretically contextualising fieldwork data testifying to the lack of a theory of material agency 
arising from the notion of personhood, this thesis reflects on the possible role of phenomenology in 
the social sciences. Ethnography and religious studies are still influenced by humanist and 
anthropocentric features in the elaboration of typological and binary accounts, where the supposed 
alterity of mind and body is continually reiterated. For instance, museums are conceived by some 
scholars, such as Paine (2013) and Duncan (1995), as post-secular spaces, where artefacts are 
secluded from the chain of exchange analysed by Appadurai and Kopytoff, in a fashion similar to 
the process of sacralisation of the objects displayed for a ritual context. In both cases, materiality is 
subjected to human agency. Following the dependence of materiality from human agency, 
materiality would not establish different relationships from those wanted by humans, as mind’s 
will would guide body.  
This theorisation of museums as potentially sacred spaces is problematised by fieldwork 
data acquired during the participant observation of museum galleries and the interviews with the 
curators.2 This research has found that, despite the efforts in constructing exhibitions according to 
material culture studies, museum artefacts are considered by curators to be dead, dry 
representations of something which can only be understood fully outside museum spaces, in this 
case in temples and religious performances. Participants in this research, mostly curators, believe 
that materiality (the material substance which constitutes the artefacts) must be bracketed in order 
to talk and express religious contents. Curators perceive with suspicion any intromission of 
rituality within museum cabinets. According to my interpretation of the data, rituality is 
something which must be domesticated, on the premise that educational process is the primary 
goal of a museum. In addition, religious artefacts are often reduced by curators or Western 
participants in general to aesthetic works, especially in the case of art museums, as will be 
explored in the fourth chapter. As this research will argue, while aestheticisation leads to an 
arbitrary and partial interpretation of religious objects, on the other hand this perspective is 
                                                          
2 The methodology used for the interviews was subjected to the ethical approval of the Ethics Committee of 
the University of Chester, before proceeding with fieldwork and interviews. The participants to this research 
viewed the final draft of this thesis and approved it. 
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familiar to post-secularism, since explicit religious references are denied in favour of a more 
general, mystical tone, that of the pure and uncontaminated beauty which must be revered by 
passive contemplation. Intriguingly, the emphasis on the transcendent concept of beauty is the 
mechanism that reduces Indian storytelling scrolls to the status of folk art and, thus, ancillary and 
imperfect in respect to Western ideals of high art. 
Darśan interferes with Western juxtaposition between mind and soul, upon which not only 
museums, but the entire Western culture, relies, by insinuating the doubt that museum artefacts 
are merely reifications of social, human features, containers of human culture from which visitors 
can strengthen their intellectual knowledge. By looking at scrolls, Hindu visitors touch the 
superhuman, develop a mystical union (see for instance Hughes & Wood, 2009, 36 and Elliott, 
2006), and so the common human patronizing of material object is inverted: artefacts guide 
humans. Even though Western curators and visitors do not engage with the intimacy with the 
divine as Hindu believers, nevertheless they cannot escape from this spiritual bond in their 
grasping meaning of the scrolls, as the interviews with them show. This leads me to an inquiry 
into the efficacy of Western cultural instruments for describing an approach which blurs 
boundaries between rational and irrational, mind and body, human and nonhuman, as well as 
problematises the usefulness of a category such as that of materiality. Phenomenology, as the 
study of the embodiments and incarnations, in its suggestion of a symbiosis or a hybridism 
between the perceiving and the perceiver seems to be the narrower means elaborated by European 
scholars for dealing with darśan. Because of the centrality of darśan in deconstructing the notion of 
materiality as elaborated by Western culture, phenomenology suggests a new methodological and 
theoretical framework for social sciences, until now committed to the subjection of the nonhuman 
to the human. Far from Derrida’s accusation of abstraction and metaphysics, phenomenology is 
considered in this thesis as an interesting contribution to social sciences.  
In order to better contextualise the scrolls observed in museum spaces during fieldwork, the 
following section of this introduction reviews the social and cultural features of the bards, the 
Bengali painter-storytellers patuas and the Rajasthani storytellers bhopas, first intermediaries 
between humans, superhumans and materiality. What the section will show is the religious 
connotation of storytellers’ activity in order to pinpoint the darśanic relationships created between 
the scrolls and their viewers. In so doing, materiality becomes a powerful actor in shaping 
religious and ritual spaces, as well as in justifying social roles. The final section of the introduction 




The patuas and the bhopas 
 
The anthropological literature refers to patuas and bhopas, as well as other Indian storytellers, 
as untouchables (SenGupta, 2012, 66). This common trait of storytellers is accompanied by the belief 
that painting is a sacred activity, the process of materialising the presence of the deities, of 
annihilating the distance between the ordinary and the supernatural realms, as the chapter three 
(sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) will show. As Douglas (2009 [1966]) in Purity and Danger claims, the 
activities centred around the ritual and the sacred entail a double and contrasting set of responses. 
On the one hand, handling the sacred creates a separation or an interdiction of the ordinary, and so 
the roles of the social actors within the ritual change. On the other hand, dealing with the sacred 
means also a degradation or the possibility of degrading the sacred because of the ordinary features 
of the actors engaged within the ritual. Materiality, thus, together with the adaptability of darśan to 
contexts different from that of the temple, gives to storytellers an ambiguous status, in tension 
between quasi-priestly functions and socially degraded roles. The ambiguity of storytellers is even 
more emphasised if we look at the fact that they create the possibility to reach the deities for the 
lowest, mostly rural, social strata, whose access to the orthodox temples is usually restricted. 
Furthermore, darśan via storytelling scrolls justifies the cult of tribal or regional deities: by 
representing them in the scrolls, storytellers give to these minor deities the importance of those in 
the Hindu pantheon, as well as the deities of the other religions present in India, first of all Islam. 
The holders of the Bengali storytelling tradition are the patuas,3 an artisan caste (jat) 
                                                          
3 The synonym of patua is patidar and both terms derive from the noun pat, an Austro-Asiatic word entered 
into Sanskrit, which means cloth, silk or jute and ‘gradually assumed the additional meaning of ‘picture 
support’’ (Kaiser, 2012, 12), the Bengali prefix ua, in the case of patua, and the Persian prefix dar, in the case of 
patidar. Both the prefixes mean holder (McCutchion & Bhowmik, 1999, 3-5). Another term used to indicate 
the painter-storytellers is chitrakar, which is the Sanskrit translation of patua (Hauser, 1998, 183; Chatterji, 
2012, 43). However, Kaiser (2012, 12) signals that this term is part of the Bengali language and is the 
compound by chitra or citra, ‘any sort of pictorial work’, and kara, ‘‘to make’ or ‘to do’’. Dutt (1999, 82-83) 
gives a detailed account of the phases of the realisation of a scroll: ‘First stage. Glue is prepared by boiling 
crushed rice. A sheet of paper intended to be used for the preparation of a pat is washed with water and 
spread out on a smooth wooden board. Rice glue is applied on the surface of the paper. Another sheet of 
paper is washed and spread out on the first sheet and made same way as that of the first sheet. Ten or twelve 
sheets of paper are successively glued and placed one on another to form a thick pad. Second stage. The pad 
is rubbed hard on the wooden board with a stone pestle so that the layers get permanently stuck to each 
other and form one compact sheet. Third stage. Several similar compact pads are prepared and successively 
joined at the ends so as to form one long scroll. The joints are rubbed hard on the wooden board to make 
them fast. Fourth stage. The scroll is spread out in the open on several successive nights to be soaked with 
dew, and is rubbed hard every morning. Fifth stage. To secure the scroll against tearing at the two long edges 
a strip of cloth or a wide sari border is stuck with glue to each long edge on the underside. White is first 
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predominant in the Medinipur, Murshidabad, Birbhum (according to Bhattacharjee, 1980, XIX, this 
district would have the highest population of patuas, who are furthermore the most famous) and 
Purulia districts (Jain & Aggarwala, 1989, 106). The bhopas, or ‘devotee perfomers’ (Wickett, 2010, 
3),4 were a seminomadic and endogamic community of storytellers who controlled an area of ten 
villages dominated by a ruler in the area of Rajasthan (Wickett, 2010, 3). After the independence of 
India, they started to conduct a sedentary life by settling within the dhanis, or enclaves in the towns’ 
outskirts (Wickett, 2010, 3). However, they can return to the nomadic life when they are no longer 
supported by patrons, mostly Rebarī or Raika camel-rearing nomads (Wickett, 2010, 3).  
Colonial sources first raise the issue of the patuas’ contradictory religious identity.5 In 1891, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
applied over the whole surface to be painted, after the chalk (khadi) has been mixed in a solution of rice glue. 
This is called khadi deoā. The next step is called chhaka or rough marking of the outlines of the designs with 
āltā or shellac die. The spaces in which it is intended to draw the figures are next painted yellow. […] After 
this, outlines of the figures are marked in blue-black, called mayūrkanthī neel, or ‘peacock-neck blue’. The 
general background which has hitherto been left white, is painted with the colour intended to be given to it. 
Red is a favourite colour for the figures of the pat. After the painting is finished, the pat is exposed to the dew 
on three or four evenings’. The patuas of Bengal avail themselves with a repertoire of traditional songs 
through which they plan and unfold pictures (Singh, 1998, 110). During a sung performance, the roles are 
subdivided into the soloist (payārdar), the refrain singer (duyādar), and the choir (Hauser, 1998, 88-90). The 
verses (pherangan) follow a metrical structure characterised by fourteen syllables, called chanda (Hauser, 
1998, 164). According to McCuthchion and Bhowmik (1999, 122), however, the most frequent metre of the 
patuas’ songs is composite (Payar or Mishra Vitta), followed by the syllabic (Dala Vritta), created for dancing 
and community, indigenous songs (McCuthchion & Bhowmik, 1999, 123) and the moric metre (Kala Vritta), 
which is that used in the Sanskrit classics (McCuthchion & Bhowmik, 1999, 123). The composite metre was 
born from a combination of the syllabic metre with the moric one and became well-established in the 14th 
century (McCuthchion & Bhowmik, 1999, 124). Despite the musical accompaniment, the patuas’ 
performances are chiefly visual. The unveiling of the scroll to the audience (pata-dekhaba) is core to the 
performance (Singh, 1998, 108). While singing, the patua opens the scroll in correspondence to the scene 
narrated with the help of bamboo sticks. This performance is called jorano pata (Ghosh, 2003, 844), in order to 
distinguish it from the pata-chitra or chala-chitra (in McCutchion & Bhowmik, 1999, 7 jorano is also called 
gutano and chala-chitra is called chauka), a semi-circular or rectangular panel which depicts a single episode 
(Sen, 1994, 18). According to Bhowmik (1989, 12), the Sahibpat is the most complicated to interpret jorano pat, 
related to revolutions of Santhal and Chuar. The shape and dimensions of the panels are strictly related to 
the type of narration and the pictorial frame. For instance, the episodes in the jorano patas are organised 
along a linear narrative structure leading to a climax, so that the painter can dedicate more space to personal 
improvisations (Jain, 1998, 12). 
4 In contrast with the patuas, the bhopas do not paint the paṛs on their own, rather their patrons commission 
the painting to the citeros, painters belonging to the Josī caste and settled in south-east Rajasthan, mostly in 
the towns of Bhilwara and Shahpura (Srivastava, 1994, 597; Smith, 1991, 9). 
5 According to Bhattacharjee’s informants, whose theories are reported in Kaiser (2012, 43), the patuas’ 
religious oscillation between Islam and Hinduism may well have a historical root. During the Mughal period, 
in order to avoid the pool tax (jizya) imposed to non-Muslim subjects, the patuas would have converted 
themselves to Islam without, however, a complete assimilation to Muslim society because of their 
dependence on Hindu patrons. The patuas’ birth, then, was caused by the market expansion and the 
subsequent specialisation of their activities, because of which the artisans were affiliated to specific 
subgroups or shreni (SenGupta, 2012, 38). In addition, the patrilineal patuas (Bhattacharjee, 1980, 45) present 
an infra-caste structure which is not inferred from religious identity (SenGupta, 2012, 50),5 despite the Hindu 
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Risley’s The Tribes and Castes of Bengal describes the patuas as ‘very lax in their religious practices’ 
(Hauser, 1998, 12). Although they do not respect the Qur’anic precept not to represent living beings 
(Saeed, 2007), the patuas have a worldview formed by beliefs and practices from both Hinduism 
and Islam.6 This seems to be confirmed by a foundational myth. According to the version given to 
Dutt by an informant in 1930, the ancestor of the patuas portrayed Mahadev (Shiva) without the 
god’s approval. Shiva found this out, and, in panic, the poor painter swallowed his brush. Because 
of his polluting act, Mahadev condemned the painter to be a Muslim. However, since such a 
decision entailed the renouncing of their main source of profit, the god softened himself and 
decided patuas would be neither Muslim nor Hindu (Chatterji, 2012, 42; compare Bhattacharjee, 
1980, 3). Following the version of Chatterji’s informant given in 2008, the patuas’ transgression 
derives from their painting of erotic scenes between Shiva and Parvati (Chatterji, 2012, 42). In the 
Brahmavaivarta Purana of the 13th century, patuas were degraded because they denied the traditional 
norms of representing gods (Chatterji, 2012, 42; compare Chakraborty, 1989, 9). Kaiser (2012, 34, 41) 
reports the accounts of two informants, respectively Kinkar Chitrakar, a jado-patua, and 
Dukhushyam Chitrakar, one of the most famous patuas in Naya village, which offer once again a 
different explanation of the patuas’ origin.7 
[Kinkar is using the Mahabharata as a source] When Abhimanyu died on the war-charriot, 
Arjun couldn’t bear it. Then what happened? Then God created a chitragupta [the scribe of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
influence (SenGupta, 2012, 54), and has the village, panchayat, as the socio-political unit (SenGupta, 2012, 56). 
While the chitrakar patuas, the real painters, constitute the highest level of the hierarchy, the others are related 
with itinerant occupations, such as treating female diseases and abortions (SenGupta, 2012, 51, 52). The 
lowest caste, the maskata patua, cannot have intercourse with the chitrakar patuas (SenGupta, 2012, 52). During 
the colonial period, chiefly because of the application of a divide et impera strategy, patuas tried to justify their 
Hindu origins by means of traditional texts. In the Brahmavaivarta Purana there is a systematic analysis of 
Bengali castes and their origins (Hauser, 1998, 186; Ghosh, 2003, 865; Chatterji, 2012, 42). Nonetheless, patuas 
maintained their double surname, Hindu and Muslim, depending upon the religious target of customers 
(Ghosh, 2003, 865). Taxonomic research is further complicated by the lack of a rigid identification of patuas as 
a professional painters’ caste and the existence of several sub-castes whose hierarchy varies even from village 
to village. (Chatterji, 2012, 43). The patuas’ activity is associated with that of begging (bhiksā karā), hence the 
patuas’ ambiguity towards their social condition, since begging in Hindu society entails both a way of living 
by making a work for a paying patron and a sign of degradation (Hauser, 2002, 110). This ambiguity is 
reflected in the patuas’ contemporary songs, such as this: ‘Listen, babu, listen to what I say/Get me cloth from 
your home./Don’t be feeble, babu, in giving money or rice,/Your name will be sing through the world./If you 
don’t give, babu, let me tell you,/You scrape empty rice pots, I will tell the whole village (translated from 
Singh, 1998, 114)’ (Ghosh, 2003, 866). 
6 ‘Patuas live as outcastes and are treated as untouchables. To escape from this miserable plight they 
embraced Islam which promised social and religious equality. So while the men went to the mosques to 
pray, the women observed Hindu rites’ (Chakraborty, 1989, 10). 
7 ‘Coomaraswamy mentions that the Pata painters of Bengal are descendent from the ancient painters 
belonging to the Buddhist community who were later absorbed into the Hindu society and given the status 
of Shudras’ (Sharma, 1994, 20). 
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Yama, the death’s god]… That chitragupta went out, with a picture of Abhimanyu. That is what 
happened. It was then, when chitragupta was created vishvakarma created us. What did he do 
then? At that time there were not so many people. So at that time chitragupta drew Abhimanyu. 
He went there and showed the (35) drawing to Arjun: ‘See. This is your son’s photo (Eng.); I 
snapped it!’ And when he showed Abhimanyu to Arjun, the latter found peace. So whoever 
dies –his picture is drawn. When old Pilchu [Pilchu Haram; the Santal’s ancestor author’s note] 
died –in those days there was no paper. On sal leaves it [the drawing of the deceased] was taken 
to his house. Then there his son gave gifts, and with that our origin began. And so it has gone 
on. […] This continued age after age. This narrative roots in the Sathya Yug. 
A patua killed a devil. […] He, after killing he goes and says, ‘I have killed a demon’. No 
one believes. How will one believe? He took the demon’s hair, his teeth, a part of his body to 
show to the people. But it is impossible to carry the entire dead body. Then some people –those 
were intellectuals of those days –they told him: ‘You come back with drawn picture of him!’ So 
he went back, sat there and drew a picture of him. He used to go from village to village. That 
used to help him out in order to maintain his family. From then only… Now no one will see the 
same things again and again in the village. Then they told him: ‘Ok, since you could draw that, 
then now draw something on Rama. Ramayana, Mahabharata.’ In this way one after another, 
one after another, that is from forefathers the way they know, we also know the same way. The 
way you know, my son will also know the same way. There is no second way to it. 
According to Smith’s informant, Paṛbū Bhopo, the epic text of Pābūjī was originally a written 
text (Pābūprakāśa) composed by the high-caste poets of the Rajpūts (Cāraṇs) and kept in Pābūjī’s 
temple in Koḷū (Smith, 1991, 18). According to Paṛbū, the Nāyaks, who were corrupted Rajpūts, 
started to memorise and orally transmit the text (Smith, 1991, 18). 
The earliest sources confirming the existence of the patuas can be found in Sanskrit texts 
(Hindu, Buddhist and Jain) dating from the 3rd century CE (Jain, 1998, 11). In Vishakhadatta’s 
Mudrarakshsa (Jain, 1988, 10) and Bana’s Harshacharitam8 (Jain, 1988, 11) picture showmen are called 
yama pattika. Fruzzetti and Östör (2007, 11) add that they are described in the first play as 
exhibiting yama patas, or scrolls depicting the punishment of hell. In the commentary of the 
Buddhist Samytta Nikaya, the mobile pictures of some heretical Brahmins, or charanchitra, are 
mentioned. Jain literature gives an even more detailed account of the patuas. In the Aupapatika 
Sutra, circa 3rd-5th century CE, two different names are used to distinguish between painters-
storytellers (mankla) and bards (magaha) (Fruzzetti & Östör, 2007, 8). The Kavalayamala, 8th century 
                                                          
8 Zvabitel (1976, 146) dates it back to the 7th century. 
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CE, recounts the adventures of an itinerant master painter, who showed a panel about the universe 
cycle, a samsarachakra, to a Jain monk (Fruzzetti & Östör, 2007, 9).9  
Engravings in stone panels of the 2nd century BCE have been found in Bharhut (Madhya 
Pradesh), and, it seems they may be the direct ancestors of the paper scrolls used by the patuas 
(Kramrisch, 1968, 70). These engravings, historically situated after the Mauryas empire, 
particularly from 185 BCE to 520 CE (Avari, 2007, 165), confirm the renovation process of Buddhist 
monasteries during the Shunga rule (Kulke & Rothermund, 2004, 86), and are characterised by ‘a 
new style of relief sculpture’ (Kulke & Rothermund, 2004, 86). 
The origin of the patuas as a caste is firmly linked to the eclectic cultural-religious context of 
the Middle Ages in the subcontinent, when several theatrical expressions developed. This is 
particularly evident in Bengal, where, from the 13th century until the birth of the Mughal Empire in 
the 16th century (Hauser, 1998, 182), the penetration of Islam favoured cultural syncretism. From 
the beginning of the 15th century, the mangalkabyas (auspicious poems), a significant corpus of epic-
narrative poetry became prevalent.10 This genre, hugely popular in rural Bengal (Chatterjee, 2008, 
517), was musically accompanied, sung and sometimes graphically rendered by means of painted 
scrolls. It is not a coincidence that the narration of these kabyas is based on legendary events aiming 
to justify the presence of a particular goddess (Chatterjee, 2008, 517).11 SenGupta (2012, 39) states, 
indeed, that religious propaganda usually employs a pre-existing myth in order to popularise the 
new deities. 
The extreme social variety and religious hybridism of the patuas became a problem with the 
end of British colonialism. On the one hand, patuas were considered a genuine folk expression, but 
on the other hand, the Muslim faith of some of them was perceived as dangerous for some 
nationalistic movements tending to identify the future nation of India as the land of the Hindus. 
Therefore, during the 1920s and 1930s, many patua groups were forcibly converted by The Society 
for the Advancement of the Chitrakars of Bengal (Bangiya Chitrakar Unnayan Samiti). At the conversion 
                                                          
9 Jain mentions other Buddhist and Jain texts. However, I have chosen the most significant ones in order to 
show how patuas were referred to in the past. 
10 ‘Yama was the subject matter of scroll paintings from the very beginning of time to the medieval period. 
But in the medieval period, in order to earn more money from the so-called Bengali Brahminical society, 
some of the Patuas started to draw on the Mangal Kavyas’ (McCutchion & Bhowmik, 1999, 20). ‘The narrative 
is classified as mangal kavya, a Bengali genre of long poems (kavyas), ‘the reciting of which promises well-
being (mangal) and frequently refers to competition between deities or the religions associated with them’ –in 
this case the contest between Shiva and Manasa’ (Kaiser, 2012, 148). 
11 During the same period a local and literary version of the Ramayana – attributed to Krttibas Ojha (circa 
1381–1461) –also circulated (Ghosh, 2003, 844). 
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rituals (variously called shuddhi, yajna, dharma sabhā) the patuas were given the surname of 
Chitrakar12 (Hauser, 1998, 183; Chatterji, 2012, 43). Furthermore, in the 1951 census the Bangiya 
Chitrakar Unnayam Samiti distributed a leaflet ‘urging the patuas to enrol themselves as Hindus’ 
(Bhattacharjee, 1980, XII). These measures did not have any substantial effect, however, since the 
majority of the patuas continued to be Muslim, despite keeping the surname Chitrakar (Chatterji, 
2012, 43). In addition, inclusivism was a dominant trend. In Hindu Samajer Garan (1949) by the 
Bengali sociologist N.K. Bose, a model for the absorption of tribal culture into mainstream 
Hinduism was suggested (Chatterji, 2009, 56), whereas in the 1930s the Bengali scholar G. S. Dutt 
began ethnographic research among patuas, and collected several scrolls. His collection resulted in 
an exhibition in Kolkata for The Indian Society of Oriental Art in 1932 (Hauser, 1998, 12, 219). 
The art of the patuas, heavily syncretistic in nature, has been influenced by a number of 
traditions, genres, practices and beliefs (Hauser, 1998, 155). An example of the continuous 
influence of different local artistic expressions is that of the Kalighat paintings. Kalighat pictures 
were created between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th by some patuas who 
settled around the main Kali-mandir in Kolkata (Jain & Aggarwala, 1989, 107).13 However, other 
artisan castes were involved in the realisation of the Kalighat painting. In particular, it is interesting 
to see how the sutradhar (carpenters) influenced the volumetric style of the Kalighat, which made 
them closer to the theatrical forms, and also had the function of emphasising the satirical tone of 
the representations (Jain, 1999, 13, 24). These paintings, then, combined the established pictorial 
representation of the goddesses with new artistic means (e.g. theatre, cinema and photography) 
that developed during the days of the British Raj. The underlying intention was that of criticising 
mass media and presenting them as destroyers of the traditional social balances (Ghosh, 2003, 864). 
Because of that original combination of East and West, Kalighat pictures attracted Western trade, 
owing to the printing press, and later became known as bazaar pictures (Jain & Aggarwala, 1989, 
107). In particular, with the introduction of the railway and the subsequent increase of pilgrims, 
there was a ‘souvenir trade’ boom (Jain, 1999, 40). The social critique of the Kalighat painters 
borrows heavily from their heterogeneous background. Considering the different religious 
traditions in Bengal –Islam and its mystical tradition (Sufism), Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, and 
                                                          
12 In my research, I have always used the term patua instead of chitrakar, as other scholars do, in preference 
for the vernacular expression patuas used to describe themselves over the Sanskrit translation. 
13 The patuas who established themselves in Calcutta, especially in the nearby Kalighat temple, were and 
have been Hindu and the majority of them came from the South-Western Bengali group, today 
corresponding to the district of Midnapur. In Bankura and Purulia they are known as patidar, whereas in 
Birbhum they are termed chitrakar (Jain, 1999, 49). 
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Tantrism –the patuas learnt how to interpret and handle different, often contrasting, ethical 
interpretations of reality with the purpose of transmitting sacred and divine rules, as chapter three 
(section 3.2.2) will show.  
The contents of the story (patgan) comprise two categories: puranik (ancient) episodes from 
Hindu mythology, and adhunik (contemporary) tales taken from ordinary life, i.e. social criticism, 
communalism, etc. (Hauser, 1998, 155). Dutt (1999, 70, 71) establishes, however, three types of pats: 
those centred around the Rama-līlā, then everything related to the heroic and practical aspects of 
life; those depicting the Krishna-līlā, or the romantic, idealistic life and spiritual devotion (bhakti); 
and those dealing with metaphysical themes and Tantric philosophy. Besides, particular pats are 
dedicated to folk-deities who are usually associated with martial medieval heroes, such as 
Bāghaidevatā, Satyapīr and Badekhān Gāzi, known for defending the Bengali population from the 
Mughals or demanding fees for their feuds by deploying an army of tigers, (Dutt, 1999, 75, 76). In 
particular, Badekhān Gāzi has a specific type of scrolls, called Gāzir pats (Dutt, 1999, 76). Since Gāzir 
is employed in Eastern Bengali in order to describe a long and incoherent speech, it is probable 
that these scrolls were in the past rather long (Dutt, 1999, 76). In the 1970s, according to Kaiser 
(2012, 47), a new ‘sub-category’ was added, that of the social (samajik), with collaborations and 
works with NGOs and political parties in promoting ‘social criticism’. 
The main epics narrated by the bhopas are those of Pābūjī and Devanārāyaṇ.14 To be more 
specific, there are two types of bhopas in the Devanārāyaṇ’s epic, the first one dedicated to the 
administration of the shrine, and the second one gravitating around the paṛ (scroll):  
The story of the creation of the institutions of the ochre-colad (bhekdhārī) and the scroll-
bearing (paṛdhārī) bhopās […]. […] their ochre-clad, celibate counterparts, who control not only 
the administration of shrines and temples but ultimately also the activities of the former. The 
context of the story is provided by a “competition” between famous physician, Baidnāth Bābā, 
and Devanārāyaṇ. After curing hundreds of individuals who have been afflicted by leprosy, 
Devanārāyaṇ challenges the physician to do the same or at least to cure his son, Bīlā of the 
disease. In this manner the story also highlights Devanārāyaṇ’s sovereignity over matters 
relating to physical healing (Malik, 2005, 41). The paṛ narration can also be found in Gujarat, 
Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh (Mair, 1988, 95-96). 
The paṛ narration differs from other types of storytelling, such as jhurave ganewale and the 
                                                          
14 The bhopas who narrate the Devanārāyaṇ epic belong principally to the castes of Kumhārs (potters), Gūjars 
(cattle-keepers and farmers) or Balais (weavers) (Mair, 1988, 95-96), while the bhopas linked to the Pābūjī 
constitute the low castes of the Thoris (Singh, 1980, 162) or of the Nāyaks (Smith, 1989, 30). 
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mata (drum) epic, not only because of the specific musical accompaniment, as will be seen, but also 
for the elements of the worship which opens the performance (Srivastava, 1994, 601). Pābūjī 
belongs to bhomiyos, or local heroes venerated as minor deities after their death (Malik, 2005, 70-
71). More particularly, Pābūjī is a medieval warrior prince, but also an incarnation of Lakșmaṇa, 
Rama’s brother and a folk-god especially worshipped by shepherds and camel-herders Rebārī 
(Smith, 1989, 30). It is likely that the necessity of linking Pābūjī with the puranic gods was due to 
the desire to confer a higher status to him (Smith, 1991, 99). In fact, images sculpted in stone of 
Pābūjī and his courtiers riding horses are worshipped all around Rajasthan and are present in 
several family temples (Mondini, 2013, 53). Pābūjī is a Hindu warrior who resists and defeats ‘the 
barbaric cow-killing Muslim ruler Mirzā Khān’, protecting women from his attack (Smith, 1991, 4). 
Despite his role, Pābūjī follows the principle of nonviolence (ahimsā), and his strength derives from 
his sexual continence (Smith, 1991, 4) because, due to his involvement in battle, Pābūjī’s marriage 
has been delayed several times and is not completed. His wife follows his ascetic attitude by 
becoming a sati. Pābūjī is, in fact, an incarnated god, born from a celestial nymph (Smith, 1991, 8). 
Devanārāyaṇ can be distinguished from Pābūjī in the paṛ, as he is always depicted with a 
snake in front of him and seated on Śeṣ. Furthermore, his paṛ is much longer than that of Pābūjī 
(Singh, 1980, 162). Devanārāyaṇ is a mythical and godly figure, son of the very first human pair’s 
incarnation, who freed the cows from the Rajput ruler of Rāṇ City as both incarnations of Rāma 
and Rāvana (Malik, 2005, 103).15 By combining the notion of avatāra with that of yugas, or time 
cycles, the cult of Devanārāyaṇ, as well as that of Pābūjī, I would add, is extended in temporal 
terms (Malik, 2005, 92), thus evoking their presence in the present (Malik, 2005, 45). It is 
emblematic that ‘the cloth of Devanārāyaṇ’s coat is extended to accommodate the size and 
dimensions of a paṛ’ (Malik, 2005, 40), which is therefore ‘connected to Devanārāyaṇ’s apparel.’ 
(Malik, 2005, 41). The narration consists of a deconstruction of the pictures and a reconstruction of 
their meaning, hence the paṛ cannot be read such as a book or codified such as an art work, rather 
it is understood by paṛẵ kā lekh, writing on the paṛ, which is the intersection of images and sung 
words (Malik, 2005, 15). All this is more understandable once the epic of Pābūjī has been analysed. 
The bhopas’ performance is referred to with the two expressions ‘pābūjī rī paṛ vẵcṇo’ (‘reading 
Pābūjī’s paṛ’) and ‘pābūjī rā paṛvāṛā (‘Pābūjī’s story-episodes’) (Smith, 1991, 14). There are two types 
of epic, paṛ-epic and māţā-epic. The first is performed by a bhopa of the Nāyak caste and his wife 
                                                          
15 ‘The Bagaṛāvat […] narrates the adventures of the 24 sons of Bāghjī: all of them are slain in battle by Rāṇājī, 
and Devanārāyaṇ, the son of one of them, avenges the death of his father and his brothers’ (Singh, 1980, 162). 
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(bhopi). The bhopa is the lead singer and plays a kind of fiddle (rāvaṇhattho) while dancing, whereas 
the bhopi illuminates the paṛ with an oil lamp and sings the accompaniment (Smith, 1991, 14). The 
singing (gāv) is interspersed with the explanation (arthāv) (Smith, 1991, 14). The second is 
characterised by a group of bhopas, two of whom play drums (māṭā) (Smith, 1991, 14). The time 
when the Raika are coming back with their livestock is considered sacred, as it is the confluence 
between night and day, and it is properly during this time that the performance can take place.16 
The epic is composed of an ensemble of paṛvāṛos, the episodes of the epic (not surprisingly, 
paṛvāṛo means battle), and sāyls, or the stories of miracles operated by Pābūjī, either during the epic 
or after his ascent to heaven, in order to help a suppliant (hence its meaning, petition) (Smith, 1991, 
19). The sāyls are sung only in the paṛ-epic and during the episodes of Gogo and Pābūjī’s 
weddings, during which the bhopas perform songs of invocation to the deities invited to these 
ceremonies (Smith, 1991, 20). A precise metrical beat accompanies each episode(Smith, 1991, 31-
32). Smith (1989, 31) compares the performance of the storytelling to a road-journey, since the 
narrator knows how the story ends, but also all the different routes he can use to approach it: the 
destination is ‘fixed’ but he has some freedom of choice. 
The paṛ reveals a specific pattern, which does not correspond to a concrete geographic map: 
the courts of Pābūjī and his allies or friends are in the centre of the paṛ and are surrounded by the 
courts in which the marriage-relations are established, while the terrains of the villains’ are placed 
at the extremes of the paṛ (Smith, 1991, 65-66). In the case of Devanārāyaṇ, who is at the centre of 
the paṛ as the cosmological nucleus, the juxtaposition of the pictures in the paṛ determines kinship 
and temporality. The closer a character is to Devanārāyaṇ as kin, the closer the former is to the 
centre of the paṛ. Devanārāyaṇ’s ancestors are placed on the left of the cloth, and those 
contemporary with Devanārāyaṇ are found on the right of the paṛ (Malik, 2005, 51). Thus, the paṛ 
represents a cosmological map, where the forces of good and evil are placed in the world and 
opposed in an epic battle (Smith, 1991, 65-66). This symbolic pattern mirrors the ‘double 
accountability’ (Smith, 1991, 94) of the epic: Devanārāyaṇ and Pābūjī are not just the worldly 
protagonists of a story, but also godly incarnations, and they have to contend with both these 
instances: 
The two opposing forces which bring them into being are well recognized in Sanskrit epic 
literature, where they are known as daiva ‘that which comes from the gods’, i.e. Fate, and 
                                                          
16 According to a scholar during an interview. 
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pauruṣa ‘that which comes from a man’, i.e. human will (Smith, 1991, 96).17 
The double accountability of the two epics has also a temporal ground: the human motive, 
explicit in the narrative, is influenced by past events, while the cosmic one, not explicit, alludes to a 
future fulfilment (Smith, 1991, 94; cfr. Miller, 1980, 117). Therefore, it can be said that ‘The Bhopa 
makes a “sacred journey over the space organized in the paṛ,” by alternating the sung part (ghav) 
with an explanation of it (arthav) which brings the audience in the contemporary times’ 
(Srivastava, 1994, 601). Thus, space and time are interchangeable (Malik, 2005, 47). This alternation 
and, at the same time, co-presence of the human and superhuman elements is exemplified by the 
treatment given to the paṛ and by the bhopa’s performances. 
  
                                                          
17 The Pābūjī epic has both the historical elements of the brigandish accounts and the ahistorical 
characteristics of myth-making, therefore the narrator should explain the link between the two realms (‘the 
high purpose’), but not all the bhopas have the skills to do that (Smith, 1980, 54). However, Mondini (2013) 
criticises the theory of the brigandish accounts. 
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Plan of the work 
 
As the previous section has shown, darśan’s flexibility permits the creation of rituals among 
low castes and social strata, and in so doing materiality empowers patuas and bhopas with a new 
agency, in order to bring social issues as well as representations into consideration, rather than 
permitting them to remain overlooked and silent. The deconstruction of the category of materiality 
entails, thus, an egalitarian inclusivism, such as that wished by Braidotti (2013), where human and 
nonhuman are intermingled. However, as the starting paragraphs of the first section of this 
introduction pinpoint, darśan means also an anthropomorphisation of the material, which reflects 
Western repetition compulsion in thinking the nonhuman within the notion of personhood. The 
thesis aims, therefore, to identify the historical, cultural and cognitive mechanisms according to 
which the nonhuman has been presented as either the opposite or an imitation of personhood, as 
well as to offer the instruments for a deconstruction of the notion of materiality. This notion, in 
fact, is implied in every bipolarisation of reality, e.g. the sacred and the profane, mind and body, 
rational and irrational, etc., as it acts as the counterpart of what is established as human and, thus, 
secluded, protected from the nonhuman, which is defined as object-like. In order to deconstruct 
materiality, it will be necessary to describe the dynamics by which humans enter into contact with 
the nonhuman and, because of that encounter, define their identity as separated and totally other 
from the nonhuman.  
Phenomenology, as the study of perception and knowledge of the entirely new, represents a 
two-fold useful instrument in this investigation. On the one hand, phenomenology is an 
intersubjective appraisal of materiality by the researcher’s body. It is not just an abstract 
theorisation, but rather it is experiencing on my own skin, with my own flesh, with my own 
embodiment and dwelling in space and time how materiality is represented and treated as such. 
By becoming a visitor of museum spaces, I, as researcher and as a perceiver, testify which the 
effects of curators’ usage of materiality are on museum experience. Thus, the common points 
between my personal reification of materiality and that of the curators can sustain a general 
theorisation of how Western culture deals with materiality. In addition, the discrepancies between 
my experience of museum artefacts and curators’ goals illuminate the resistance of materiality to 
human actions. On the other hand, phenomenology, corroborated by post-humanist studies or 
authors such as Latour and Derrida, is the theoretical assumption from which the object/subject 
duality is deconstructed. 
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The first chapter, with an examination of Gell’s theory of material agency, will offer a 
starting point from which considering what still needs to be done in reframing the relationship 
between the human and the nonhuman and the category of materiality, as Gell’s work represents 
the last scholarly effort to think of materiality as active. In order to deconstruct the notion of 
materiality, the chapter will begin with analysing the common points between Western treatment 
of and reflection upon nature by following Merleau-Ponty’s work on the subject (2003 [c. 1956]). 
Merleau-Ponty’s reflection aids in the understanding of human difficulties in dealing with 
something which is totally alien to the intellect. It also helps to establish an equivalence with the 
human reception of materiality and, consequently, to identify the commonality between the 
human and the nonhuman.  
By describing the encounter between the I and the Other in phenomenological terms, the 
second chapter will build from this account the ethics adopted in my fieldwork, by suggesting, 
thus, the usefulness of a phenomenological lens in anthropology. The chapter will analyse how the 
anthropomorphisation into which Gell fell is developed within the relationships between the I and 
the Other, understood as both the nonhuman and the other-than-I human. The act of gaze, far from 
being a passive and disembodied activity, becomes central in the process of awareness of the Self 
and of the Other. 
The third chapter will define the phenomenon of darśan by demonstrating how seeing is 
central in religious materiality and in building rituals. Darśan, in fact, creates a ritual relationship 
in unsuspected contexts, such as that of the comic books Amar Chitra Katha, or gives religious 
features to marginalised social strata, such as those of storytellers, who acquire priest-like 
functions. Through a comparison with Christian rituals where the belief in the ‘animistic power’ 
(Faure, 1998) of the visual occurs, the chapter will also prepare the ground for the analysis, in the 
fourth chapter, of the process of secularisation to which seeing has been subjected in Western 
modern culture.  
The fourth chapter, then, will focus on the gaze as a way to navigate the Western approach to 
materiality. The detachment of seeing from its ritual connotation has originated with Latour’s 
(2010) dichotomy between a fetishisation of materiality, on the one hand, and a reified idea of the 
material, on the other hand, such as an objectification of a social structure or of an ideal of beauty. 
The disciplines of aesthetics and museography demonstrate this conflicting juxtaposition: they 
both refer to materiality, which is collected and dissected, in order to find proofs of abstract 
structures, with the final goal of elevating human intellect. Museums, in particular, are the 
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epicentres of this opposition between a rational theory and an irrational practice or reality. 
Fieldwork has demonstrated, in fact, that curators appreciate storytelling scrolls as examples of 
ethnographic theories or pure art works, in contrast with the belief that they are the temples and 
the icons of the deity depicted. This process of aestheticisation, or intellectualisation, which occurs 
in the scrolls impedes an anthropological understanding of them by the visitors. In addition, that 
process is once for all the demonstration of the fact that museum artefacts are revered by Western 
culture in a post-secular way, by following the theory of the art-as-such (Abrams, 1985), where art 
is adored for its own sake as it provides spiritual deliverance. 
The fifth and final chapter will show materiality’s resistance to human projection and 
intellectualisation by using the fieldwork data to problematise museums as spaces of religious 
experience. Some authors, such as Paine (2013), use the category of the sacred and of the profane in 
describing museums as post-secular spaces. According to these authors, the eradication of the 
artefacts from their contexts of production means the construction of a ritual space where they are 
no longer touched or exchanged. In contrast, fieldwork showed that the categories of the sacred 
and of the profane are inapt in describing situations where materiality overlaps the two realms and 
escapes from human control. This is clear in the recreations of Hindu and Buddhist religious 
contexts and places, such as altars, temples, chapels, etc. Whilst curators construct these spaces in 
order to clarify some cultural aspects such as darśan to the visitor, these recreations do more than 
informing visitors, to such an extent that people visit them as pseudo pilgrimage sites. The 
unusefulness of the categories of the sacred and of the profane derives precisely from the 
conviction that museum artefacts are under the control of curators, and therefore that materiality 
cannot be independent from the human: sacredness would be determined by human choice 
according to this idea. What reconstructions show, instead, is that the profane and the sacred 
overlap with each other as part of the fuzziness of the interaction between the human and the 
nonhuman during perception. 
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Chapter 1 





I was observing the pats belonging to a member of a cultural organisation in the UK which 
promotes Indian folk art in the art market, at the home of the owner. The pats were scrolled up and 
placed down on the floor. Suddenly, her little child appeared and looked at the scrolls with 
interest. His face depicted a clear desire to touch them, and he put his little toe on the frame of a 
pat with the intention of jumping on it. His mother shouted at him, saying that deities cannot be 
trampled on, they must be respected. Do the storytelling scrolls transmit this sense of respect in 
gallery spaces? How does darśan speak to museum curators and visitors? 
This chapter prepares the ground for the general argumentation of the thesis, the discussion 
of Western opposition between abstract, self-evident and intellectual notions and the concrete and 
irrational reality where humans have to deal with materiality and its cognitive challenges. The 
phenomenon of darśan, which concretely offers a case study in which the material artefacts shape 
and guide social relationships and ritual practices, represents a useful instrument by which to 
destabilise Western museum practices, which rely upon this dichotomy between ideas and reality. 
Fieldwork, then, constitutes a privileged point of view in the light of which I undertake a more 
general reflection on Western epistemologies and ontologies Particularly, the aim of the thesis is to 
find a way to think about material agency without relating it to human control, whose reasons, 
especially in terms of the necessity of human projection onto the nonhuman, are analysed and 
problematised. The main point which the thesis suggests is that the deconstruction of the concept 
of materiality leads to the problematising of the humanist paradigm, where the entire Western 
culture and epistemology is orientated and based upon the supremacy of the human being, as the 
main actor and perceiver of social relationships. As the introduction to this thesis has already 
suggested, phenomenology can represent a useful resource for the social sciences in dealing with 
empirical data where a substantial fusion and symbiosis between subject and object, perceiver and 
perceiving, occurs. The task of the current chapter is to take the overall argument further by 
analysing what is at stake in the anthropological debate on materiality, in order to theoretically 
frame my main argumentation and to help the reader locate my argument within that debate. In 
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particular, the chapter analyses Gell’s work as the latest attempt at thinking about materiality in 
terms of agency and, because of that, shows the level of persistency of the humanist paradigm in 
the contemporary, scholarly debate in the field of material culture studies. 
Materiality constitutes a problem, as it represents the totally Other from humans: it seems 
inert, as it cannot be animated if it is not moved by humans or animals. Likewise, it cannot be 
easily described by linguistic means, as its bond with humans pre-exists the birth of language. 
Therefore, materiality both resists and can be understandable only by means of humans’ projection 
on it. This quotation from Augé on African vodũ illustrates the core of the difficulty in dealing with 
materiality: 
Ce qui fait problème, c’est l’inerte, la matière brute. Ce qui fait problème et ce qui résiste. 
[…] L’impensable et, d’une certaine manière, la puissance sont du côté de l’inertie brute, de la 
pure matérialité. Le naturel, donc, c’est la vie –ce qui laisse penser que le surnaturel est du côté 
de l’inerte. Assez remarquables, de ce point de vue, sont les représentations des «fétiches» 
africains, toutes très proches de la matière brute; la caractère anthropomorphe y est à peine 
esquissé, comme une allusion à la necessité de comprendre quelche chose et, simultanément, à 
l’impossibilité d’y parvenir: comme s’il ne s’agissait que d’animer «au plus juste», juste pour 
comprendre l’inanimé, l’inflexible, l’inexorable, le déjà là18 (Augé, 1988, 30). 
The material object condenses social relations, laws and principles, as well as the imagined 
(e.g. the ancestors’ word) with the real. In so doing, the material object is a socially total object, as it 
expresses simultaneously all the phenomena and dynamics of a society (Augé, 1988, 143-144). The 
material object affirms and at the same time negates the boundaries between different individuals, 
as the social unity and subjects’ diversity are co-present in materiality, which suggests the 
necessity of overcoming individuality in order to originate sociality (Augé, 1988, 144). As Miller 
(2005, 2) says, humanity has always been conceived as ‘the position taken on the question of 
materiality’, specifically humans’ usage of the material in order to shape their identities. 
Anthropology rises from a reification of human subjects in social relations coinciding with 
materiality (Miller, 2005, 3). This is possible in virtue of the ‘humility of things’ (Miller, 2005, 5), 
                                                          
18 ‘What is problematic is the inert, the brute material. It is problematic and opposes resistance. […] The 
unthinkable and, in a certain way, the power are on the side of the brute inertia, of the pure materiality. The 
natural is thus life, and that makes us think that the supernatural is on the side of the inert. In this 
perspective, the representations of the African “fetishes” are very important, all of them close to the brute 
material. Their anthropomorphism is barely sketched, like an allusion to the necessity of understanding 
something and, simultaneously, the impossibility of succeeding: as if the point would be to animate “at the 
right point” in order to understand the unanimated, the inflexible, the inexorable, the already-there’ (my 
translation). 
39 
that is to say the tendency of objects’ social properties to resist conscious definitions and 
understandings and, therefore, to be strictly connected to the human unconscious (Miller, 1987, 
100). In other words, the more objects are not perceived as actors in social relations, the more 
materiality affects human actions and, conversely, the more humans recognise the impact of the 
material on their lives, the more they can intervene. 
Anthropological efforts in elucidating the intertwining of the material with the human are 
summarised by the question: ‘In what ways is agency, like animacy, also a distributed phenomenon, 
in which not only humans but also nonhumans are implicated?’ (Knappett, 2005, 23). Gell’s 
posthumous work Art and Agency. An Anthropological Theory (1998) represents the first and 
unsurpassed attempt to dismiss the Cartesian dichotomy between subject and object in favour of 
the entanglements and relational characteristics of the interactions between human and 
nonhuman: materiality is, for the first time, considered as an active entity in shaping and 
determining social relations. However, Gell’s paradigm does not radically challenge the notion of 
materiality as derived from and informed by the human category of personhood. As the example 
of the children’s play with toys will show (section 1.4), materiality, even though it means actively 
determining actions and relations, is thought to be controlled, in ultima ratio, by human will. The 
idea of personhood demonstrates, in this respect, human interference with nonhuman. In order to 
follow Gell’s revolutionary empowerment of materiality without remaining entrapped into an 
anthropocentric framework, this thesis adopts phenomenology, particularly Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception, as both its research methodology and theoretical framework by 
which the intellectual construction of materiality is problematised and deconstructed. In fact, 
perception and social phenomena are analysed by Merleau-Ponty beginning from the idea that 
reality is the result of the fusion between the perceived and the perceiver. The latter has just a 
specific and single perspective of the whole reality, where, instead, a ‘vision from everywhere’ 
occurs and is given prior to the act of perceiving, so that each point of view, with no differentiation 
between species, is formerly identical. To summarise,  
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception proposes a radical break with our intuitive, 
commonsense understanding of vision as located where our eyes are. In a literal sense, our 
commonsense assumption is egocentric: the world is centred upon the perceiver. However, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, such subject-centred notion of vision is actually misleading […] 
(Holbraad & Willerslev, 2007, 333). 
This introductory and theoretical chapter, then, will focus on Merleau-Ponty’s and Gell’s 
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works in order to express what is at stake in the anthropological debate on materiality as well as 
the argumentation of the thesis within that debate. Before exploring how Merleau-Ponty and Gell 
have considered the issue of materiality, the chapter will reflect on the wider treatment of 
materiality by the discipline of anthropology. In fact, the founders of anthropology devoted their 
intellectual efforts to analysing the belief in the existence of animacy or soul in nonhuman entities, 
or the phenomenon of animism. Animism represents the fundamental step towards the 
consideration of materiality’s intellectual challenges to human rationality, as animistic belief 
‘suggests the very antithesis of this objectifying modern stance’ (Hornborg, 2006, 2) where mind or 
‘an inner spiritual soul’ is opposed to body or ‘an outward material appearance’ (Willerslev, 2010, 
514). The word ‘soul’, born in Jewish-Christian discourse and derived from the Latin spiritus or 
breath, is originated from that ontological opposition between spirit and materiality, ‘which 
implies that the soul is immaterial’ (Willerslev, 2010, 517). 
The originator of the expression ‘animism’ was Edward Burnett Tylor in his work Primitive 
Culture (1994 [1871]). He adopted the word from the German scientist Georg Ernst Stahl, who had 
defined the inner soul as the cause and origin of human diseases. By consulting the ethnographic 
material provided by missionaries and colonial officers, he claimed that the so-called primitive 
people do not distinguish dreamlike conditions from reality, for they attribute a material nature to 
the soul, which thus duplicates the human body. In an evolutionistic fashion, animism, according 
to Tylor, constitutes the elementary basis of each religious system: with a progressive development 
of primitive societies, the soul coincides with God. Tylor formulated his theory of animism by 
observing children’s behaviour, because ‘early childlike philosophy’ was supposed to be the form 
of modern reasoning closest to the primitive (Tylor 1994 [1871], 99). In fact, Tylor begins from the 
assumption that materiality’s life reflects an intellectual system. This system would later be 
defined by Levy-Bruhl (1960 [1922]) as pre-logical or mystical, and so the capacity of materiality to 
impact on humans’ lives is generally ascribed under the tag of magic. Tylor (1994 [1871], 131-132) 
inserted fetishism as a ‘subordinate department’ of animism, understood as a doctrine which 
attributes human life to what is external to and different from humans. Fetishism, in this light, is 
the application of the animistic doctrine to material objects.  
Frazer, in his The Golden Bough (1994 [1911]), particularly focused on magic. His intellectual 
effort aimed to compare present and past religious systems in order to explain the origin of the 
need to religion within human society (see Willerslev, 2010). Frazer, thus, continues the 
evolutionary approach of Tylor, by evaluating magic as humans’ most primitive epistemological 
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apparatus. Magic is the misapplication of two scientific principles based on associations, 
particularly those of similarity and contiguity (Frazer 1994 [1911], 26-27). Then, the imitation of a 
thing would produce, in the imitative magic, its properties, whereas the use of a material object 
which came into contact with a person, thereby the name ‘homeopathic’ magic, would have 
influence on the person even at spatial-temporal distance. This wrong interpretation of reality 
reflects the animistic belief: 
As the savage commonly explains the processes of inanimate nature by supposing that 
they are produced by living beings working in or behind the phenomena, so he explains the 
phenomena of life itself. If an animal lives or moves it can only be, he thinks, because there is a 
little animal inside which moves it: […] the soul (Frazer, 1994 [1911], 153). 
 French social thinkers developed a slightly different concept of animism than that of the 
British founders of anthropology. Animism, in authors such as Emile Durkheim and Marcel 
Mauss, is not merely a wrong reasoning, but rather is created for social purposes, society’s need to 
social cohesion. Durkheim, in his The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1995 [1912]), concurs with 
Tylor that animism is originated from ‘the double life’ provided by the awaking and sleeping 
conditions and ‘the representations he has in his mind are of the same significance whether he is 
awake or dreaming’ (Durkheim, 1995 [1912], 45), but he is clear in distinguishing the animistic 
belief from children’s delirious conviction that their toys are alive.  
His tendency [of the child] to treat his toys as if they were human beings is explained 
similarly. His very intense need to play creates suitable material for itself, just as, in the 
preceding case, the strong feelings that pain had unleashed created their own, out of nothing. 
Thus, to be able to play conscientiously with his puppet, he imagines it as a living person. The 
illusion is easier for him, moreover, because imagination is his sovereign mistress; he scarcely 
thinks in anything but images, and we know to what extent images are pliable things that bend 
in obedience to all that desire commands. But so little is he the dupe of his own fiction that if it 
suddenly became reality and his puppet bit him, he would be the first astonished (Durkheim, 
1995 [1912], 63). 
Meaning and reason of animism must be found on a different level, that of the society. 
Totemism, in Durkheim’s work, substitutes animism. In totemism, soul coincides with the 
organizing principles of society.  
Mauss develops Frazer’s homeopathic magic by stating that the reciprocity in the gift is 
justified by Maori’s belief that a thing retains holder’s characteristics through its hau, or spirit, so 
that the giver or the thief must relate with its past owner (Mauss 1990 [1924], 13-15). The hau urges 
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the new holder to return to its original place. As Mauss specified in his work A General Theory of 
Magic (2001 [1902]), the relationship between persons and things is made possible by the magic 
ritual, where causes and effects are confused (Mauss, 2001 [1902], 77-78). As in Durkheim, then, 
Mauss agrees with Tylor and Frazer about the fact that magic in non-Western cultures is derived 
by irrational thinking, but has an important social function within relationships’ dynamics. 
If looking at the Anglo-Saxon academic scene nearly seventy years later than Tylor’s 
Primitive Culture, the social functionalism of animism and magic theorised by Durkheim and 
Mauss is further developed by Malinoswki. He explicitly stated that Tylor’s definition of animism 
is ‘too contemplative and rational’ (1968, [1948]). Frazer’s theory of magic, whilst ‘it explains […] 
the sympathetic principle which underlies the creative metaphor of magic’ (1965 [1935], 240), ‘does 
not account for the enormous organizing part played by magic’ (1965 [1935], 240). However, 
society’s organizing principle is not understood as Durkheim’s abstract social cohesion, but rather 
it is declined into human concrete feelings of the everyday life: ‘What I am trying to contribute 
here is a reinterpretation of Durkheimianism in empirical terms’ (Malinowski, 1965 [1935], 235). 
However, Malinowski does not negate Tylor’s idea of the erroneous equivalence between dreams, 
visions and reality.   
Man’s conviction of continued life is one of the supreme gifts of religion, which judges 
and selects the better of two alternatives suggested by self-preservation—the hope of continued 
life and the fear of annihilation. […] Religion saves man from a surrender to death and 
destruction, and in doing this it merely makes use of the observations of dreams, shadows and 
visions (Malinowski, 1968 [1948], 33). 
Malinowski (1965 [1935], 68) argues in Coral Gardens and Their Magic that magic, similarly to 
the social role of technology (Malinowski, 1965 [1935], 240), is a problem-solver. 
[…] the acts of magic are an organising influence in communal life: firstly because they 
punctuate the progress of activities at regular intervals and impose a series of taboo days or rest 
periods; and secondly because each rite must be fully performed on the standard plots, and 
these plots must be perfectly prepared for it, whereby a model is established for the whole 
village […]. Magic therefore is not merely a mental force, making for a more highly organised 
attitude of mind in each individual, it is also a social force, closely connected with the economic 
organisation of garden work (Malinowski, 1965 [1935], 67-68). 
Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism represents the first attempt in anthropology to give magic the 
same intellectual status as Western science, as Bird-David argues (1999, S70). Magic is analysed as 
a parallel epistemological system to that of science. However, according to Bird-David (1999, S70), 
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magic is ‘dissociated’ from its empirical substratum, so that it becomes a mere symbolic 
representation. 
Magical thought is not to be regarded as a beginning, a rudiment, a sketch, a part of a 
whole which has not yet materialized. It forms a well-articulated system, and in this respect 
independent of that other system which constitutes science, except for the purely formal 
analogy which brings them together and makes the former a sort of metaphorical expression of 
the latter. It is therefore better, instead of contrasting magic and science, to compare them as 
two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge. […] Both science and magic however require the 
same sort of mental operations and they differ not so much in kind as in the different types of 
phenomena to which they are applied (Lévi-Strauss, 1966 [1962], 13). 
What clearly emerges in this rapid examination of the interpretation of animism, in 
particular, and magic, more generally, by some of the most important founders of the discipline of 
anthropology is the idea that soul and body are different entities (Willerslev, 2010, 516), 
reproducing, then, the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and body. Materiality, in this concept, 
as a mere ‘appearance’ (Willerslev, 2010, 514), is subordinated to the soul. Willerslev (2007, 181-
184) in a study on Siberian animism contests the anthropological approach to animism: the 
interpretation of it as a metaphorical thought disconnected from a supposed “real” and scientific 
realm to which the anthropologists’ theories belong. This ‘sovereign perspective of abstract 
scientific reasons’, along with the separation between the human and the nonhuman, is the result 
of Cartesianism and its dogmatic evaluation of knowledge as true or false (Willerslev, 2007, 13, 
184).  
The above-mentioned scholars’ thought continues to influence contemporary works on 
material culture. For instance, Appadurai (2003, 12), followed by Kopytoff (2003), resumes 
Bourdieu’s comparison of the Maussian realms of exchange and that of the gift by stating that the 
degree of values changes from context to context, which he calls ‘regimes of values’ (Appadurai, 
2003, 12): the exchange of things or commodities implies a constant confirmation or 
disconfirmation of that localised system of meanings which is culture. We can see, then, that 
Mauss’ idea of materiality as an expression of humans, because of the hau’s magical link with the 
owner, is re-proposed with similar effects, particularly the idea that materiality cannot be 
independent from humans. Artefacts are understood as inert and passive, either because they are 
not consciously attributed to social dynamics, or because the stress is put on human manipulations 
on them.  
Animism, however, suggests a second, contrasting interpretation, according to which soul 
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and body overlap, an approach which has been adopted by post-modernist anthropologists. It is 
worthy lingering on a paper from this school of thought, Bird-David’s ‘Animism Revisited’ (1999), 
as Gell’s paradigm on materiality’s agency partly reflects the scholar’s argumentation. Bird-David 
states that the scholars who have focused on animism have not challenged the discontinuity 
between nature and culture upon which ‘Western objectivist reality’ (Bird-David, 1999, S70) is 
based. By relying on her fieldwork data acquired among the South-Indian tribe of the Nayakas 
hunter-gatherers, Bird-David suggests that animism is a relational epistemology. Nayaka ideas of 
personhood do not rely upon the modernist dual ontology subject/object, but rather on the feature 
of sharing, of relating between two actors: ‘The person is sensed as “one whom we share with”’ 
(Bird-David, 1999, S73). In this respect, she introduces the concept of ‘dividuate’ as opposing to 
individuate. 
When I individuate a human being I am conscious of her “in herself” (as a single separate 
entity); when I dividuate her I am conscious of how she relates with me. This is not to say that I 
am conscious of the relationship with her “in itself”, as a thing. Rather, I am conscious of the 
relatedness with my interlocutor as I engage with her, attentive to what she does in relation to what 
I do, to how she talks and listens to me as I talk and listen to her, to what happens 
simultaneously and mutually to me, to her, to us (Bird-David, 1999, S72). 
The tendency to animate things, thus, originates, according to Bird-David, in human 
cognitive skills (Bird-David, 1999, S78). As Ingold says, animacy is a relational dynamic and, 
because of this characteristic, ‘is rather ontologically prior’ (Ingold, 2006, 13) to the differentiation 
between mind and body, subject and object. However, Bird-David continues to use the concept of 
personhood and applies it to materiality by attributing to it human characteristics, without, then, a 
true challenge to the duality human/nonhuman. This contradiction is clear in Viveiros de Castro’s 
objection to Bird-David’s suggestion. 
The problem remains framed in terms of knowledge, even though the answer could be 
taken to imply that knowledge, let alone the cogito, has little to do with it. Anthropologists 
persist in thinking that in order to explain a non-Western ontology we must derive it from (or 
reduce to) an epistemology. Animism is surely an ontology, concerned with being and not with 
how we come to know it. Bird-David falls into the Tylorian trap and feels compelled to assess 
the validity of this epistemology and to justify it on the basis of its cognitive naturalness (Bird-
David, 1999, S79). 
This contradiction can be found in Gell’s work, demonstrating my contention that a 
deconstruction of materiality would allow the social scientist to understand and describe more 
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fully certain phenomena where the irrationality of materiality operates. An important point which 
must be acknowledged to Bird-David, however, is that the relational dynamics, the relation 
between an I and the Other, must be analysed in order to understand the functions and the role of 
materiality. The bond between humans and materiality is given, thus, at the junction between 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis, due to its link to perception and the unconscious (Augé, 
1988, 143). A phenomenological approach, then, permits us to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of this bond between the human and the nonhuman and, subsequently, the necessity 
of a definition or a categorical separation between them. The following section will introduce 
phenomenology and the role of bodily perception in shaping knowledge of the Other. The second 
section of this chapter will further deepen the theme by proposing phenomenology as an 
important methodological tool in the social sciences, especially for what concerns the formulation 
of a dialogical ethics with alterity. The analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s (2003 [c. 1956]) study on nature 
in the third section will provide a historical-philosophical framework for understanding how 
Western culture has treated the nonhuman by starting with the fundamental premise that the 
nonhuman is what is not defined by an intellectual will. Even though materiality has started to be 
viewed as an actor imbued with agency by Gell’s (1998) work, the idea that the material is under 
human control is still persistent. The last two sections, therefore, will examine Gell’s work and will 
introduce post-humanist studies as a possible perspective not only for deconstructing the primacy 
of the human, but also for considering materiality independently from humans’ actions.  
As already mentioned in the introduction, the goal of this thesis is deconstructing the 
concept of materiality, understood as a passive and anthropomorphised entity, as elaborated in 
Western modern culture. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of nature, on the one hand, and Gell’s theory 
of the agency of art objects, on the other hand, represent the two poles from which I define 
materiality as a Western category. Whilst Merleau-Ponty pinpoints the feature of nature as 
something which continually creates and is created, Gell attributes agency to that creative power. 
In both cases, materiality is thought of as supporting of the human. Therefore, I refer to post-
human scholarly literature in order to critique the humanist paradigm. Phenomenology, with its 
examination of the fusion between the perceiver and the perceived, constitutes, thus, the 
methodological and theoretical framework by which materiality, as a notion clearly distinguished 
and dependent from the human, is problematised. 
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1.2 Experiencing the nonhuman: phenomenology 
 
The branch of philosophy which has investigated the senses in order to find a common 
explanation of human relations with the world and, thus, with the nonhuman, is phenomenology: 
‘Phenomenology carries out its clarifications in acts of seeing, determining, and distinguishing 
sense’ (Husserl, 1999, 43). The work of Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, has been contested 
by several scholars, such as Flood (1999) and Derrida (2008a [1967]), as it puts itself in the 
ambiguous position of depending upon reality and, at the same time, transgressing it by claiming 
the synthetic skills of a pre-existing ‘pure vision’ (Husserl, 1999, 43; see also Husserl, 1982 [1913]). 
Because of this vision, phenomena can be studied and observed in abstract from the mundane, 
physical sphere. According to Bourdieu, by relying on the primary experience of the world, 
phenomenology would exclude the social world (Bourdieu, 2011 [1972], 3). An even clearer 
critique of Husserl’s phenomenology by Derrida (1973) states that Husserl seeks to exclude 
language, as the thing, e.g. object, other human being, etc., is already present and experienced. 
According to Derrida, the thing transcends its human understanding and grasping, thereby it can 
be described only by linguistic means, which are still imperfect for this goal. Therefore, for 
Derrida, phenomenology restores metaphysics, even though the former wishes to overcome the 
latter. However, Husserl’s phenomenology is far more nuanced and subtle than a pure abstraction. 
As Woodruff Smith (1995, 323) states, Husserl’s phenomenology is the conflicting integration of a 
sort of kaleidoscopic monism of events and of a pluralism of essences, senses, body and mind. In 
that way, a single event expresses two different aspects which are interdependent as ‘moments’ of 
the same event, so that there is no room for a Cartesian dualism (Woodruff Smith, 1995, 323-325). It 
is precisely because Husserl wants to reach a universal entity from the particular that the 
particular is carefully analysed and never dismissed. The eidetic necessity marks this continuous 
influence between particularisation and universalisation. Consequently,  
One must sharply distinguish the relationships belonging to generalization and 
specialization from the essentially heterogeneous relationships belonging, on the one hand, to 
the universalization of something materially filled into the formal in the sense of pure logic and, on the 
other hand, to the converse: the materialization of something logically formal. In other words: 
generalization is something totally different from that formalization which plays such a large role 
in, e.g., mathematical analysis; and specialization is something totally different from de-
formalization, from “filling out” an empty logico-mathematical form or a formal truth (Husserl, 
1982 [1913], 26). 
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To put differently, universalisation does not rise from an abstract, disincarnated or, equally, 
sui generis body, but from the concrete body of the phenomenologist or of the perceiver, in other 
words, from the specific position of a body. We can see, then, in phenomenological reduction the 
opposite of a dry theorisation, the implicit possibility of an ethical encounter with the Other: ‘In 
the phenomenological reduction, everything is also an index of the experiential contexts and 
possibilities of experience belonging to it, and which are empathized in it by me –and so it is for 
every I’ (Husserl, 2006 [1921], 86).  
The intersubjective tone of phenomenology is particularly at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s Prose 
of the World (1973 [1969]). Language and speech are instruments of the depersonalisation of the 
embodied subject in order to attribute its thoughts to a wider and unified system of Self-Other, 
where the Other is identified as an another I (Merleau-Ponty, 1973 [1969], 17, 18, 19). To put in 
another way, ‘the principle of communication’ is already given when ‘man perceives another man 
in the world as a part of the spectacle’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973 [1969], 42), thereby both the I and the 
other-than-I participate with the same action in the same context which coincides with the field of 
the I. A generalisation of ‘the corporeal relation’ between perception and the embodied I can be 
elaborated at this stage, with the consequential and immediate bond with the Other in this 
‘universality of feeling’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973 [1969], 136-137). It is important to bear in mind that 
this generalisation is not a Cartesian objective space, but instead an ‘anthropological “locality”’, as 
far as we ‘find the other the same way we find our body’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973 [1969], 138).19 As 
Husserl (2006 [1921], 2) points out, the I is always a very specific and determinate perspective, that 
of subjectivity, and it is, at the same time, not just one level of the experience but the experience 
itself, as it is ‘the one experiencing’ (Husserl, 2006 [1921], 2). Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the 
projection of the self onto the Other, then, is not merely an awakening of ‘ready-made thoughts’, 
but rather an openness to an estrangement of the self which overlaps the shared speaking and 
thought with the Other in its becoming ‘the one to whom I am listening’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973 
[1969], 118). A paradoxical situation, then, occurs, as it embeds the principle of ‘openness from 
closure’ (Wolfe, 2010, XXI), singled out by Wolfe in her understanding of the post-humanist 
authors Derrida and Luhmann. Subjectivity is the instrument for knowing the Other-than-Self but 
it is also the differentiation from the Other, and it is precisely this separation which allows a 
                                                          
19 A critique of Descartes’ aprioristic idea of the essence of the soul as the faculty of thinking is developed in 
James’ The Principle of Psychology (1993 [1890]). In fact, hysterical and hypnotic subjects reveal ‘the existence 
of a highly developed consciousness in places where it has hitherto not been suspected at all’ (James, 1993 
[1890], 132). 
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creative dealing with the world. 
Phenomenology, according to Merleau-Ponty’s definition (2002 [1945], vii), is the study of 
the essences located into existence, or the study of the ‘facticity’ of these essences, which precedes 
their descriptions by language. Perception becomes, in this approach, the antechamber of the 
possibility of a more precise knowledge: the intersubjective relation with the thing perceived is 
temporally extended to the past and the future perception of it (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 62). 
The division between Self and things is an abstraction from the empirical: 
The empirical Self is a hybrid notion, a mixture of in-itself and for-itself, to which 
reflective philosophy could give no status. In so far as it has a concrete content it is inserted in 
the system of experience and is therefore not a subject; in so far as it is a subject, it is empty and 
resolves itself into the transcendental subject. The ideality of the object, the objectification of the 
living body, the placing of spirit in an axio-logical dimension having no common measure with 
nature, such is the transparent philosophy arrived at by pushing further along the route of 
knowledge opened up by perception (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 65) 
Phenomenology is, thus, a return to the subjective, which is knotted into a historical-social 
chain of concrete monads or Is (Paci, 1962, 4, 10, 22). As understood now, phenomenology is not so 
far from Haraway’s work, where the return to the subject means an ‘ethical and political 
accountability’ (Braidotti, 2006, 197) or, similarly, ‘an enlarged sense of community, based on 
empathy, accountability and recognition’ (Braidotti, 2006, 201). Particularly, Haraway’s notion of 
compound, which is simultaneously characterised by that peculiarity, seen above, of enclosure and 
openness, is a direct derivation of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘infoldings of the flesh’, specifically the creative 
and reflective encounter between the subjective body and environment (Haraway, 2008, 249). 
Holbraad and Willerslev (2007, 335) confirm the link between post-humanist studies and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology by stating how its ‘normative ideal’ or the ‘view from everywhere’ has 
introduced the legitimacy of perspectivism in the agency theorisation. As Law and Hassard (1999, 
3-4) point out, the so-called actor-network theory applies relationality to all the materials as an 
autopoietic principle. Therefore, ontology is dismissed in favour of perspectivism, because, in 
Viveiros de Castro’s words (2014, 13-14), ‘each soul only knows who and what it is on the basis of 
what its body looks like from the perspective of another soul’. Personhood becomes an ontological 
potential of every entity, being it human or nonhuman, in its capacity of occupying a specific 
perspective (Viveiros de Castro, 2014, 57-58). We can see an extraordinary resemblance between 
post-human studies and perspectivism in Ingold’s theory. It completely rejects notions such as 
external and internal, bounds and constitutive parts. What exists is, rather, an ‘organism-person’, a 
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creative mix of relations or lines with the environment in which it is entangled (Ingold, 2000, 4-5; 
Ingold, 2007, 103). This immersion of the organism-person in the environment is ‘an inescapable 
condition of existence’ (Ingold, 2000, 153). The organism-person has to learn how to live in that 
environment, or what Ingold calls ‘dwelling perspective’ (Ingold, 2000, 153). Since relations and 
things are the same (Ingold, 2011, 70), the concept of the organism-person can be translated into 
‘beings of manifold kinds, both human and non-human’ (Ingold, 2000, 5).  
Merleau-Ponty’s example of the touching hand of my other hand or of the Other’s hand 
(compare Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 367, Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 24-25 and Merleau-ponty, 2003 
[c.1956], 76) reflects how the categories of subject and object are relative and temporally and 
spatially determined, as well as prior to a linguistic and intellectual differentiation:  
I come to sense someone at the end of this hand: to perceive the other is to perceive not 
only that I shake my hands, but that he shakes my hand. […] I do not project on the body of the 
other an “I think”, but I apperceive the body as perceiving before apperceiving it as thinking 
(Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 76).  
In order to perceive something, there must be a movement towards the Other with the body 
as an instrument of incorporation (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 159, 160, 161). Therefore, body and 
motion are not equivalent to the thing perceived, they do not belong to the same space in which 
the thing exists. Body inhabits time and space and the thing exists on its own without deriving 
from an aprioristic representation (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 159, 160, 161). Thus, Merleau-
Ponty’s body is not a fixed unity, but rather is an incoherent sum of different moments, as Watkin 
(2009, 21-22) argues in his reconciliation between Derrida’s critique of phenomenology and 
phenomenology itself: 
The body is irreducibly open. The body itself, furthermore, is not a given but an 
inextricable mutuality of the biological and the historical, as much a human creation as a 
natural artefact. It is not a physical object that the body is to be compared, but to a work of art 
(PP 176/PP 150). 
Merleau-Ponty seeks to articulate this inextricability of ‘fact’ and ‘essence’ through the 
notion of ‘style’. There is no dichotomy of bodily perception and bodily expression because 
perception is always already expressive, poetic and creative; […]. Merleau-Ponty would agree 
with Derrida, contra Husserl, that we have no access to a pure or pre-schematised world of 
meanings, no reduction to meaning. Perception, Merleau-Ponty claims in ‘Le langage indirect et 
le voix du silence’, must be poetry, […]. The ‘style’ of existence is expressed in the body, again 
with no gulf between perception and expression (Watkin, 2009, 22). 
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In a nutshell, it is a question of context and position, not of degree or substance (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2014, 57-58). The logical consequence of this new, anthropological thought is a different 
type of methodological research, that of multispecies ethnography, where the human kind is no 
longer considered ‘as a biocultural given’, but instead as a type of ‘corporeality’ which emerges 
from ‘a shifting assemblage of agentive beings’, a dynamic process between a collection which can 
vary from ‘biophysical entities’ to ‘the magical ways objects animate life itself’ (Ogden, Hall & 
Tanita, 2013, 6). In this last respect, the ‘world making power’ (Odgen, Hall & Tanita, 2013, 17) of 
the nonhuman is counted in multispecies ethnography’s analysis of human attachments to other 
species and things, e.g. the fear of unicorns in Middle Ages. Animism, in Willerslev’s (2007, 181) 
words, is then ‘taken seriously’ and not categorised as a human mental representation or belief. 
Rather, animism is a bodily-grounded experience through which subjectivity arrives to share the 
life world dimension with the other. In this respect, Willerslev sees in mimetic empathy, 
particularly the partial disembodiment of the Self whilst trying to understand the Other’s position 
by imitating it, the day-to-day practice which translates perspectivism in perceptual experience. It 
is precisely in this ambiguous identity (‘experiencing another point of view without being that 
other in an absolute sense’ (Willerslev, 2007, 107) or an ‘incomplete copying’ (Willerslev, 2007, 
108)) embodied during the mimesis that the empathising person (in this case the Siberian Yukaghir 
hunter) is empowered. As in the game of seduction, the seduced wants to become the ideal image 
she sees of ‘her lovable self image’ (Willerslev, 2007, 108). In this sense, mimesis is not considered 
as an uncreative repetition, but rather, as Goody (1997, 7) articulates, according to the creative 
dimension of the re-enactment, or, as scholars of masks would say, of the experiencing of a second, 
virtual dimension (see Nunley & McCarthy 2000 and Risé, 2001-2002). 
The other flip side of the coin of mimetic empathy is a confusion between the Self and the 
Other. In his bold theorisation of religion as a human need to anthropomorphisation, Guthrie 
(1993) adopts Piaget’s animistic (‘the tendency […] to consider things as living and conscious’ 
(Guthrie, 1993, 40)) and artificial (‘the belief that everything in the world is produced by humans 
or a human-like God’ (Guthrie, 1993, 40)) phase of children and extends it to adult life, by 
stressing, for instance, how Linnaeus’ taxonomy of insect development shows an anthropomorphic 
attitude, because ‘He called the newly hatched stage a “larva”, or mask, and the adult an “imago”, 
or essential for’ (Guthrie, 1993, 171). We perceive, then, the world around us as a symbiotic unity 
with ourselves (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], xiii). Our reflection already contains in itself the image 
of what we perceive of the environment surrounding us (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 4). Instead of a 
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Cartesian cogito, which defines us on the basis of our thoughts, there is a cogito which takes for 
granted these thoughts as matters of truth, or products of our perception of the world (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002, xiv). This illusory assumption is an ‘illusion of immanence’, a tendency to think of our 
perception as spatially located in our consciousness (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 5). In this total confusion 
between the perceiver and the perceived, the ‘I’ recognises the different, the Other as a 
manifestation of itself (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], xiii). More clearly, we transfer to the Other our 
cogito (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 434). We are not able to observe an external object or being in 
its whole nature. Rather, we elaborate a synthetic description of one side only of what is being 
given to us at a precise moment (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 8-10). The perceived, therefore, is opaque and 
can be known only as a representation that does not tell anything apart from the consciousness we 
have of it (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 10-11). In other words: 
The knowledge of the thing-world (der Dinglichkeit) has an unsurmountable 
disadvantage: Granted that a thing is experienced as existing for whatever good reasons, […], 
for cognition it always remains, as it were, a mere presumption of existence. […] experienceable 
being in principle is not exhausted by a percipi, but rather, in opposition to it, is an In-itself. And 
this In-itself comes to givenness. And yet it is in principle never given in an absolute way. […] And 
consequently, the Being-In-Itself of a thing is, in regard to knowledge, also always a presumption, 
insofar as we never really get rid of the experiential consciousness. At all times, it depends on 
the further process of experiencing whether the once achieved thesis of experience can be 
legitimately maintained. The thing is given in experiences, and yet, it is not given; that is to say, 
the experience of it is givenness through presentations, through “appearings” (Husserl, 2006 
[1921], 36-37). 
As a consequence, we do not observe reality. We have a ‘quasi-observation’ of it (Sartre, 2004 
[1940], 15). The image of our perception is a creative act, i.e. we interpret what we perceive (Sartre, 
2004 [1940], 15, 19). Alternatively, we only perceive and our minds do not register this act. We 
need an image, a reflection of our perception to be aware we perceive something (Sartre, 2004 
[1940], 53). In addition, this image substitutes the real perceived object (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 117). 
If knowledge is partial and influenced by the act of interpretation, imagination corresponds 
to the making of an affective object on the ground of viewing it as something to possess or desire 
(Sartre, 2004 [1940], 71, 81). Between the perceiving human being and the narcissistic phase in 
childhood there is no difference.20 In both cases, we have a ‘magical act’ (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 125), 
                                                          
20 In this respect, Erikson’s work, Childhood and Society, is illuminating. It shows how playing constructs the 
child’s identity and her ways of seeing and behaving in the world (Erikson, 1963 [1950]). 
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where thoughts become objects to be possessed: ‘There is always, in that act, something of the 
imperious and the infantile, a refusal to take account of distance and difficulties. Thus the very 
young child, from his bed, acts on the world by orders and prayers’ (Sartre, 2004 [1940], 125). In 
order to exorcise the insecure feeling towards a ‘beyond […] unreachable in fact and in 
representation’ (Crapanzano, 2004, 14), we give it a shape by transforming it into something 
familiar. We give it a name, allowing it to take a place in our language (Foucault, 1974 [1966], 160). 
We are satisfied, convinced that we have deciphered it (Foucault, 1974 [1966], 35). According to 
Bourdieu, the lack of knowledge is translated into a ‘model’ or a ‘map’ which should offer possible 
answers to the foreigner (Bourdieu, 2011 [1972], 2). Said goes further, saying that the unknown is 
like a text to decipher (Said, 2003 [1978], 93). Both the authors describe, in a metaphorical way, the 
final product of reification and, because of that, they ‘have a homunculus problem’ (Crapanzano, 
2004, 151-152). Indeed, they reduce the fluid psychological process of knowledge to a fixed object, 
a particular phase or aspect of the former, which pretends to explain the dynamics of the process 
itself (Crapanzano, 2004, 151-152). Bourdieu is able to identify his mistake with the definition of 
‘scholastic illusion’ (Bourdieu, 2004, 37), the logical vision which takes into account the opus 
operatum, the final product of a practice, without thinking about the modus operandi, the practice in 
its making (Bourdieu, 2004, 37). Similarly, he calls this process ‘epistemocentric fallacy’ (Bourdieu, 
2003, 130).  
In this elucidation of phenomenology’s ethical implication, I concur with Gell’s re-reading of 
Taussing’s notion of mimesis when the former criticises Frazer’s idea that imitation in sympathetic 
magic is based on a mistaken physical casualty. Mimesis is ‘an epistemic awareness’ which implies 
‘to be sensuously filled with what which is perceived, yielding to it, mirroring it –and hence 
imitating it bodily’ (Gell, 1998, 100). Put differently, ’the very possibility of reflexivity is grounded 
in embodiment. We can reflect on our own experience because of the essential alterity that allows 
us to experience our own body as an object, an “other”’ (Csordas, 1994, 277) or, again, mimesis is 
perceiving the world around us as such, of ‘being literally “in touch” with the world’ (Ingold, 2000, 
23). However, where Gell falls short is explaining why and how humans employ mimesis in 
dealing with nonhuman entities, as the following section will further explain. He apparently 
employs the object-as-person in order to be clearer with his reader, without a further, explicit 
reflection on the objects’ personification. The immediate consequence of mimesis, from an ethical 
perspective, is to consider the anthropologist or the ethnographer as a participant and not a mere 
spectator of what she studies (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1996, 170). 
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For phenomenologists, the central question of social science is how one can enter or grasp 
the experience of another. This implies that understanding is a social rather than a purely 
intellectual activity. By this I mean not only that the process of understanding is dialogical, but 
that the ‘knowledge’ that emerges from our interactions in the field are to be evaluated less in 
terms of epistemological criteria than in terms of the practical, ethical, social and aesthetic 
demands of the world we both share (Jackson, 2005, 31). 
Derrida’s fear in Le Touches (2000) that Merleau-Ponty’s description of the touching body, 
inherited from Husserl, as the moment of acknowledgment of alterity runs the risk of not 
distinguishing the Other as the different can thus be problematised (Watkin, 2009, 15). The I is a 
subject-object (Husserl, 1989 [1913], 205) which experiments a continuous loop between integrity 
and alienation during perception. The following section will focus on how phenomenological 
perspective deals with the problem represented by the Other, the nonhuman and, thus, how 
phenomenology poses itself in Western historical-cultural debate on the nonhuman. 
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1.3 The position of phenomenology in the construction of the category of the 
nonhuman: Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on nature 
 
As previously seen, phenomenology constitutes an epistemological framework within which 
the so-called nonhuman or the Other results from the movement of the perceiving I towards the 
thing perceived. The nonsense of a categorical distinction between the human and the nonhuman 
consists of the fact that Otherness always refers to a specific sensing body. The explanation of the 
need to categories such as the human and the nonhuman can be found, thus, on a further level to 
that of perception. Merleau-Ponty, with his work on nature, offers a phenomenological perspective 
on the historical need to distinguish between the human and the nonhuman, a need which has 
determined the concept of materiality. Therefore, examining Merleau-Ponty’s discussion 
progresses the deconstruction of materiality with a definition of what materiality means in 
Western modern culture. 
The word nature derives from the Latin nascor, ‘to live’, ‘to be born’, which originates from a 
Greek verb meaning the vegetative, and so nature would coincide with a meaningful life without 
thought, something which is generated from its interior but it is opposed to what is human, 
specifically language and intellectual activity (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 3). Merleau-Ponty 
differentiates nature from objects, as they are not auto-produced, but rather constructed (2003 [c. 
1956], 3). It is precisely the nonconstructed feature of nature which would lead one to think of it as 
an aprioristic given, a primordial origin which incorporates what is established and instituted 
(Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 4). Because of that, nature would be conceived of as a permanent 
entity, infinitely producing (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 15). With the influence of the Jewish-
Christian tradition, meaning by which nature reproduces itself, as infinite producer, is made 
coincidental with the divine, so that nature appears to be split in two realms: naturans and naturata, 
which is a mere exteriority (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 8-9). The human, therefore, is two-fold: 
on the one hand, the pure thought, which coincides in Descartes with God, understood as an 
external rationality, and, on the other hand, the contradictory composite of soul and body, the last 
one connected to nature. Descartes, according to Merleau-Ponty (2003 [c.1956], 20), does not 
resolve this composite into unity, but he states it as a mere juxtaposition. Kant radically alters 
philosophy’s understanding of subjectivity by locating meaning within the subject itself. This shift 
in location means that meaning can be detected only through sensible experience (Merleau-ponty, 
2003 [c.1956], 21). As nature can have a meaning only for the sensuous subject, the perceiving 
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subject is the legislator who can construct or directly operate on nature, hence the double meaning 
of nature as what is experienced and what is constructed (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 22-23). 
Kant, on a closer inspection, does not overcome the Cartesian idea of nature, as nature is always 
the construction of something directed by intellect, whereas nature does not have any will 
(Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 36). In addition, Kant problematises the naturans by acknowledging 
that human reason cannot justify it (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 36). The naturans remains an 
abyss which cannot be overcome by the subject and, in the ethical sphere, can be addressed 
through God (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 37). Romanticism, especially in Schelling, begins from 
Kant’s abyss and determines the infinite not as an essence, but rather as an existence, hence the 
finite is not ‘immanent to the infinite’ any more and nature runs parallel to God, in a circular 
movement of production alternated with the produced thing (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 37). In 
Bergson, the materiality resulting from the creative jest is used by subjective consciousness as a 
way to recompose itself, to find its inner meaning: nature coincides with life (Merleau-ponty, 2003 
[c.1956], 51-70). Husserl wants to solve the Cartesian dichotomy of soul/body as well as reveal the 
reasons behind the placing of bodies in nature, instead of relying on a naïve belief about the world 
without any conscious justification (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 74). He tries to do that with the 
idea of the incarnated subject: 
When I perceive an object, I am aware of the motor possibilities that are implied in the 
perception of this thing. The things appear to me as a function of the movements of my body. 
But if these movements are deployed around the object, I must not imagine that they are 
thought by me as objective factors. Perception is not an analysis comparable to that of the 
physicists, in terms of which we would refer certain perceptions to our body, for example, the 
tremor of the countryside under each of our footsteps. But in reality, this tremor is not 
perceived, the movement of my body gives me naturally the means to deduct the 
appearances; in this sense, knowledge of my body is not a knowledge, and my movements are 
not thought as objective factors of knowledge. The awareness that I have of my body is a 
sliding awareness, the feeling of a power, of a being-able-to. I am aware of my body as an 
undivided and systematic potency to organize certain unfoldings of perceptual appearance 
(Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 74). 
As the subject lives in the body and, through the body, lives in things, the body is, as 
previously seen, simultaneously a subject and an object (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 74, 75). 
From localising an amorphous thing, particularly the contact between the body and the perceived 
objects, the I can build from this continuity of subject/object a precise identity: ‘From prehuman I 
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become human’ (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 76). The animal, therefore, for Husserl is just 
‘another manner of being a body in human being’ (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 214) and the 
differentiation between the animal and the human lies in the sensuous relationship between them, 
in other words by the perceiving human body which identifies the animal as the body of the Other. 
The matter here does not relate to the presence or the absence of rationality, but rather with ‘the 
Ineinander with the animal’ (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 214). To recapitulate with Merleau-
Ponty’s words (2003 [c.1956], 78): 
Husserl rehabilitated the idea of Nature by this idea of jointure to a common truth that 
subjects would continue but of which they would not be the initiators. All that happens is not 
explained by interiority, or by exteriority, but by a chance that is the concordance between 
these two givens and is assured by Nature. 
All these theories, Merleau-Ponty (2003 [c.1956], 83) argues, reveal that nature resists 
humans: meaning of body can be understood only through existence and in any case it has an 
‘interior’ over which mind or the cogito does not have any control. Any representation of it made 
by the ‘I think’ is ‘bastard’, ‘false’, as this interior principle of nature escapes from any reduction. 
In addition, nature produces without the intervention of humans, it is ‘a productivity which is not 
ours, although we can use it’ (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956], 125). Nature’s ambiguity has posed 
problems of identity to human beings in their self-definition. The nonhuman must be objectified as 
a mere thing without any will. Particularly, the alienation of nature from culture derives, 
according to Marchesini (2002, 9), from the idea of the human identity as biologically incomplete –
that is to say, not totally determined by species. This biological incompleteness elevates humans 
towards nature, perceived as corrupted and wicked (Marchesini, 2002, 11). Human identity must 
be pure, uncontaminated, separated from any other context, so that a distinctive trait of identity, 
recognisable between similarity and difference can be discerned (Marchesini, 2009, 47): 
Central to this universalistic posture and its binary logic is the notion of ‘difference’ as 
pejoration. Subjectivity is equated with consciousness, universal rationality, and self-
regulating ethical behaviour, whereas Otherness is defined as its negative and specular 
counterpart (Braidotti, 2013, 15). 
As a consequence, humanity cannot be in dialogue with Otherness, but rather is confined in 
a self-contained sphere (Marchesini, 2002, 12), while Otherness is connoted by negative features, as 
in the case of monsters which will be examined in chapter four. According to this humanist 
paradigm, humans are morally free to determine their own choices because they are not restrained 
into biological duties (Marchesini, 2002, 9, 19). 
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As seen at the beginning of this discussion, Merleau-Ponty differentiates between nature and 
the material object, as the latter is constructed by humans. However, that does not explain why 
materiality is seen in certain contexts, such as the phenomenon of darśan or Western and non-
Western episodes of idolatry examined by Gell (see further in section 1.4), as possessing animacy 
and life on its own. It seems to me that what Merleau-Ponty describes in the differentiation 
between nature and humans comprehends the nonhuman in its broader sense, which extends even 
to include the material. Materiality is opposed to the human in terms very close, if not identical, to 
those of nature: the material is considered divorced from thought and, therefore, humans can use 
and control it. Materiality, in these terms, can be considered as the basic unity of the category of 
the nonhuman: nature and animal are both developments from an inert material. What 
distinguishes them from materiality would be a supposed higher level of animacy and agency 
characterising them. However, their pejoration and exploitation by humans is justified by the fact 
that they are, let me use this expression, more material than humans: their activities cannot be 
explained by pure rationality. Gell’s paradigm of material agency, fully described in the following 
section, represents a significant effort to acknowledge to materiality the same agency attributed to 
the human. However, in his comparison with the notion of personhood, Gell does not effectively 
free materiality from its subaltern condition. 
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1.4 Deconstructing Gell’s material agency 
 
As already anticipated in the introduction and in the previous sections of this chapter, a 
critical review of Gell’s theory explicated in Art and Agency (1998) is fundamental in pinpointing 
the persistency of a humanist paradigm from which the category of materiality originates. In fact, 
Gell’s work has been the first effort in Western academic philosophy in giving agency to 
materiality. In this section, however, I will argue that, by attributing human qualities proper to the 
idea of personhood, Gell’s paradigm has had the paradoxical effect of reinforcing the 
predominance of the human. The reasons why materiality cannot be understood without its 
anthropomorphisation become an important epistemological enquiry in the field of material 
culture studies, anthropology and anthropology of art. 
Before considering Gell’s perspective, it is important to clarify the notion of deconstruction, 
in order to offer to the reader a key reading of my broader review of Gell’s theory of material 
agency developed in this thesis. Let me quote a passage on Derrida’s deconstruction of 
phenomenology: 
Deconstruction consists in limiting claims made by metaphysics (but also ethical and 
political claims) with experience; deconstruction is always enlightening: “the violence of light” 
as Derrida says in “Violence and Metaphysics”. Yet Derrida’s critique of metaphysics, and 
therefore his critique of phenomenology as metaphysics, contains two aspects. On the one hand, 
deconstruction engages in a classical phenomenological critique in which claims are limited 
with evidence, with presence; in this aspect, deconstruction relies on what Husserl of course 
called “the principle of all principles”. In fact, as we shall see, Derrida turns “the principle of all 
principles” against any lapses in phenomenological vigilance; he turns it against dogmatism 
that might remain in Husserl’s philosophy. On the other hand, deconstruction engages in what 
we are going to call a “super-phenomenological critique”, in which deconstruction limits 
metaphysical claims (or ethico-political claims) with the very experience of the non-Greek non-
foundation, with the very experience that in fact Husserl himself points us toward when he 
describes time and alterity: the experience of the non-presence (Lawlor, 2002, 3). 
On the one hand, deconstructing Gell’s theory means comparing it to what happens in 
reality, namely fieldwork. The participant observation of curatorial practices on darśan shows the 
extent to which Gell’s idea of material agency can be or cannot be applied, as chapter three, four 
and five will show. On the other hand, deconstructing also entails returning to Augé’s matière 
brute, to the point where materiality cannot be understood in terms of agency or, at least, 
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personhood, human agency, in a single expression: to the experience of the nonperson, the totally 
Other. With this two-fold goal of deconstruction in mind, this section starts with a close analysis of 
Gell’s main work, Art and Agency (1998), in order to prepare the ground for a close examination of 
the advantages and disadvantages of his theory. 
Gell’s primary aim in Art and Agency is an elaboration of a theory of anthropology of art. 
That means, according to the author, overcoming the aesthetic tendencies through which the West 
has seen other cultures and which signal a de-contextualisation of the artefacts from their social 
contexts (Gell, 1998, 3-5). It can be said, therefore, that Gell rejects aesthetics as a reified category, 
separated from its nexus (Chua & Elliott, 2015, 12). By relocating Western analyses of non-Western 
artefacts in an anthropological approach, Gell evaluates artefacts in terms of social relationships, 
and so objects substitute ‘persons or “social agents”’ (Gell, 1998, 5). Gell proposes, then, an 
alternative to the semiotic approach to objects, as materiality belongs to a different system to that 
of language, even though something can be said about the topic of objects. In addition, treating 
objects as if they were texts disentangles materiality from its anthropological dynamics or 
relationships (Gell, 1998, 6). However, Gell warns that the use of the notion of person in this new 
theory of an anthropology of art must be problematised as the result of a radical defamiliarization 
and relativization proper to the discipline of anthropology (Gell, 1998, 9). Objects, thus, are 
persons’ extensions, as already discussed by Tylor, Mauss, Malinowski and Frazer (Gell, 1998, 9) 
and seen at the beginning of this chapter.  
A direct consequence of Gell’s theory is a biographical approach: ‘relationships are seen as 
part of a biographical series entered into at different phases of the life cycle’ (Gell, 1998, 11). Thus, 
the actors within a relationship can change their role accordingly. Agency, then, can or cannot be 
attributed on the ground of a ‘classificatory context’ and is, thus, ‘exclusively relational’: for any 
agent there is a patient, its counterpart (Gell, 1998, 21-22). If the features of persons are attributed 
to artefacts, the artefacts infer social agency in a process called ‘abduction of agency’, a cognitive 
operation which establishes a causal connection by starting from a physical thing or index, e.g. 
visible smoke as index of fire (Gell, 1998, 13-15). The index is, thus, simultaneously the result and 
the means of social agency (Gell, 1998, 15), and defines four entities in relation with each other: the 
index; an originator, to whom existence and the properties of the index is attributed; a recipient in 
relation to whom the index exerts agency; a prototype, which is represented by the index through 
abduction (Gell, 1998, 27). 
In the chapter The Distributed Person, Gell mentions darśan, mimesis, sorcery, idols and the 
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cult of the images,  
since nowhere are images more obviously treated as human persons than in the context 
of worship and ceremonies. […] it emanates not from stupidity and or superstition, but from 
the same fund of sympathy which allows us to understand the human, non-artefactual, ‘other’ 
as a copresent being, endowed with awareness, intentions and passions akin to our won (Gell, 
1998, 96). 
In order to defend his argumentation from the possible objection of moving from an art 
theory to a religious one, Gell states that art is a historical and spatially located process within 
Western culture which disguises a fundamentally religious relation with the artefacts. This aspect 
will be examined in greater depth in chapter four, where I will examine Gell’s essay The Technology 
of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology (2006) in considering how aesthetics and 
museums’ approach reproduce a post-secular behaviour. Suffice it to say for now that what Gell is 
interested in is the mechanism by which humans attribute agency to objects, where art is 
understood as human creation, instead of viewing it in aesthetic terms.  
The attribution of agency and, thus, in Gell’s perspective, of personhood to material objects is 
much clearer once the definitions of primary and secondary agents are given. A primary agent is 
an entity which starts actions by its own will, whereas a secondary agent is the one which does not 
have its own will, but is fundamental for the formation of the action (Gell, 1998, 36): ‘agency is not 
just “making” but any modality through which something affects something else’ (Gell, 1998, 40). 
An index is, thus, a secondary agent, as it obtains its agency from an external entity and transfers 
that agency to the recipient (Gell, 1998, 36), whereas a prototype could be a primary, when ‘it is 
endowed the ability to intend its own appearance’ (Gell, 1998, 37), e.g. a king, a magician, a 
supernatural being, as well as a secondary agent, when it is an object considered to have no will. 
The roles of passive and active agents are interchangeable and simultaneous. For instance, the idol 
is an index of godly mediation of agency over the worshippers, but it is also an index of these 
devotees who, through the practices rotating around the artefact, e.g. consecration, can manipulate 
godly intervention, whose efficaciousness would be otherwise inconsequential (Gell, 1998, 40). Gell 
quotes the reaction of an African mask carver interviewed by D’Azevedo as an example of how an 
object can render its artist a patient. The final product, as never visualised as such but rather as a 
succession of operations during its production, would cause surprise to the artist, who cannot 
believe he has generated something which is perceived as alive (Gell, 1998, 46). According to Gell, 
we are all idolatrous in this respect, as the artistic product has its own agency, so that it seems to 
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have a life on its own (Gell, 1998, 46). For instance, in Western iconoclastic gestures, such as that of 
the suffragette Richardson against Velasquez’s representation of Venus, an equivalence between 
images and persons, in this case Pankhurst, is established and it is because of this equivalence that 
iconoclasm is feared by society, not just because of the damage created. What is unacceptable for 
society is attributing person’s agency to a painting, as well as being contaminated by it. 
The contrast between the supremely controlled and detached agency exercised by 
Velázquez in creating the painting image of Venus, and the frenzied gestures of Richardson 
defacing the image so that its ‘death’ corresponds to that of Pankhurst create the space in which 
the life of images and persons meet and merge together. Richardson endowed the Rokeby Venus 
with a life it never possessed before by ‘killing’ it and turning it into a beautiful corpse. The 
restoration of the picture to its original condition, though of course necessary and desirable, was 
also a means of re-erecting the barrier which prevents such images troubling us unduly, 
politically, sexually, or in any other way (Gell, 1998, 64). 
Gell, then, concurs with Guthrie (1993) in identifying an anthropomorphic attitude of 
humans towards the nonhuman. However, he contests Guthrie’s theory that this attribution of 
animacy means thinking of things as animate (Gell, 1998, 121): things are animated without having 
an animal or biological life. The remarkable feature of animated things lies precisely in the fact that 
they are not alive even though they appear to be so (Gell, 1998, 122). The same can be said of 
human projection on nonliving things: the projection entails the transferring of a part of human 
features to the things, without a complete identification and the subsequent inference that the 
things are alive or human (Gell, 1998, 122). In addition, these attributions are linked to the 
thingness which characterises humans. Gell uses the example of giving a heart and human body 
temperature to a statue (Gell, 1998, 124). It continues to be a thing, as heart and temperature 
objectively describe humans but do not qualify their personhood (Gell, 1998, 124). Therefore the 
conclusion: ‘The idol is worshipped because it is neither a person, nor a miraculous machine, but a 
god’ (Gell, 1998, 125). 
At this point, Gell analyses two different attributions of agency, those of externalist and 
internalist theories (Gell, 1998, 126-127). The first sees mind as the expression of social entities or 
public manifestations, with the resulting weakness of not considering how ordinary human beings 
‘approach the same problem’ (Gell, 1998, 127). In this respect, human beings attribute the others’ 
behaviour as the reflection of their own mental images and, at the same time, believe that their 
minds or the ‘ghost in the machine’ are invisible in the intersubjective relation and hidden inside 
the others’ body (Gell, 1998, 127):  
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if we are to attempt to ‘depict’ the physical realization of the other’s possession of an 
intentional psychology, the natural way to do this is to make a duplicate of the other in 
homuncular form (a representation of the inner person who interprets the other’s 
representations) and lodge that homunculus inside the other’s body’ (Gell, 1998, 131).  
Gell calls this theorisation internalist (Gell, 1998, 127). The religiousness of attributing an 
intentional psychology to nonliving things is given by contradicting the fact that the distinction 
between living and nonliving beings rests upon possessing or not an intentional psychology (Gell, 
1998, 131). Psychology cannot be attributed to the material nonliving being by giving to it a mind, 
as mind or soul is totally abstract. However, Gell argues, mind can be approximately reached by 
adding human physical characteristics which open the access of the inwardness which mind 
requires. Intentional psychology coincides, then, with an abduction from a physical verisimilitude 
(Gell, 1998, 132). However, Gell warns that it could be misleading to translate the necessity of a 
visual representation of the moving from an external body to an inner mind into an art form 
automatically, even though that happens. What is fundamental and basic in this translation is the 
reproduction of a ‘spatial and concentric’ opposition: mind is enveloped, circumscribed by a vessel, 
the body, which is totally nonmind (Gell, 1998, 132-133). That does not mean that the relationship 
between the human and the superhuman is symbolic. Quite the contrary: the essential nature of 
idolatry is precisely the physical interaction between the two realms (Gell, 1998, 135).  
The link between the external, relational and, thus, social context and the internal 
intertwining of mind and body causes an infinite reproduction of different scales of self-
expression, as the carving from Rurutu in the Austral Isles exemplifies (Gell, 1998, 137). The 
sculpture represents the declination of god’s attributes into several miniatures of the god as a 
whole, which are contained into an ark coinciding with the sum of exterior gods (Gell, 1998, 137). 
The god represented, then, is the ‘assemblage of relations between (literally) homunculi’ (Gell, 
1998, 139). Personhood is, therefore, a concentric adding of layers, as an onion (Gell, 1998, 140). 
According to Gell, there is a structural isomorphy between what ‘we know (from inside) as 
“consciousness” and the spatio-temporal structures of distributed objects in the artefactual realm’ 
(Gell, 1998, 222). By distributed object he means ’an object having many spatially separated parts 
with different micro-histories’ (Gell, 1998, 221). By this logic, social relationships are the 
externalization of a cognitive process; in other words, personhood transcends biological life in 
order to be diffused temporally and spatially via the indexes (Gell, 1998, 222-223), so that 
personhood or, equally, agency, is objectified in the ‘outside’ (Gell, 1998, 231) and mind exists both 
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internally and externally (Gell, 1998, 232). By this logic, ‘persons may be ‘distributed’, i.e. all their 
‘parts’ are not physically attached, but are distributed around the ambience’ (Gell, 1998, 106). It is 
not the case, then, that Kückler (2015, 33) defines Gell’s theory as a ‘material mind’. The scholarly 
approach to objects, with this new perspective, is radically changed: 
An important arm-shell or necklace does not ‘stand’ for someone important, in a 
symbolic way; to all intents and purposes it is an important person in that age, influence and 
something like ‘wisdom’ inheres in its physical substance, in its smooth and patinated surfaces, 
just as they do in the mind and body of the man of renown to whom it was attached, and from 
whom it has flown away as an idol of distributed personhood (Gell, 1998, 231). 
In order to make the reader understand the intermingling of an externalist and an internalist 
attribution of agency, Gell compares idols to dolls (Gell, 1998, 129). Both have a passive agency 
which is the target or the patient, in Gell’s terminology, of the others’ agency, which is the real and 
independent source (Gell, 1998, 129). Let me turn in detail to the comparison. 
Dolls, even those which open and close their eyes, emit cries, or even wet themselves, 
never produce any behaviour which is not directly under the control of the nurture-providing 
play-mother. The playing child knows this perfectly well, but that does not prevent them 
having the liveliest sensation that the doll is an alter ego and a significant play-mother. Doll 
play is so totally satisfying just because of this passivity […]. The doll’s ‘thoughts’ and inner life 
(which certainly are attributed to it while play is in progress) are a reflex of the child’s own 
thought, which include the doll as a passive being whose thinking is done ‘for it’ just as 
dressing and undressing have to be done. […] We could interpret the thought-processes of idols 
along the same lines, that is, as something that devotees do for idols, which can none the less be 
attributed (in context) to them. Because idols (like dolls) are wholly ‘passive’ others, they exhibit 
‘passive agency’, the kind of agency attributable to social others who or which, by definition, 
are only the target of agency, never the independent source (Gell, 1998, 129). 
A child’s mind reflects, then, the association of the doll with a living baby, and so the child 
can give full meaning to her play by identifying herself with a caring mother. Gell completes this 
theorisation of the distributed person by introducing the categories of time and space. The 
concepts of person and of object are reconfigured in Gell’s analysis of the artistic œuvre,21 directly 
derived from Husserl’s notion of time, which is the temporal sum of the preparatory sketches and 
contains in itself the possibility to be a future study for later works (Chua & Elliott, 2015, 10; see 
also Gell, 1998, 239-251). In other words, 
                                                          
21 Gell introduces the notion of œuvre in order to reconsider that of distributed person in a Western context 
(Gell, 1998, 232). 
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Suppose we are at B. The temporal landscape at B consists of the now-present perceptual 
experience of the state of affairs at B plus retentions of A, as A’, sinking down to the past. A’ is a 
‘modification’ of the original A –it is what A looks like from B, i.e. attenuated or diminished, but 
still present. Perhaps one can think of the ‘modification’ of A as it sinks down into the past (A-
>A’->A’’) as a gradual loss of verisimilitude affecting the perceptual judgements entertained at B, 
C, D, etc. our perceptual judgements at A do not become inapplicable immediately by virtue of 
passage of time, but only gradually, because the world does not change all at once and in all 
respects. We can no longer, at B, say that the state of affairs at A is ‘now’ the case, because of the 
change of the temporal index; but many of the features of A have counterparts at B. The fading 
out of the background of the proximate past as successively weaker retentions (A’->A’’->A’’’…) 
corresponds to the increasing divergence of perceptual judgements entertained at A and 
judgements entertainable at increasingly distant points in the succession of ‘now’ moments 
(A’/B, A’’/C, A’’’/D, etc.). But out-of-date perceptual judgements are still salient because it is 
only in the light of these divergences between out-of-date beliefs and current beliefs that we can 
grasp the direction which the events surrounding us are taking, thereby enabling us to form 
protentions towards the future phases of the current state of affairs (Gell, 2015, 103-104). 
Objects, thus, extend their meanings in space and time and become macro-objects, as an 
artist’s creativity or thoughts are both inside and outside the artist, in conjunction with the artistic 
work in a single temporal process (Chua & Elliott, 2015, 10). Chua and Elliott (2015, 8), in their 
critical examination of Gell’s reviewers, stress that the index would not be merely a representation 
of social relationships, but a fundamental part of the relations themselves in passage from the 
externalist theory of intersubjective relations to the internalist theory on perception. Agency 
operates in its distribution within the chain between mind, body, sociality and world, and, thus, 
objects cause the happenings of things (Chua & Elliott, 2005, 9). To turn to the example of the doll, 
this toy is not just the index of maternal care, but is also the child’s engagement of her positioning 
into her cultural development of caring practices and ideas towards maternity during that specific 
play with that specific doll, in a pattern which is connected with her parents’ past practices of 
playing and projected onto the possible, future caring of a baby and her playing with her own doll. 
Elliott and Chua (2015, 10) conclude, then, that Gell, despite his use of terms such as personhood 
and cognition, can be compared to authors such as Ingold and Latour in their giving ontological 
room and equivalence to the nonhuman. 
It can be said that Gell, in his ideas of passive/active agency and internalist/externalist 
attribution of agency, follows an approach similar to that of Jackson’s phenomenological 
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anthropology: ‘we are at times actors, in control of our situations, and at other times at the mercy 
of circumstances, and acted upon’ (2005, 137). Dichotomies, far from being ontological entities, are, 
therefore, ‘discursive strategies’ as defensive actions towards the substantial ambiguity of 
intersubjective life, where humans are ‘thrown’ (Jackson, 2005, 138). The process of bipolarisation, 
then, must be existentially and phenomenologically deconstructed, and so relationships are not 
fixed, determined essences, but, instead, the ‘domain of the inter-est (inter-existence)’ (Jackson, 
1998, 3)22, of the social. Philosophical theorisations of the relations between ‘the one and the many’ 
(Jackson, 1998, 5) must be dismissed in favour of the practicality of the dynamic within a specific 
context: ‘To echo quantum theory, the subject-object partition is an artefact of our interventional 
acts of measuring reality: in fact, selves are no longer single existence than are atoms and molecules’ 
(Jackson, 1998, 6). Thereby artefacts are not passive recipients of human agency, but rather they 
express different moments of engagement with humans, who can be subjects or objects of the 
occurred agency. 
However, Gell’s approach to materiality has been contested by some scholars. While some 
view Gell’s theory as a deflection from human agency, others accuse Gell, in his equivalence 
between objects and persons, of having proposed an agency model which does not challenge the 
primacy of humans in anthropology (Chua & Elliott, 2015, 13, 14). The perspective of Gell’s 
detractors can be summarised by Miller’s (2005, 13) words: ‘So Gell’s is a theory of natural 
anthropomorphism, where our primary reference point is to people and their intentionality behind 
the world of artifacts’. My deconstruction of Gell begins from these critiques and represents a 
suggestion to complete his theory, instead of being a sterile and destructive polemic. 
One of the most relevant merits of Gell has been dismissing the idea that objects are merely 
symbols of social relationships: they are actually relations, they are no longer passive entities acted 
upon by humans. By this logic, I concur with Chua and Elliott in their comparison of Gell with 
Ingold and Latour, where the notion of personhood is not a self-evident and reified fact, but is the 
result of a continuous influence and symbiosis with external environment and with the Other. In 
Gell’s expression of the distributed person there is much of Ingold’s notion of dwelling (see 2.1): 
subjectivity cannot be spatially and temporally located, but rather it is extended in time and space. 
Instead of thinking materiality under the culturally limited umbrella of art, Gell understands the 
                                                          
22 See also Duranti (2010, 1-2), in his reinterpretation of Husserl’s intersubjectivity: ‘I suggest that 
intersubjectivity could be the commonground on which to find a truly interdisciplinary study of human 
sociality. […] These domains include the natural world as a shared world of experience as well as the co-
world made possible by the language faculty in all of its realizations’. 
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material artefacts as the knots around which humans construct meanings and creates actions, so 
that non-Western coming-to-terms with materiality can be fully included and not considered as an 
imperfect and partial version of Western art any more. Art is deconstructed in its features and 
shown as far as non-Western forms of idolatry: art is first of all a belief in the capacity of 
materiality to impact on humans, therefore it is a peculiar form of religion (see chapter four). Gell 
is well aware that his theory is anthropomorphic, but this anthropomorphism is not naïve or not 
sufficiently pondered. Anthropomorphising materiality is a necessary implication of the 
distribution of personhood: human mind projects externally itself and, in so doing, attributes its 
features to materiality, transfers them to it. 
Despite the fact that Gell, in his formulation of the artistic œuvre, acknowledges Husserl’s 
phenomenological approach to time, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s overall influence in his thought, 
as it emerges from his biographical account (Gell, 2006), phenomenology is missing from his 
broader theory of agency. Gell gives a precise account of how humans project themselves on to the 
nonhuman, with the consequence that the nonhuman seems to possess a life on its own, as the 
empirical examples taken from idolatry, iconoclasm, artistic realisation, etc. clearly show. 
However, the reason why humans, so to speak, animate materiality is not explained with the same 
accuracy. As previously seen in this chapter and further developed in the following one, 
phenomenology is the discipline which is the closest to an explanation of the rise of the categories 
of subject and object. In his idea of the homunculus, then the establishing of a relation between 
internal sensations and the Other’s feelings, Gell elaborates the notion of the distributed person by 
phenomenological means but without explicating this phenomenological framework. What I want 
to argue is that the concept of materiality without a true abandonment of the category of 
personhood is impeded by the exclusion of phenomenology from his paradigm. In the example of 
children’s play with dolls, for instance, the doll is transformed as an active player in the game only 
because the child decides so. It is her projection onto the doll which permits its activation, Gell 
wants to tell us. However, human projection constitutes the surface or the last outcome of a far 
more complicated process. In fact, phenomenology warns us that it is our perception which 
determines an equivalence between us and the Other. Nevertheless, the Other cannot be ever 
known as it really is: ‘there is no reason to suggest that being-in-itself is composed of objects or that 
this something is anything like our perception of the world’ (Bryant, 2011, 62). We come to the 
conclusion, then, that the crying doll is just the tip of an iceberg which dwells in an ‘interior’ which 
is unknown for the human. Materiality is apparently under our control, but it is not. Therefore, 
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even though Gell’s attribution of agency to materiality allows him to move from the odd 
anthropological condemnation of the material to a passive role, this revolution is only partial. Even 
more than that: by giving agency to the artefacts on the general premise that they are still under 
our control, the division between subject and object is reinforced, as it operates also in contexts 
where the object ceases to act as such. Gell’s effort to overcome Western categorisation of the 





1.5 Some remarks and suggestions 
 
Reviewing Gell’s theory of material agency cannot prescind from a critique of a Western 
categorical paradigm, well rooted and justified by an anthropology historically known as 
humanism, that is to say the conviction that humans, intended as free and rational agents, are the 
fundamental means of comparison and judgment of the world and its phenomena. What defines 
the human, first of all culture, would be compromised by concepts such as materiality, body, 
sacred, nature, whose meaning cannot be reflected by intellect, as already seen in the section 
devoted to Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on nature (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956]). Predominant in 
the humanist paradigm is the will to reject the context, which can vary from the animal nature of 
humans to the natural environment in general, as something irrational. Sacred phenomena and 
artefacts can be included in the process of objectification and pejoration experienced by nature, 
since they are reminders of the bodily practices from which they derive. This operation can easily 
be understood through this excerpt taken from Clunas (1998, 41): 
When I was fourteen I went to London with my father. […] I visited the Victoria and 
Albert Museum for the first time, and there in a large room titled ‘Far Eastern Art’ I was 
enthralled to see a great carved lacquer seat, labeled ‘Throne of the Emperor Ch’ien-lung’. 
While the uniformed warder looked away (or pretended to), I knelt down and put my forehead 
to the black linoleum in homage. 
These are not the tales curators tell. Their role in maintaining objects (in both senses of 
the word) demands that they suppress such embarrassing personal engagements and secret 
fetishisms, which threaten to reopen the space between the viewer and the artefact.23 
 
If scientific method is based upon this strategy, on the other hand the phenomenological, 
natural, and historical description of reality as a connubium of rational and irrational is 
impoverished (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956]). The category of the human originates, then, from the 
repression of and divorce from embodiment, which includes also the animal nature (Wolfe, 2010, 
xv). Returning to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the decontextualisation operated by the 
humanist paradigm, from Descartes to Kant, is stopped by the idea, developed by Schelling, 
Bergson, and Husserl, that nature and, then, context encompass humanity before any reflections or 
rationalism (Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956]). The point of deconstructing humanism is to criticise the 
                                                          
23 For a full extent of the consequences of an objectifying way of seeing and the thread caused by situations 
when this type of gazing is put into doubt, see the episode of Derrida’s cat (Derrida, 2008). 
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rejection of the context, the reification of humanist values as inalterable and eternal truths. To put 
differently, 
the point is not to reject humanism tout court –indeed, there are many values and 
aspirations to admire in humanism –but rather to show how those aspirations are undercut by 
the philosophical and ethical framework used to conceptualize them (Wolfe, 2010, xvi). 
With a decentralisation of human identity as something not absolute, a description of the 
process between rationality and materiality can operate. This is particularly evident in the 
phenomenon of seeing, as described by Merleau-Ponty (1964). Seeing cannot totally restore and 
recompose external reality, that of the context, and internal reality, that of subjectivity, as a 
spontaneous and immediate relation. This is because the body cannot be aware of itself while 
seeing reality, due to the symbiotic unity between subject and object, seer and seen as it will be 
further discussed in chapters two and three. Nevertheless, the seen, the visible thing is a constant 
reminder of the invisible, the seer, otherwise things cannot be perceived. It is precisely the sensory 
perception which bridges the visible and the invisible: the act of seeing incorporates the perceived, 
allows the seen object or the visible to enter the sphere of the seeing subject or the invisible 
(Merleau-ponty, 2003 [c.1956]). That is the reason why this thesis deconstructs the notion of 
materiality as opposed to humanity and subjected to it by analysing the darśan as an embodiment 
between the perceiver and the thing perceived. 
Phenomenology can be corroborated by the growing academic field of post-humanist studies 
in this transcending of binary, static categories in favour of fuzzy, osmotic, hybrid and dynamic 
descriptions, as already suggested in the second section of this chapter. Post-humanism is a 
current of thought which conceives the formation of human identity as a continuous transgressing 
of the borders of subjectivity in order to come into contact with and to be influenced by alterity 
(Farisco, 2011, 67). The prefix ‘post’, according to Farisco (2011, 67), expresses the alternative to a 
fixed identity, specifically the continuous flow of becoming established in the contact and 
influence with alterity and the subsequent transcending of the self boundaries. Braidotti states that 
post-humanism (or anti-humanism in her rendition) leads her ‘to object to the unitary subject of 
Humanism, including its social variables, and to replace it with a more complex and relational 
subject framed by embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities’ 
(Braidotti, 2013, 26). In the supposed universality of humanity, the Other coincides with 
‘pejoration’, the ‘negative and specular counterpart’ of a subjectivity ‘equated with rationality’ 
(Braidotti, 2013, 15). In contrast, life, or, more precisely the ‘self-organizing structure of life itself’ 
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(Braidotti, 2013, 60), becomes, in post-humanism, an open-ended process in which all the possible 
actors, human and nonhuman, operate, so that life cannot be ascribed to the human as the unique 
species or ‘pre-established given’ with ‘unalienable’ rights (Braidotti, 2013, 60). In so doing, post-
humanism entails an egalitarianism which reconnects categories and species previously segregated 
in a vital and creative dynamic, exemplified by zoe as ‘the wider scope of animal and nonhuman 
life’ (Braidotti, 2013, 60). Human culture, in these terms, is no longer a completion of the so-called 
imperfect human being, but rather an expression of the process of hybridism between humans and 
other species or objects (Marchesini, 2002, 28, 32, 70-71).  
This thesis argues that the notion of materiality, as a category from which the nonhuman is 
distinguished and dependent from the human, must be problematised, by finding a way by which 
material agency is not shaped by the criteria of personhood. In doing so, this chapter has argued 
that the lack of a phenomenological approach within social sciences has not produced a real 
critique of the humanist paradigm, at the cost of describing materiality by using the concept of 
personhood. On the contrary, what the analysis of Gell’s work with a phenomenological approach 
shows is that the anthropomorphisation of materiality responds to a human intellectual need to 
project her characteristics on to the Other but, nonetheless, does not fully describe and understand 
materiality for what it is. Perceiving implies a substantial fusion between the perceiver and the 
perceived, with a constant mirroring of the former in the latter and vice versa, which impedes a 
complete knowledge of the Other. Our idea of the Other is always contextualised, spatially and 
temporally situated and related to our own point of view, to our own, singular body. That makes 
us come to the conclusion that materiality escapes from our control. The following chapter, by 
examining more closely the phenomenology of the encounter with the nonhuman or the Other, 








As stated at the beginning of the first chapter, the aim of the thesis is to find a way to think 
about material agency without relating it to human control, by discussing how social sciences have 
elaborated the category of materiality, especially by problematising an anthropology of materiality 
oriented to an anthropomorphisation of things. The previous chapter has addressed the theoretical 
debate which has risen from the issue of materiality, particularly how the discipline of 
anthropology has analysed animism and how Merleau-Ponty and Gell have thought about 
materiality in terms of agency. The subject/object polarization has never disappeared, but rather 
has been concealed by agency theories, such as that of Gell, where materiality plays the role of 
persons and vice versa, in a never-ending loop. In order to criticise this basic conundrum, the 
mechanism of anthropomorphisation must be deconstructed. Given the fact that 
anthropomorphising seems a universal proclivity of humans, according to the ethnographic 
accounts (thoroughly unpacked in the following chapter), the present chapter seeks to describe 
how this mechanism occurs by analysing knowledge and experience of phenomena via a 
phenomenological perspective. What I try to demonstrate is that the methodology and ethical 
framework of my research, of every research, cannot avoid acknowledging that the researcher 
continually approaches different realities, and, because of that, new academic achievements can be 
considered as the results of subjective adaptations.  
Methodology, thus, is not only a tool for problematizing the divide between subject and 
object, but also for transgressing that divide. In fact, the understanding of curators’ manipulations 
of religious materiality is an embodied activity, in which I constantly verify the impact of 
curatorial representations on my subjectivity. This does not mean falling into a different kind of 
anthropocentrism or egocentric trap, where the researcher’s subjectivity becomes the unique 
source of knowledge. Rather, the methodology I have adopted requires acknowledging that it is 
the result of a negotiation between the researcher and the participant in the research. In addition, a 
phenomenological methodology is implicit in all research anyone ever conducts. This is given by 
the fact that perception always entails an implicit denial and reification of the Other by myself and 
of myself by the Other in order to grasp the Other and myself as distinct entities, what Merleau-
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Ponty calls the ‘violent act which is perception itself’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 421). The I is not 
only the contingent and situated I, but it is simultaneously the I experienced by the Other. 
Therefore, a comparison between different types of research conducted by distinct researchers is 
possible. I concur, thus, with Thomas (2009, 43) in his surprise in noticing that there are very few 
works which ‘openly identify themselves as phenomenological’ (Thomas, 2009, 43) and which 
recognise the role and consistency of phenomenology beyond ‘a methodology in which the 
investigators base their interpretations of a place or object upon their unbridled subjective 
experience’ (Thomas, 2009, 43). Moustakas’ (1994) suggestion of narrating a pseudo-biographical 
account preceding the data analysis is an example of this partial and improper use of 
phenomenology. The “looking” of the title of this chapter precisely alludes to the fact that 
methodology is not merely a tool but also a way of life with embedded and consequential 
theorisations on how reality is perceived by us. Looking is not a passive and contemplative 
activity, but rather an engaging process, which knots and overlaps material reality and thoughts, 
researcher and participant’s subjectivities and characteristics. In stating this, I also disagree with 
Miller (2005, 3) when he condemns phenomenology and, more generally philosophy, as abstract 
approaches ‘of only limited benefit to anthropology’ (Miller, 2005, 3). On the contrary, 
phenomenology should be a mediation between the ‘ambition’ of philosophy and the ‘ordinary 
language’ (Miller, 2005, 15) of practices of peoples in its transcending of subjects and objects in 
considering materiality. What this chapter discusses, instead, is that phenomenology and the social 
sciences are different aspects of the same epistemological effort, to understand reality, and, 
because of that, they are interrelated and mutually complementary. Attention is also given to the 
mechanism of reification of the Other by reviewing different literature sources, spanning from 
phenomenology to sociology and anthropology. With a demonstration of the validity of 
phenomenology in my ethnographic practice, in particular in interviews, the chapter moves on to 
considering the methodological choices made in the course of the current research—primarily my 
appraisal of the sacred, and the preliminary data of fieldwork, upon which I had to formulate a 
particular and practical strategy. 
Having said that anthropomorphisation is a universal tendency, the methodology developed 
here precisely singles out how the ethnographic I, myself, reifies observed phenomena and 
projects on to human characteristics. In order to do so, the chapter must also legitimate the status 
of phenomenology and its role within the social sciences. As it will be seen throughout the chapter, 
phenomenology allows the decentralisation of the researcher and of her theorisation by stressing 
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how they are the products of the encounter and fusion between different subjectivities, and not the 
results of an abstract and theoretical superstructure. The social, understood as the broader network 
relating humans and nonhumans, is an escapable condition of existence and, therefore, cannot be 
objectified and separated from us, as Merleau-Ponty states: 
We must, therefore, rediscover, after the natural world, the social world, not as an object 
or sum of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of existence: I may well turn away 
from it, but not cease to be situated relatively to it. Our relationship to the social is, like our 
relationship to the world, deeper than any express perception or any judgement. It is false to 
place ourselves in society as an object among other objects, as it is to place society within 
ourselves as an object of thought, and in both cases the mistake lies in threatening the social as 
an object (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 421).  
Ferguson (2006, 8) claims that sociology and phenomenology overlap with each other as they 
both grasp ‘modern experience’ to the extent of the practical translation of the so-called ‘native 
categories’. Experience is, therefore, the ‘common root’ (Ferguson, 2006, 8) between the two 
disciplines, and is viewed by them from two different perspectives. While philosophy doubts 
reality as it is given and tries to understand its underlying mechanisms, sociology moves from a 
substantial curiosity and exploration of reality by starting from the knotting of sociality in 
individual experience, positioning sociality within a historical flux. This intertwining of sociology 
and phenomenology leads, according to Ferguson (2006, 10), to an ancient understanding of 
philosophy as knowledge of philia, or the ‘close interpersonal relations that include, but are not 
exclusively, kin’ (Ferguson, 2006, 10). In fact, phenomenology is characterised by intersubjectivity, 
as already seen in the previous chapter (section 1.2). 
As previously discussed, the true instrument and place of knowledge is the human body 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], viii, 273). More precisely, the perceived world (Ausdruck or the 
phenomenon of expression) and the senses are ‘woven’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 273) by the 
body. According to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bodily schema, body is the condition and the 
instrument of perceiving as the ‘vital communication with the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 
61), with a substantial synthesis and integration between each sense, as in the case of an art work 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 174). Thus, each ‘kinaesthetic situation’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 
352) corresponds to a specific perspective of perception of the world. Nevertheless, it is commonly 
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believed, even in musicology,24 that the true understanding of a work would be the original way in 
which it was created (Goher, 1994, 60). The music piece is considered, in an ontological way, as a 
distinct entity, or, in other words, a Platonic ideal (Goher, 1994, 41-46). Instead of viewing the work 
both externally, as a work produced by someone, and internally, as something which is bodily and 
subjectively experienced,25 the artefact is separated from the process of its production (Goher, 1994, 
65). Precisely because a work can be interpreted in more than one way, this does not correspond to 
reality. For instance, both a sextet and an orchestra can play Verklärte Nacht (Transfigured Night), 
one of Schönberg’s masterpieces (Goher, 1994, 60). This ontological perspective has led many 
scholars to classify and rank the senses as different mechanisms, as can be seen in this excerpt from 
Ong: 
Sight isolates, sound incorporates. Whereas sight situates the observer outside what he 
views, at a distance, sound pours into the hearer. […] When I hear, however, I gather sound 
simultaneously from every direction at once: I am at the centre of my auditory world, which 
envelopes me, establishing me at a kind of core of sensation and existence. […] There is no way 
to immerse yourself similarly in sight (Ong, 1990 [1982], 72). 
This phenomenon can be observed, also, in the field of the religious studies, particularly 
around the definitional problem of phenomena related to the terms sacred, religious, and magic. 
More specifically, religious studies have been strongly influenced by Durkheim’s 
conceptualisation of the sacred as a tool for creating a community completely separate from the 
‘ordinary’ sphere (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]), in an attempt similar to that observed in the museum. 
For instance, Mary Douglas (2001 [1966]) adopts a Durkheimian conceptualisation in her 
description of the phenomenon of ritual pollution: the fear of contamination is felt in 
circumstances where the border between ritual or sacred and ordinary is transgressed. On the one 
hand, this definition describes the basic structure of a religious community, by establishing the 
radical otherness of the sacred. On the other hand, Douglas conceptualisation runs the risk of 
reductionism, ‘in large part precluding an authentically phenomenological and psychocultural 
theory of religion’ (Csordas, 1990, 33), and then following the conviction, deeply-rooted in Western 
thought, of the separation between the categories of subjective and objective, as previously seen 
and further discussed in this thesis. Not only did Durkheim overlook the fact that the dichotomy 
                                                          
24 I am using Goher’s (1994) work because there is a deconstruction of traditional musicology, which tends to 
see and evaluate music works as pure and finished objects. This analysis is very similar to that of material 
cultural studies. 
25 I am employing here Merleau-Ponty’s expressions (Merleau-Ponty, 1979 [1961], 209). 
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of sacred-profane is defined first of all by the observer and is not a universal phenomenon, as 
Goody (1961, 160) has pointed out. The French sociologist also reduced space to the subjective 
dimension of the sacred by confusing it as a fact, rather than an aspect, of a social action, as Leach 
stressed (1964, 10-14). On the contrary, the dichotomy of the sacred and the profane is, according 
to Leach, a symbolic tool for expressing a cultural actor’s personal status inside a structural system 
(Leach, 1964, 10-14). It is also more than that. The elusiveness of a sacred self is due to the fact that 
the self does not exist per se, rather is constituted by processes (Csordas, 1994, 276). For instance, in 
the case of the sacred images: 
believers (have learned to) expect that images mediate the transcendental in a process 
that miraculously vests them with divine presence. Believers are led to engage in particular 
religiously induced “looking acts” so as not only to see the image but to sense the divine power 
that shines through it. Such “looking acts” are not confined to seeing alone but induce 
sensations of being touched. In this sense, religious images do not just meet the eye but have a 
thoroughly carnal dimension (Meyer, 2008, 716). 
The sacred ‘becomes concrete in embodied experience’ (Csordas, 1990, 26), and thus varies 
according to cultural-historical contexts and to personal experience, and its definition cannot be 
separated from an ethnological problem, where the otherness of the sacred is filled by different 
empirical data (Csordas, 1990, 34). Csordas, in this respect, concurs with scholars such as Otto, 
Eliade and van der Leeuw in their identification of the sacred, the totally Other, with ‘a generic 
capacity of human nature’ (Csordas, 1990, 34)26 by combining their theories with Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, as collapses of the duality of objective-
subjective (Csordas, 1990, 8). The result is the foundation of a phenomenological anthropology of 
perception, whose aim is ‘to capture that moment of transcendence in which perception begins, 
and, in the midst of arbitrariness and indeterminacy, constitutes and is constituted by culture’ 
(Csordas, 1990, 9). 
Following Csordas’ phenomenological anthropology, my own approach is also to assume the 
concept of the sacred not from a theological or philological point of view, but rather ‘to grasp how 
experiences of the transcendental are invoked in the here and now and underpin individual and 
collective identities. In this sense, my approach to the transcendental is resolutely down to earth’ 
(Meyer, 2008, 705-706). Amongst other scholars, Lynch (2010, 41-42, 50) denounces the lack of 
academic discussion of subjective agency, especially when that is applied to sacred subjects. 
                                                          
26 In this respect, I disagree with Morris’ definition of the phenomenological approaches as both ‘a neutral 
description of human experiences’ and ‘phenomena to speak for themselves’ (Morris, 2006). 
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Specifically, I deal with the usage and understanding of rituality, sacredness and religious 
experience by the local storytelling context, then with the ritual ‘efficacy’ of the scrolls (Faure, 
1998) on the one hand, and with the ‘meta-empirical’ experience of the scrolls exhibited in Western 
museums, on the other hand. In this respect, religion is conceived as a shaper of ideas, social 
conventions and relations, as well as a stimulus for feelings and sensations which can be 
encapsulated by the general tag of ‘transcendental’, particularly something which is perceived as 
beyond the ‘ordinary’. In doing this, I follow Faure’s thought as expressed in his significant article 
on Buddhist icons (1998). Instead of an aesthetic and symbolic perspective, according to which 
images’ effectiveness and the ‘animistic belief in the power of images’ are ‘repressed’ and 
‘removed’ (Faure, 1998, 777-778) in favour of ‘the genesis of particular works of art’ (Faure, 1998, 
787), I begin from images’ performative aspects and the response of the worshipper towards them. 
This means that gaze has not been considered as a passive contemplation, but rather as a practice 
which relates the viewed, the viewer and the context of seeing (Morgan, 2005, 4, 5). 
As the Italian scholar Piasere notes, anthropology is a science which has the anthropologist’s 
subjectivity as the first study tool (Piasere, 2002; 2009). The anthropologist can contribute to the 
contemporary academic debate only through her own relationship with Unheimlich (uncanny) 
contexts (Freud, 1990). As Freud explained in the essay Das Unheimlich (The Uncanny [1919]), 
unfamiliar things, or things appearing differently to the perceiver, can be frightening or perturbing 
in a second context. Thus, the unfamiliar contexts experienced by anthropologists imply their 
emotive perturbation.  
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2.2 The practicality of a phenomenological ethnography 
 
My own methodology for conducting interviews27 for this thesis has been based on a 
fortuitous and perturbing episode which occurred while I was interviewing a museum visitor 
during my MA fieldwork on a local Swiss museum, where Carnival masks are displayed. I asked 
him which mask had attracted his attention and why. The interviewee, after answering the 
question, posed the same one back. This unexpected turn struck me with surprise. I gave my 
answer without reflecting too much. When I returned home, I realised that my answer had been 
neither spontaneous, nor sincere at all. My reticence, a distinctive feature of my character, led me 
to give a standard answer with which I felt comfortable. Revealing myself to be a cat lover is not 
dangerous or compromising information. Therefore, I answered that my favourite mask was the 
cat-mask. What I did, however, was to enact a defensive response to the interviewee’s curiosity. In 
accordance with the sociologist Goffman’s theory of social relationships as theatrical performances, 
I was controlling his impression of me and, consequently, nature of my contact with him 
(Goffman, 1990, 26, 74). I did not want to give him a glimpse of myself (Goffman, 1986, 475). In that 
moment, I was exterting the same form of control that I experienced in my own interactions with 
the woodcarvers belonging to the local association which runs the museum at which I was 
working. I realised myself to be studying something which I was, at the same time, living, thereby 
blurring the borders between science and the object of science. To put differently, 
We create folklore in the most unsuspected places, without necessarily being cognizant of 
the fact that we ourselves are users and producers of folklore, and the scholar is no exception to 
this rule. Folklore is to humankind as water is to fish: we are engulfed by it but are not aware 
that we are immersed in it (Korom, 2006, 11). 
In reflecting on the episode of the cat-mask, I was aided by Kleinman’s notion of local moral 
worlds: the moral experience of individuals depends on the particular cultural and social context 
where it is situated (Kleinman, 2006, 25). According to Kleinman, individuals are like the Head of a 
Medical Student by Picasso, with an eye open to the suffering of the people and the other eye closed 
in order to protect themselves and continue with their lives (Kleinman, 2006, 235).  
Therefore, I interpreted the whole experience of fieldwork as an osmotic process. The 
interviewees and I are not distinct realities. Rather, we embody complex relations. We reveal and 
                                                          
27 I conducted the majority of the interviews in English, except for the interviews with Italian participants. In 
these cases, since I am an Italian native speaker, it had been more spontaneous to speak in Italian for both 
the interviewee and me. I translated the transcribed in English, afterwards. 
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retain information. We produce a mutual collection of stories, which determines a polyphonic text, 
in a counterpoint (Tyler, 1986, 126),28 or, better, in a transcript of Bateson’s metalogues: ‘A 
metalogue is a conversation about some problematic subject. This conversation should be such that 
not only do the participants discuss the problem but the structure of the conversation as a whole is 
also relevant to the same subject’ (Bateson, 1987, 1). Therefore, nature of the discussion always 
depends on the moral interpretation of and impact on the listener/interviewee (Meskell & Pels, 
2005, 9): ‘The listener tends to “fill in” or weave into any elliptical speech act certain elements of 
his or her internal experience. […] “the subjectivism” of the listener, functions momentarily as a 
“transitional object” or area of potential space between the listener and the speaker […]’ 
(Bernstein, 1998, 54). 
 In the dialogical context of the ethnographic encounter, then, the logic employed is fuzzy, an 
approximate and comparative notion of truth (Hájek & Cintula, 2006, 863; Gerla, 2006, 137) which 
is constantly negotiated, as in the case of participants’ consent:29 
c) Consent in ethnographic research is a process, not a one off event, due to its long-term 
and open-ended qualities. Consent may require renegotiation over time; it is an issue to which 
the anthropologist should return periodically. Depending on the research project, researchers 
may only be able to provide a rough approximation of some of the likely scenarios in which 
consent might be sought. Thus continuous reflection on ethical issues and conduct is necessary 
(ASA, 2011, 5). 
  
                                                          
28 In this respect, it is interesting to note the narrative structure in Gay y Blasco and DeLa Cruz (2012), where 
the anthropologist’s voice is alternated with that of the informant. 
29 Before undertaking fieldwork, my project and my methodological lines of conduct had been approved by 
the Ethical Committee of the University of Chester in December 2013. 
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2.3 The encounter with the Other: phenomenological implications 
 
The dialogical turn of my ethnography has led, then, to a standard way of conducting 
interviews and, more generally speaking, of interrelating my subjectivity with that of the 
participants of my doctoral research. The following chapters present the results of the investigation 
into eight museum collections30 and two temporary exhibitions devoted to the paṛs and pats, as 
well as analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with twenty-six participants, including museum 
curators, gallery-owners, scholars and members of cultural associations who work in close contact, 
indirectly or directly, with the contexts of the paṛs and pats. 
Fieldwork, as the primary and distinct source of my research, was adopted for several 
reasons. First, I wanted to test the literature on the intertwining of sacredness and museums by 
grasping the curatorial points of view about the current debate, and by analysing the expression of 
these curatorial ideas in museum exhibitions. Second, I wanted to investigate not only how Indian 
scrolls are treated in storage rooms and exhibition spaces, but also the level of expertise of the 
curators about the scrolls. This is an aspect which the existing literature on Indian scrolls has not 
examined, since scrolls are simply listed in their respective museums of provenance. Third, I 
conducted fieldwork, which also included interviews centred on the religious contents of scrolls, in 
order to situate contemporary curators and Western participants in the Western historical-cultural 
roots of the practise of seeing. Seeing is understood by Latour’s Moderns both as an aesthetic 
philosophy, and as a tool for appropriating and knowing ‘Otherness’, which resulted in the 
creation of institutions such as museums and in interpretations on non-Western art. 
Concerning the literature on the juncture between museum and religious studies, I wanted to 
verify, with fieldwork, whether the new theories on museums and religion reflect the procedural 
and interactive characteristics of a polyvalent space such as that of museums or, rather, are the 
result of academic thinking on scholarly categories. With this intent, I stressed in the interviews the 
personal standpoints of the curators towards this debate. In addition, a phenomenological 
                                                          
30 I do not include the V&A and the Völkerkundemuseum of the University of Zürich. I was granted the 
opportunity to thoroughly examine the different collections of Indian scrolls and folk religious artefacts of 
the V&A, as well as the archives related to them. However, as the curator in charge of the scrolls was not able 
to dedicate time to interviews, and I did not conduct participant observations of the curatorial practices of 
the V&A, I decided, therefore, not to include findings from the V&A in the writing up of this thesis. I applied 
a similar selection criteria to the Völkerkundemuseum, where the curator was available and I did conduct an 
interview with him. Nevertheless, due to time restrictions to fieldwork schedule, I did not have sufficient 
time to dedicate to a participant observation of the Völkerkundemuseum. 
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experience of museum exhibitions and galleries was fundamental. This experience resulted in 
detailed descriptions of different typologies of exhibiting, related to the museums’ specific 
histories of collecting and not only restricted to the sections devoted to the pats or the paṛs. Indian 
scrolls are not usually exhibited in Western museums. They are often kept in storage, mostly 
because of their huge dimensions, especially the paṛs. Therefore, emphasising the particular ways 
in which the scrolls are exhibited becomes meaningless. Observing exhibiting practices in the 
museum is also an important criterion for positioning curatorial practices and contextualising 
more clearly the treatment reserved for the scrolls. 
I also noted that there is a tangible lack of expertise towards Indian scrolls, unless they 
formed an important part of the museum’s collection from very early in its history. Thus, there is a 
lack of awareness of the new identities of the scrolls within museum spaces. In addition, the scanty 
documentation on the scrolls provided by early collectors precisely demonstrates the consideration 
of Indian art within Western intellectual debates, where Indian folk art has been viewed as a 
marginal expression of Indian art, and therefore an ethnological survival or curiosity of a past, 
rural and uncolonised world. 
The recruitment of participants followed a recurrent scheme. By using the information 
provided by cross-cultural networks of museums, I was able to compile a list of possible museums 
where the scrolls are contained. Subsequently, I used the selected museums’ online catalogues in 
order to verify which type of scrolls they might have and, thus, to exclude those museums whose 
scrolls did not fit with the research criteria, e.g. the provenance, the usage, and so on. Frequently, I 
had to write to museum directors, curators and staff directly, as the museums’ websites and 
catalogues might not be accurate, in order to clarify the type of scrolls in the museums’ collections. 
During my fieldwork, both because of the participants’ networks which resulted from my 
recruitment and the information provided by newspapers and the Internet, I was also able to 
include the curators of two temporary exhibitions.  
The curators also often suggested to me that I consult the museums’ online databases in 
order to select the artefacts of particular interest before my visit to the museums’ storages. On the 
one hand, that operation was part of the museums’ usual working approach, especially in big 
museums, as the material was often too abundant to permit a complete observation of each item. 
In addition, storages are continually booked by other scholars and researchers, as well as by 
museum curators in order to design installations of exhibitions, therefore the shortage of time 
obliged me to make a selection of the artefacts. On the other hand, pre-selecting the artefacts 
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created an on-demand situation, when I would have been more interested in investigating 
curators’ personal idiosyncrasies in relating to the stored objects. As will be further shown, the lack 
of curatorial expertise often frustrated my focus on curators’ knowledge of Indian scrolls. At the 
same time, the fact that the online databases or catalogues are visible to anyone made me wonder 
in what terms religious artefacts are viewed and consumed. In particular, as some scholarly papers 
have addressed attention to the on-line pūjā currently practiced (e.g., Mallapragada, 2010), I was 
intrigued by possible forms of worship using museum artefacts outside museums. However, I was 
not able to pursue this question more deeply. 
Fieldwork comprised several tasks. First, I photographed and searched for a written 
cataloguing of the artefacts of interest to me, together with conducting further research into the 
sources, e.g. correspondence, diaries, fieldwork notes, publications, etc., left by the collectors who 
had donated the scrolls to the museums. In this way, I investigated both how Indian scrolls and 
folk art are usually stored and whether the background information might have influenced not 
only the curators’ knowledge about the artefacts, but also the exhibitive strategies. Second, I tried 
to reconstruct a complete history of each museum. In doing so, I relied either on publications or on 
interviews with the curators, in order to verify how the institutions’ historical premises and 
heritage could have influenced the curatorial practices, e.g. the disposition of the cabinets, the 
criteria for selecting artefacts to exhibit, the styling given to the labels, and the museum’s research 
interests, etc. Third, I made a participant observation of the permanent exhibitions, in order to 
have a sense of how objects are generally displayed and represented by museums, as well as a 
possible visitor’s response to these representations. In this way, I phenomenologically experienced 
with my body how a visitor is supposed to react towards the artefact exhibited and, thus, which 
type of communication or dialogue is established between museum galleries and visitors and 
whether this communicative exchange entails a religious or ritual tone to the overall 
understanding of exhibitive practices. For instance, I visited the Museum der Kulturen in Basel with 
a MA student who was doing an apprenticeship at the museum for her dissertation on the agency 
of the local communities who produce the objects exhibited. If, on the one hand, this ‘guided-tour’ 
was useful in order to get some information which she had through working at the museum, on 
the other hand, my impression of the museum was not ‘spontaneous’, but rather guided and 
negotiated with her. I received a hard copy of the exhibition in English (the exhibition texts are all 
in German and French), which reminded me of this guided situation, since it was a pre-fabricated 
description of the exhibition and interfered with my personal reflection and imagination. 
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I initially considered six different potential targets of interest for my interviews. I followed a 
holistic approach in considering the entire phenomenon of Indian storytelling. Therefore, I found 
eligible for my research not only museum curators, more or less correlated to the Asian collections, 
but also art collectors, auctioneers and traders, as well as artists who either have found inspirations 
in Indian scrolls or have artistically collaborated with Indian painter-storytellers, and editors who 
have realised works with the painter-storytellers. In this last case, I had especially in mind the 
editors of the Tara Books publishing house, which has commissioned several works from patuas and 
other Indian folk artists. When I started to recruit participants for my research, however, I had to 
admit that it was extremely difficult to contact auction sellers, art traders and editors, since none of 
the possible participants of this group replied to my first informative email. Only two art gallery 
owners, together with the members of three cultural organisations, contributed to the research. It is 
probably not coincidental that they had been involved in the past or were involved at the time in 
fieldwork in the realisation of exhibitions (hence they are named in this work as ‘curators’, 
whereas scholars are called as such in order to distinguish them), therefore their willingness to 
discuss their work and activities with a researcher. 
In my initial plans, I would have paid particular attention to the visitors, since their 
subjective experience and perception of the scrolls can vary depending on their belief in the ritual 
and sacral power of the objects. Then I would have considered whether or not they were members 
of a community of believers. For the same reason, I had tried to focus on Indian visitors, since their 
cultural background can be useful in considering the cultural transformations of the painted scrolls 
once they are acquired and represented in Western museums, but this was not possible, since all 
the visitors I met were Westerners and none of them belonged to the Indian diaspora community. I 
had previously decided not to administer questionnaires, because of the risk of limiting or 
oversimplifying the visitor’s subjective experience. However, interviews brought very little 
significant feedback, due to the limited number of visitors and the restricted time they could 
dedicate to me, and so I decided to discard this option in the end. Therefore, the bulk of my 
fieldwork data comes from museum curators. 
I decided to offer to participants the possibility of maintaining their anonymity, both because 
that guaranteed a more spontaneous interaction, and because I could state from the beginning the 
transparency of my research purposes by dispensing the informed consent. However, I knew the 
fact that, especially in the case of museum curators, the ideal of an uncontaminated anonymity 
could not be completely fulfilled, as a lot of information related to the artefacts, as well as to the 
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stories and characteristics of the collections, might be used as clues for identifying some of the 
participants. Nevertheless, I tried to avoid as much as possible the gathering of information not 
strictly related to my research subject and to the clarity and thoroughness of this thesis. In 
addition, the choice of anonymity discouraged some of the hypothetical participants, especially 
scholars, from getting involved in the doctoral project, because of the popularity achieved either 
by their exhibitions, or by their published works, leading to their desire to be named in the 
research. Despite the fact that I clarified with them that the anonymity issue was only an offer for 
the purpose of protecting their privacy and, then, not a fixed and unconditional code of conduct, 
they did not usually change their minds. 
The participants might not have been sensitive to the themes of the research, since it did not 
arise from personal issues; however, their reactions towards questions, due to their personal 
background, would not be predictable, as my reaction towards the question regarding my 
favourite masks clearly showed. Participant observation and interviews, thus, had to be flexible on 
the basis of the feedback received. Specifically, this meant interrupting for a while the record of the 
interview or the fieldwork in order to give the participant the chance to recover from her negative 
emotions, or to clarify with me some points of my research, e.g. some particular question or my 
final purposes. I also had to re-elaborate questions quickly during the interview which seemed, for 
various reasons, to cause discomfort to the participant. Owing to the fact that participants worked 
during the fieldwork research, I asked if they would prefer to divide the interview into two or 
more meetings, in order to avoid as much as possible changes in their lifestyle. In some cases, due 
to the geographical distance, I provided the participants with a questionnaire, asking to them to re-
arrange it as a narrative schedule from which to derive a more detailed account. 
The interview outlines for each of the groups of interviewees share common types of 
questions. My initial effort was to analyse the participants’ level of acquaintance with and 
knowledge about Indian storytellers, whether they have come in contact with them by literary 
devices or through fieldwork, touristic, or business visits to their villages and communities. In 
addition, I wanted to explore the circumstances of the contact with storytellers. In particular: how 
they reacted towards foreigners’ interest in them, how participants acquired their scrolls—e.g., 
whether they were helped by a translator or whether they had a more personal and close contact 
with storytellers; what kind of expectations the participants had for the encounter with storytellers 
and, finally, whether these encounters have laid the ground for collaborative works, such as 
workshops, etc. A second block of similar questions investigated participants’ personal opinions 
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on the Indian storytellers’ interaction with local, national and international mass media and forms 
of art. In addition, I asked them to specify their commitment either in shaping a nationalistic 
identity and rhetoric in propagating religious ideals in the Indian contemporary context, in the 
case of possible Indian participants, or in developing a new spiritual sensibility among a Western 
audience, in the case of possible Western participants. I expanded this section of the questionnaire 
by stimulating a debate around some scholarly assertions about the scrolls, by referring to some of 
Perdriolle’s (2012) insights, particularly the comparisons between Indian scrolls and other so-
called tribal arts, especially aboriginal art, and postmodern art such that of Basquiat. 
In most of the cases, it became apparent that the museum curators had no expertise about 
Indian storytelling scrolls; therefore, I had to adapt my prepared questions and orient the 
interviews more towards the curators’ standpoint regarding religious objects in general. In other 
cases, due to the particularity of some fieldwork data or circumstances, e.g. temporary exhibitions, 
I added specific questions about the context I was analysing, particularly by highlighting 
participants’ visual perceptions of museum artefacts. Furthermore, I wanted to make participants 
reflect on the literature on the dialogue between religious contexts and museums, by raising 
critical questions, such as the possible religious role of the museum in the future or the possible 
religious consumption of museum spaces, and by contextualising those questions by specific 
quotations taken from the literature review I did on this theme. For instance, I often used the 
quotation from Hughes and Wood (2009, 32-36; see further in this thesis) about touching a 
religious statue in a museum as a way of worshipping it. I, then, invited participants to reflect on 




2.4 Introducing the museums observed during fieldwork 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
When I was writing up the thesis, I realised how difficult it is to present, describe and 
interpret data while maintaining clarity for the reader. Indeed, exhibitive and collective practices 
depend substantially on the history of the individual museum, thus presenting data within a 
typological approach risks impoverishing the distinctiveness of each museum. However, a 
typological approach is important in order to grasp the main conclusions reached by analysing 
data. For instance, the section devoted to the problematic aspects of exhibiting Indian scrolls in the 
frame of Western aestheticism (4.4) could not have been formulated without coming into contact 
with art museums which often have quite opposite purposes from anthropological or university 
museums. In addition, the location and the museum culture of the country of provenance of the 
museums, such as being situated in Europe rather than in the U.K. or U.S.A., are important factors 
in determining the specificity of each museum. For example, there are substantial differences 
between Italian historical-cultural approaches to museums, which have been strongly 
characterised by the peripheral role of Italy in colonialism, and the French museum culture, which 
has been influenced by Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism and experimental studies within museums such 
as that of the museologie de la rupture.31 The following preliminary description of some of the 
museums where I conducted fieldwork, then, must maintain the historical specificity of each 
museum. 
Even though every museum constitutes a unicum, the common characteristic shared by all 
the museums I visited is the fact that the main, permanent collections were acquired during the 
colonial period. Therefore, the information left from past collectors determines the level of 
knowledge and expertise of the current curators about the artefacts of their collection. The World 
Museum of Liverpool represents a good example of this. The first public museum in Liverpool 
(1850-1853) was commissioned by the influential elite of the city to Thomas John Moore, a member 
of the Zoological Society of London (Millard, 2010). Moore’s interest in natural history is reflected 
by the encyclopaedic nature of the museum, with a level dedicated to the aquatic fauna, a level 
focused on archaeological artefacts and the third level occupied by the World Cultures collections. 
                                                          
31 Term invented during the 1970s and 1980s by the director of the Ethnological Museum in Neuchatel, 
Switzerland, characterised by the attempt to break some naturalised laws of the museum experiences, such 
as the contemplative and distant engagement of the visitors. 
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Colonial officers or tradesmen collected ethnographic material, therefore information varied 
according to the particular roles of the purchasers. For instance, Indian cabinets, presented 
alongside collections from Burma and Java, have fewer objects than the Tibetan section. The 
curator explained to me that 
It is really a matter of pragmatics. The Tibetan collection is bigger, it has the target of the 
galleries to put together, it had somebody conducting research on them and the Indian 
collections are really very poorly documented, so we do not know a great deal about them, 
which makes it very difficult to display them. In terms of ethnography, we very much rely on 
the context for the objects, so in terms of the Indian collections we have a lot of arms and 
armours which were clearly taken and looted during the British colonial period in India, but we 
know actually very little about the circumstances under which they were collected and, so, 
often we only know the region from they came from, sometimes the label just says India and the 
documentation is so poor, we do not actually know more than that.  
The Museum der Kulturen (Museum of Cultures) in Basel offers another telling example. The 
Museum der Kulturen started in the mid-19th century as a mixture of an ethnographic and natural 
history museum. In the 20th century, due to its director Alfred Bühler, the primary focus of the 
museum was textiles. The museum has four paṛs, three dating from the mid-19th to the beginning 
of the 20th century. Two of the paṛs were bought by Alfred Bühler in 1964. One was bought from a 
family of bhopas, belonging to the nomadic Vanazara group. The third was a donation from a 
private collector in 1980. The last paṛ (ca. 1970) was donated in 1975. It was bought from two bhopas 
from the town of Bewar (region Ajmer), who lived in Ahmenabad. Most of the textiles seen 
together with the four paṛs seemed not to be exhibited or analysed in much more depth. The most 
striking feature of these paṛs is that they have been catalogued under the tag of textiles, which tells 
a lot, not only about the primary focus of the museum, but also in terms of the interpretations of 
the paṛs, described according to fabric painting techniques, etc., but not adequately contextualised 
with the ritual and anthropological conditions of usage. 
Sometimes, the difficulties faced by curators are not restricted only to past collectors, but 
rather the problematic aspects of the collections intertwine with contemporary policies. For 
instance, the Kulttuurien museo in Helsinki, which is the result of different collections of the 
University of Helsinki from the 19th century, has been incorporated into the National Museum of 
Finland since the beginning of 2014. This has led to huge problems of space, and thus of power, 
because the National Museum has given just two rooms as permanent exhibitive spaces to the 
Museum of Cultures. In addition, the Museum of Cultures, at the time of my fieldwork, had two 
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showcases inside the National Museum in order to ‘advertise’ its moving. The curator told me that 
the design and the lights must not be changed and this limited the choice of the artefacts to exhibit. 
For these reasons, the Museum of Cultures had to make some compromises and to collaborate 
with other museums in the city, such as that of the University. 
In terms of past heritage, the museums have adopted two different strategies, from which I 
have been able to derive two general museum typologies. On the one hand, heritage constitutes an 
obstacle to the exhibitive practices, and the museums have not yet found an efficacious way to 
bridge the gap inherited by the previous museum management. This is the case of the Musée du 
Quai Branly in Paris, of the Penn Museum in Philadelphia and of the Museum of Archaeology and 
Anthropology of the University of Cambridge. The general lack of expertise towards Indian scrolls, 
observed in all the eight museums, is, in these cases, exacerbated, since the lack of information 
remains generally unremedied. 
On the other hand, the past is either problematized through the contemporary engagement 
of the museums with local communities from which the artefacts come, or situated in the 
neighbouring regions of the museum. This means using the past collections in a critical way and in 
continuous connection with the feedback given by the local communities, the only ones capable of 
bridging the gap left by previous collectors, as the attempt observed at the MAA of the University 
of Cambridge. As I was able to read from a label, the Oriental Museum32 of the University of 
Durham was founded with teaching purposes by Professor Thomas W Thacker, Director of 
Durham University’s School of Oriental Studies from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The interests 
of several art collectors in donating or selling their objects to the museum, as further shown in this 
section, made the collection sizable, therefore the construction of the present museum building in 
1960 was necessary.33 This continuous flow of donations or landings is still a trend in the museum 
today, as either local or art museums further afield have historical collections which either do not 
fit with their contemporary focus of interest or nobody is currently researching on, hence the 
problem of allocation and space for the Oriental Museum, which is a small building.34 Despite this, 
the museum is able to exhibit contemporary objects or themes, in a constant debate with the local 
                                                          
32 ‘The ‘Orient’ is not an area with defined geographical boundaries and the term can mean widely differing 
things to different people, from a very narrow definition relating to East Asia, to a much wider concept 
stretching beyond the boundaries of Asia into the Near and Middle East. In the case of the Oriental Museum, 
the definition is a wide one indeed, and the collections cover an enormous area ranging from North Africa 
right through to South East Asia […]’ (informative material on the museum). 
33 For further information about the story of the Oriental Museum, see Oriental Museum, 2014, 12-23. 
34 Information collected by an informal conversation with the curator whom I interviewed further. 
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communities who live near the museum. For instance, the South-Asian section of the museum is 
still under-explored, as most of the collection consists of weaponry and in colonial-racist moulds. 
To correct this, the curators are trying to acquire contemporary artefacts from India or more 
ethnographic pieces from other South-Asian collections in the U.K. 
While the Penn and the MAA are university museums, the Musée du Quai Branly is a national 
museum. Therefore, the first two museums have a more scientific approach compared to the 
French museum, where the main goal is to reach the widest social strata of visitors through use of 
divulgative language and a spectacular rendition of the artefacts in the cabinets. All three 
museums are characterised by extreme difficulties in networking their research activities with the 
collections they inherited from collectors influenced by an antiquarian and aesthetic interest 
towards ethnological material. That is true also in cases where museums are in a middle way 
between archaeological and anthropological typology, so that even contemporary curators 
collected Indian storytelling scrolls as secondary findings of their research. This is clear, for 
instance, in the case of the Penn Museum.  
 
2.4.2 The Musée du Quai Branly 
 
The Musée du Quai Branly is the result of a work of design and re-elaboration of previous 
ethnological collections, mainly from the Musée de l’Homme and the National Museum of Oceanian 
and African Arts.35 The last museum started as the Museum of Colonies and it was created in the 
1930s in connection with the public exhibition in Parc Saint Vincent. It became the Musée des Arts 
Africaines et Oceanians in 1962 and the Asian collection of the previous Museum of Colonies were 
sent to the Musée de l’Homme. The Asian collection of the Musée de l’Homme contains mostly objects 
from French ex-colonies, then principally from South-East Asia. In addition, the Musée de l’Homme 
received several objects from the Musée Guimet,36 which focused more on the artistic rather than 
ethnographic properties of the objects. Then, objects not considered artistically worthy were sent to 
the Musée de l’Homme. The heterogeneity of provenance of the original collections renders a 
detailed cataloguing difficult. As the curator who helped me in the storage did not have Indian 
storytelling scrolls and folk paintings as areas of expertise, I had to rely on the online catalogue 
                                                          
35 For further information on the history of the museum, see De L’Estoile, 2007. See also the critiques on the 
foundation of the museum and its process of aesthetisation in Clifford, 2007, Dias, 2008, Jolly, 2011, Lebovics, 
2006, and Levitz, 2006. 
36 The collections of the Musée Guimet originally came from the Louvre (from the interview with the curator). 
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and on the online additional information provided by the database for museum staff. Among the 
one hundred and fifty Indian scrolls, I selected: three Mithila paintings (for me the most 
significant37 in terms of religious representations); three jadu patuas’ scrolls (a jom pat, a Binti pat ou 
Santali Janma (The Birth of the Santals’ World), a series of chaksudan pats); three patuas’ scrolls 
(Satyapir pat, Manasa pat38 and a pat on the history of Indian Independence), and a kavad. While 
Katherine Dass donated the Mithila paintings, dating from the 20th century, all the other artefacts I 
examined originally came from the Musée de l’Homme. All the patua and jadu-patua scrolls were sold 
to the museum by Jean-Baptiste Faivre (1951-1984),39 while the kavad was acquired during the 
mission of Jacques Millot (1897-1980) and came from the Basi village, of the Bhil minority (Kavadia 
Bhats, Rajasthan). The shape is inspired by the temple of Benares (Arapurna). Millot bought it in 
Udaipur in 1961. Despite the fact that the database reports the name of the artists who realised the 
artefacts as well as the names of the purchasers, I was not able to find any other information on the 
circumstances of the realisation of the artefacts and their acquisition. While the kavad was 
described in detail, in the section of ‘usage’ of each scroll the same words of those of the label in 
the gallery are reported.  
The curator of the Musée du Quai Branly, when introducing the permanent collection, told me 
about the problems of design and the logistic/practical availability of the objects. Since the cabinets, 
designed by a famous French architect, Jean Nouvel, cannot be changed due to artistic property 
rights, they do not fit with some pieces of the collections. Furthermore, because of the large 
amount of textiles and pictures on paper, the permanent exhibition must be rotated periodically in 
order to prevent light damage, which is very likely to happen since light is massively used for 
‘scenographic’ reasons. By visiting the other sections of the museum on the last day, I could 
confirm the scenographic effect of the exhibition, which is sometimes even more spectacular in the 
case of Oceanian and African pieces, e.g. altar/shrine reconstructions, or a scanty use of light in the 
case of funerary puppets and objects. In addition, the sections are connected by a corridor which 
resembles a desert dune, and the park outside of the museum tries to give an exotic allure. The 
spectacular renditions of the museum objects is perceived by the public, mostly school classes, 
                                                          
37 Namely, a kohbar ghar, or the auspicious decoration of the marriage room, a painting of ten female 
goddesses and a representation of Ardhanarishvara. 
38 It is interesting to note that these two pats came from the village of Naya. 
39 ‘The first persons who are known to have lived among the Jādopatiās for some time are Jean-Baptiste Faivre 
and his friend Utpal Chakrobarty. Faivre was an artist and Chakrobarty is an art historian. From December 
1978 until March 1979 they did fieldwork on the Jādopatiās in the region of Santal Parganas (Bihar)’ (Hadders, 
2001, 24). 
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who are more attracted by the display of the object than by the contents.  
The ritualistic and religious dimensions of the object are described in an informative way, 
and its spectacular or evocative aspects are highlighted. A folk reading explains the concept of 
darśan: 
Krishna/Radha et les vachères (Nathadwara, Rajasthan, Première moitié du 20e siècle, 
peinture sur toile de coton) – Le jeune Krishna suscite chez les villageoises un sentiment 
amoureux qui est en fait le désir de liberation de l’âme individuelle par son union au divin. Le 
regard du dieu (darsana) est purifiant et bénéfique pour ses fidèles. Ici, comme souvent dans 
l’art indien, les yeux jouent un role central.40 
The ritual dimension of the Asian section of the museum is again present in the Nepali ritual 
lamps and masks and Tibetan objects, as well as in the video installation on Theravâda 
Buddhism,41 and even in the area dedicated to music, where the four continents are united. Here a 
film of ritual temple song in the Kathmandu valley is shown. The video installation, with 
snapshots of the ritual, remarks on the supernatural dimension of the context by zooming in on 
deity masks, temples and goddesses’ pictures. 
The three Santhal scrolls42, the only examples I encountered of exhibited scrolls within 
permanent galleries, are located in a little nook of the Asian section of the museum. While the 
other sections (Africa, Oceania and the Americas) are organised according to ethnological 
concepts, e.g. the rites of initiations in the African sector, or in geographical units, e.g. in the 
American sector, the Asian section is subdivided into socio-structural frames, e.g. women’s 
clothes, weapons, etc. The curator said to me that this organisation resembles an old-fashioned 
ethnological encyclopaedia,43 and, in some way, this is true. The Indian cabinets break this logical 
display, because they are not related to a main label or title. The visitor can easily understand, 
however, that the common traits shared by the Santhal scrolls, ritual bronzes, Sri Lankan exorcist 
masks, popular artistic production related to Vishnu and Krishna (bronze, painted textiles, games, 
                                                          
40 ‘Krishna/Radha and the milkmaids (Krishna/Radha and the cowherd, Nathadwara, Rajasthan, early mid-
20th century, painting on cotton cloth). The young Krishna arouses in the village’s female inhabitants a 
feeling of love, which is the desire for freeing the individual soul via its union with the divine. The deity’s 
gazing (darshana) is purifying and beneficial for its worshippers. Here, as in Indian art, the eyes play a 
central role’ (my translation). 
41 L’Hommage à la statue du Bouddha. 
42 Rouleau peint, «La fête de Baha» (Rampado Chitrakar, India, Bihar, 20th century); Rouleau peint «Le 
royaume de Yama» (Lankeshwar Chitrakar, India, Bihar, 20th century; Rouleau peint «La déesse Kali» 
(Nabahani Chitrakar, India, Bihar, 20th century). 
43 In the interview, he specified that this mental schema is referred to the French branch of the ethnological 
thoughts (e.g. Lévi-Strauss). 
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cards, etc.), and bronze animals, humans and mythical creatures, are the performative/ritualistic 
usages of these objects. This is clearly stated, at least from my point of view, by the Andra Pradesh 
shadow puppets displayed in the niche. As well as two video installations, one about the patuas 
and the other one on the shadow puppets, reproducing the performance, there are also shadow 
puppets of the Syrian theatre Khayâl l-dhill used during Ramadhan, but the position is peripheral 
compared to those from Andra Pradesh. The storytelling performance and the realisation of the 
scrolls are presented in the case of the patuas, while in the case of the shadow puppets a French 
subtitled synthesis of the Ramayana is given along with the puppets dancing on the screen.44 
Turning to the three scroll paintings, there is no label translated in English, and thus their 
aesthetic dimension is more emphasised for a nonspeaker of French. The distinction between the 
Santhal tribe and the other patuas is blurred, since the scrolls, clearly made by jadu-patuas, are not 
directly identified with Santhal mythology–even though the title of the stories depicted should 
recall the Santhal world to the careful visitor–despite an explanatory label. In addition, it is not 
clearly stated that the jadu-patuas are not Santhals. The fact that the scrolls are considered tools 
between the living and the dead worlds is also briefly explained in the video, and we can find the 
same confusion between patuas and jadupatuas. Dukkushyam Chitrakar, of the district of Naya, is 
filmed along with Santhals’ patuas and the title is Patua. Pentres et montreurs d’images. 
 
2.4.3 The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University of Cambridge 
 
The Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University of Cambridge was established 
in 1884, even though the first deposit in the ethnographic collection occurred in 1883 and 
there was some difference of opinion as to where they should be placed; some said they 
were purely antiquarian, others said they were part of the Natural History of man and therefore 
should be placed in the New Museums, with the large collection of crania… (passage of the 
Cambridge University Reporter, 27 November 1883, quoted in Ebin & Swallow, 1984, 4) 
The museum was, in fact, the union of different collections in Cambridge colleges, the so-
called displays of curiosities from the 16th century onwards, which showed miscellaneous interests 
spanning from natural history and classical items to ethnological specimens (Thomas & Elliott, 
2011, 6). This blurred area of interest reflected the eclectic nature of the newly born anthropological 
discipline. The main anthropologist of the university, as well as curators throughout the time of 
                                                          
44 I suppose it is not a real performance filmed in India, but rather a recreation. 
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the museum, Haddon, Rivers and Seligman were, first of all, biologists, who applied the scientific 
method to the study of humankind (Ebin & Swallow, 1984, 18) and, thus, took an evolutionary 
approach. The institutionalisation of these collections into a museum was established by the 
Cambridge Antiquarian Society, founded in 1840, which was seeking to find a place to house its 
own collection (Thomas & Elliott, 2011, 6; Ebin & Swallow, 1984, 9-10). The efforts of the society 
met those of the Fitzwilliam Museum, which was searching for a space for ‘a teaching collection of 
casts of classical sculpture’ (Thomas & Elliott, 2011, 7), and those of Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 
ex-Cambridge student and colonial governor, who was trying to present his collection on Fiji 
(1875-1880) to the university (Thomas & Elliott, 2011, 7; see also Ebin & Swallow, 1984, 10). 
The different actors involved in the foundation of the museum had different views of 
ethnological objects, as Sir Edmund Leach described in the foreword to Ebin and Swallow (1984, 1-
2). On the one hand, the members of the antiquarian society collected and analysed the artefacts 
for their own sake. On the other hand, scholars such as Haddon and Rivers viewed the artefacts as 
depositories of a pre-historical past. 
Gregory Bateson, who made his collection of Sepik River (New Guinea) art in 1929 was 
almost the first of our collectors to have a clear appreciation, not only that ethnographic objects 
cannot be understood if they are isolated from their physical and social context but also that 
social institutions […] cannot be understood if they are isolated from the material apparatus 
with which they are normally associated (Leach, 1984, 2). 
The museum has, therefore, historical collections with which to come to terms. A good 
example is Paul Montague’s collection, some samples of which were exhibited during the period of 
my fieldwork. Paul Montague (1890-1917) was a zoologist student of the University of Cambridge 
who made an expedition to New Caledonia in 1913 with his friend and botanist R H Compton. 
Even though the expedition’s aim was to collect wild specimens, Montague soon became 
interested in the Kanak culture and started an ethnological collection with a special interest in the 
so-called magic stones used by the Kanak to ‘manipulate the world around them’. The ethnological 
collection grew with the goal of documenting the Kanak culture before it disappeared. Indeed, at 
the time of his collecting, the Kanak started to be converted to Christianity and missionaries 
pushed them to throw away objects related to ‘pagan’ rites. This collection had never been exposed 
or exhibited for a century, but 
Now, as part of a project called Pacific Presences: Oceanic Art and European Museums, 
Kanak researchers are visiting Cambridge and reconnecting objects with Montague’s notes, 
drawings and photographs. Their work adds new layers of interpretation and raises questions 
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about how individuals and communities deal with loss, memory and remembrance.  
 
 
2.4.4 The Penn Museum 
 
Sommerville, one of the principal collectors of the Penn Museum in the XIX century, collected 
fifty-six Kalighat paintings, which I had the possibility of viewing and cataloguing during 
fieldwork. I selected forty-five of them, as they have a religious theme. The other collector, 
Alexander Scott, also acquired Indian objects, although mostly of them related to Buddhism, as 
seen above. I found a 20th century Hindu triptych45 and a kavad 
(http://penn.museum/collections/object/356863), but the information related to them is not 
sufficient to have a more thorough idea of the circumstances of provenance and acquisition. I 
catalogued also a paṛ which I cannot include in the category of the Pābūjī ki paṛ, as the scenes 
depicted were completely new to me, and did not follow the Pābūjī epic at all. I did not ascertain if 
the paṛ is a Devanārāyaṇ type, as the dimensions are too small to fit that category. This paṛ was 
commissioned by the archaeologist Posselh, who was in charge of the Asian section during the 
1970s and the 1980s.46 I consulted the archives in order to find whether Sommerville, Scott and 
Possehl mentioned the circumstances of collecting the Indian items of my focus. In particular, 
The Gregory L. Possehl Indus Civilization papers are composed of twelve boxes of 
correspondence, a seven box visual archive of negatives, slides, photographs and drawings and 
twenty-three boxes of field data, (4) notebooks, field cards, analysis, professional and 
publication material and correspondence related to the individual sites and years of the 
expeditions. There are two small file boxes of notes and a bibliography (Rodgers, 2012, 3). 
Unfortunately, none of them wrote about the Indian material, and I suspect that they simply 
gathered them as traveller’s curiosities and donated them to the museum in a second phase. In the 
case of the Kalighat paintings, this might be confirmed by the fact that they are called ‘bazaar 
                                                          
45 Chance/White’s archives: ‘Hindu Triptych-India-20th century- Formed of stamped clay plaques, painted 
and gilded. All represent Vishnu; all three seem to have been made in the same mold but the outer panels 
have been cut down. Central one has side scenes showing Krishna (left) and Lakshmi (right). Lower corners 
show (left) Narasimha Avatar (right) Vishnu sleeping under the hood of the serpent Sesshu. In wooden case 
with glass. Gift of Presbyterian Board of Missions, 600 Schaff Bldg., Phila, Mr Caldwell-catalougued SVRC 
1948’. 
46 Even though Possehl did a Ph.D. in anthropology and was a professor in the Department of Anthropology 
and Oriental Studies, his academic interests were more related to archaeology, since he studied the 
Harappan civilisation from 2500 BCE to 2000 BCE (Rodgers, 2012, 3). 
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paintings’, which were sold to tourists. In fact, European travellers in Calcutta during the second 
half of the 19th century started to bring back Kalighat paintings as Indian curiosities or descriptive 
examples of Indian iconography, rather than artistic work (Jain, 1999, 10).  
Robert Stewart Culin (1858-1929), the first director, from 1892 until 1899, of the Free Museum 
of Science and Art in Philadelphia started to house the museum’s collection in the University of 
Pennsylvania’s library building. He assembled the objects in order to make cross-cultural 
comparisons (White & Long, 2008, 97), a feature which was then inherited by the consolidated 
University Museum. Indeed, the principal goal of the museum was putting together the so-called 
‘great civilisations’ (Hodges, 2008, 76). Between 1913 and 1926, the museum started to be involved 
in ethnographic expeditions in the Middle East, which were carried out by the first director of the 
Museum, George Byron Gordon, as well as to Central and South America. These expeditions also 
had the purpose of acquiring objects, mostly major works of art, especially Buddhist masterpieces, 
from private collectors. Particularly concerning the Asian collection: ‘In 1914 the Museum acquired 
objects from Nepal and Tibet that had been collected by the amateur painter and tea merchant 
Alexander Scott’ (Winegrad, 1993, 58). Scott was made Honorary Representative of the University 
Museum by the Board of Managers, and started his expedition in India with a specific focus on 
Buddhist art (White & Long, 2008, 103). His first response to Indian art was unease, similar to that 
which has already been analysed in the previous chapter on Western perception of Indian deities, 
as he reported in the paper on his collection: 
When I saw Indian gods and temple ornaments for the first time I remember feeling, like 
others, a sense of dislike. They gave me little pleasure on the aesthetic side and as for their 
religious significance, the words of an old hymn, “The heathen in his blindness, bows down to 
stocks and stones”, rang in my ears every time I looked at them (Scott, 1914, 58). 
Despite the fact that a Tibetan monk, Dousand Up (Dawasamdup), in clarifying the religious 
iconography and functions of the collected objects (Scott, 1914, 57; White & Long, 2008, 103), 
helped Scott,47 it is quite probable that Scott’s collecting was driven more by aesthetic appeal rather 
than anthropological queries. This is confirmed by nature of the other museum collections, since 
some of the acquisitions belonged more to the sphere of art rather than anthropology, and there 
was a fruitful collaboration and exchange with the Philadelphia Museum of Art (Winegrad, 1993, 
61). The author mentions as an exception the Crystal Ball of the Imperial Palace in Peking 
(Winegrad, 1993, 61). My overall impression when visiting was of an art museum, as the exhibitive 
                                                          
47 English notes written by the monk can be found in Scott’s collection. 
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spaces showed the accuracy of realisation of the objects, rather than furnishing a detailed 
contextualisation. This is especially true in the case of the Asian collection, with its Harrison 
Rotunda, added in 1915: ‘Unique in North America, the 90 foot high dome is one of the largest 
unsupported masonry domes in the world’ (Winegrad, 1993, 60), thus the installation adds a sense 
of monumentality to the objects, most of them already architectural pieces of temples. Maxwell 
Sommerville collected most of the objects on display at the end of the 19th century. Sommerville 
was not an academically trained explorer, even though ‘well situated among the many scholarly 
societies of Philadelphia’ (White & Long, 2008, 99), with a specific interest in glyptology. His gem 
collection, according to him, could have rivalled the cabinets of Lorenzo de Medici and Catherine 
the Great (Winegrad, 1993, 64). 
The curator I interviewed stated that the objects in the Rotunda were collected as art objects, 
therefore they were shown, in the 1950s, for their beauty and not put in correlation with their 
original context: ‘Set apart from their historical or cultural context, they can convey little or 
nothing of the esoteric philosophy behind their creation’ (Winegrad, 1993, 71). Some of the objects 
of the Rotunda raise questions about their legacy, as their acquisition was controversial, as in the 
case of two Chinese horses in porcelain, looted by a Chinese dealer, Mr. C. T. Loo, who later 
collaborated with the Musée Guimet in Paris (Winegrad, 1993, 63). 
He had acquired them during the reign of Yuan Shih-k’ai (1913-1916), who ruled 
northern China briefly following the end of the Ch’ing dystany. By 1927 Peking was in the 
hands of another warlord, this time from Manchuria. Writing from Vladivostok that year, Loo 
complained that he had been forced to take a local train across Siberia, a trek that had taken a 
toll on his health, and ascribed his misfortunes to “a personal avenge” on the part of a former 
employee, now in the Chinese Ministry. In a plaintive letter to Gordon, he exonerates himself 
from the accusation that the transaction ten years earlier had not been conducted strictly in 
accordance with the laws of the land […] (Winegrad, 1993, 63). 
The ambiguous circumstances of Loo’s activities are even more explicit as regards the 
Rotunda’s enormous Buddhist wall paintings, purchased in 1926. According to Loo, they were sold 
by a Buddhist prior in order to repair the temple of which he was in charge. However, in 1965 it 
was ascertained that the frescos were removed from a 14th-century ruined monastery in the Shanxi 




2.4.5 Some concluding remarks 
 
This thesis argues that materiality is a category by which social sciences establish a hierarchy 
between the human and the nonhuman, where the human becomes the metre of judgement and 
the source of agency, while the nonhuman is passively ancillary to human agency, whose notion of 
personhood determines the forms of engagement of the nonhuman with the human. The aim of 
the thesis is to problematise this concept of materiality, as the human and the nonhuman overlap 
in concrete, phenomenological perception. This chapter has shown that a phenomenological 
approach to research implies a dialogic interaction between researcher’s subjectivity and that of 
the participant. Far from the accusation of ego- and anthropocentrism, this implication clearly 
shows that it is impossible to separate social phenomena from the specific, spatially and 
temporally situated encounter between the I and the Other: the ethnographic Self is also shaped by 
the Other’s impression of the former. Instead of ontological facts, such as Durkheim’s notion of the 
sacred, we have interacting processes resulted by the embodiments of the social actors. 
Phenomenology, then, is not just a mere practicality but coincides with a peculiar world view, a 
theoretical framework with ethical implications.  
The museums explored during fieldwork have encountered several difficulties in merging 
the inheritances from their past in their present goals. The encounter between the past collectors 
and the Other was hugely influenced by an evolutionary approach, according to which Asian 
artefacts were witnesses of a less developed culture. In this process of pejoration and reification to 
which Asian artefacts were subjected, Western culture became the parameter of judgement and, at 
the same time, the instrument of knowledge and description of the Other. As the following chapter 
(3) will explain, Western museums are places where the Other is divorced from the original 
context of fusion between different subjectivities. Instead of considering the separation between 
the perceiving I and the perceived Other as a consequence of perception, Western museums, 
mouthpieces of scientific disciplines, establish this divide as a natural fact. In contrast, a 
phenomenological approach negates the category of Otherness as ontological, but rather defines 
the Other as the result of the dialogue established by the I with the surrounding context while 
perceiving. As a consequence, fieldwork becomes one of the ways of subject’s experience, instead 
of being a professional activity separated from the rest of researcher’s life. The following chapter 
will focus on the act of seeing in the specific phenomenon of darśan as an illustrative case study of 
the dynamics of the encounter between the I and the Other. 
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Chapter 3 




The task of this thesis is finding a way of thinking about the agency of materiality without 
making it ancillary to the human, thus problematising the humanist paradigm. The larger 
argument has been taken so far by analysing, on a theoretical level, the limits of the 
anthropological debate on materiality, in the first chapter, and, from a methodological point of 
view, the reductionism of Western ontologies in approaching social phenomena, in the second 
chapter. The current chapter takes the overall argumentation further by describing the 
phenomenon of darśan, as it occurs in the pats and paṛs, and by comparing it to ritual and religious 
dynamics more kin to Western culture, those of the Orthodox icons. Seeing, in fact, with the 
double connection between the seer and the seen, as well as their perceiving and feeling, 
represents the aptest phenomenon in which the rigid, humanist dicothomy is destabilised. 
Particularly, the religious phenomenologies arising from the act of seeing put in discussion the 
work of separation between facts and ideas which Latour (2010) has posed as characteristic of 
Western modernity. 
As seen in chapters one and two, the body creates an illusion of fusion between the 
perception of the subject and things themselves: the body annihilates itself during perception, so 
that the latter does not reach the former in the act of perceiving (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 24-25). This 
does not mean that the idea of the touching touched body is delegitimized. On the contrary, this 
thought is continually confirmed by observing the Other gazing at us (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 24-25). 
In particular, the thing perceived by the Other is subdivided into the thing which the Other 
perceives, which is beyond our own perception, and the Others’ perceiving body, which is given to 
our gazes (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 24-25). The Other, due to an ontological catastrophe, thus, 
becomes as the thing we perceive (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 115). In addition, ideas, perceptions, etc. 
are separated from the perceiver, and so an intentional psychology is attributed to every mental 
representation, even in the case of artistic objects (Gell, 1998, 130, 131), as seen in the first chapter, 
in Gell’s notion of internal agency. For instance, according to Mitter’s synthesis of Gombrich’s 
thought (2012, 3), artistic representations differ culturally and historically as the artist starts to 
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create by referring to a personal mental image of the world, which then varies according to 
cultural systems and times. Examining this in more depth, Jack Goody (1997) pinpoints that an 
image, as a representation of something real and not reality itself (‘Das Ding an sich’), is inherently 
ambivalent from a cognitive point of view, because it can be considered both as a presence and as 
an absence of the thing represented.  
Approaching things always entails an inauguration, an experience of them for the first time. 
Phenomena are, thus, astonishing, literally phenomenal (Ferguson, 2006, 17).  
Prior to and independently of other people, the thing achieves that miracle of expression: 
an inner reality which reveals itself externally, a significance which descends into the world and 
begins its existence there, and which can be fully understood only when the eyes seek it in its 
own location. Thus the thing is correlative to my body and, in more general terms, to my 
existence, of which my body is merely the stabilized structure (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 373). 
Furthermore, the phenomenal has always been associated with the magical and the 
supernatural, deriving from the ancient Jewish astonishment at the irruption of the divine 
(Ferguson, 2006, 19-20). As the section below (3.2) will further describe, the darśan, or the contact 
between the Hindu worshipper and Hindu deities by visual means, exemplifies the enchanted 
connotation given to the phenomenal. Ferguson, interestingly, traces the development of 
phenomenology from the process of secularisation of the ancient astonishment towards things, 
which can be observed in the historical constitution of the museum (Ferguson, 2006, 19). By 
confining the divine outside the space and by dividing the human from the natural, Nature 
became, in this process of secularisation, a self-sufficient reality, which is joined to the human by 
the senses. The natural was, then, transformed into ‘the supreme object of curiosity’ (Ferguson, 
2006, 28). What is important to note, however, is that humans have always justified their actions 
towards Nature as sharing intelligence and reason with the divine creator, then even previously 
than secularisation. 
Given that God’s intelligence was at the origin of the creation of living beings, it was 
appropriate that some of them should be able to participate in this faculty and thereby be able 
to apprehend, in the perfection of the universe, the goodness of God’s design. Humans, who are 
therefore endowed with reason and knowledge, are thus set apart from the rest of Creation, 
enjoying a supremacy that stems from the divine plan and, in consequence, calls for humility 
and responsibility (Descola, 2013, 67). 
Modernity, according to Latour (1993, 13), is a historical process by which human and 
nonhuman (objects and animals) are considered as separate entities, negating the hybridism and 
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the conjunction between them. This work of negation, and thereby of constitution of the human 
and the nonhuman, is called the ‘work of purification’ (Latour, 1993, 14). Latour (1993, 14-15) 
suggests the investigation of modernity via ethnological means. By attributing both to natural and 
social forces the incapacity of speaking, in general, and of speaking for themselves, in particular, 
the Moderns can consider Nature as a ‘radical transcendence’, with the consequence that they are 
‘the only actors in their political destiny’ (Latour, 1993, 32). Everything is approached, then, as if it 
is a human fabrication or intervention, without a distinction between the artificial and what is 
shaped. Latour calls this human projection fetish, bringing into consideration the double meaning 
of the Portuguese word feitiço, from which the notion of fetish has historically developed. Feitiço 
derives from the Portuguese past participle feito which means, as a noun, a shape, a configuration 
and, as an adjective, artificial, fabricated and enchanted (Latour, 2010, 2-3; see also Jackson, 1998, 
76-77). The fascination is precisely aroused from the implicit demiurgic power attributed to the act 
of making and doing (Latour, 2010, 2-3). Gell, in his famous essay The Technology of Enchantment 
and the Enchantment of Technology (Gell, 2006, 163), proposes that objects provide the means by 
which humans are convinced of the necessity of the social order, in a similar fashion to what is at 
the centre of Augé’s discussion of materiality explained in the first chapter. Objects have this 
power because ‘their coming-into-being’ via technology cannot be graspable by human intellect: 
objects possess a ‘halo-effect of resistance’ to humans, who are, then, ‘forced to construe 
[technology] as magical’ (Gell, 2006, 169-170). What is important for this debate on the fetish is, 
then, the magic feature of the act of making, because of which materiality and nature, as described 
in the first chapter, overlap. 
The consequences of fetishism are two-fold. First, human theories on nature are considered 
as self-evident facts and no longer connected to human cognition. Researchers’ practices are 
incorporated and fused with theory (Latour, 2010, 20-21), so that the ideas acquire an absolute state 
of authority and, thus, are revered by a pseudo-spiritual approach, usually characterised as 
disinterested and elite. Latour calls this reification of human concepts factish. In this acceptation, 
factish thoughts can be ascribed to Baudrillard’s (1994, 6) concept of simulacrum, which stems from 
the negation of any equivalence between the sign and the real and the consequent substitution of 
the real with the simulacrum. 
the scientists declare that they themselves are not speaking; rather, facts speak for 
themselves. These mute entities are thus capable of speaking, writing, signifying within the 
artificial chamber of the laboratory or inside the even more rarefied chamber of the vacuum 
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pump. Little groups of gentlemen take testimony from natural forces and they testify to each 
other that they are not betraying but translating the silent behaviour of objects. With Boyle and 
his successors, we begin to conceive of what a natural force is, an object that is mute but 
endowed or entrusted with meaning (Latour, 1993, 29). 
The second effect of fetishism is that everything which is not sustained by theoretical 
explanations is separated, precisely ‘purified’ from facts, and relegated into the status of fetish, in 
its pejorative meaning of idolatrous (Latour, 2010, 20-21). With this new perspective inaugurated 
by Latour, Gell’s agency paradigm, especially the internalist attribution of agency and the 
distributed person, becomes a sophisticated form of fetishism. By not acknowledging the fact that 
human perception covers just an aspect of the perceived, the nonhuman or the Other-than-I 
reflects perceiver’s temporal and spatial dwelling, or, to put differently, continually re-iterates Self-
projection. 
Phenomenology refuses to fetishize the words which describe a moment of experience; 
rather, it contains a vast array of possibilities, which includes also the negation of the customary 
(Jackson, 1996, 21-22). By this logic, ‘our emphasis is thus shifted from what beliefs “mean” 
intrinsically to what they are made to mean, and what they accomplish for those who invoke and 
use them’ (Jackson, 1996, 6). In other words, the ‘aim of phenomenology is to gain insight into the 
essential character of phenomena’ (Ferguson, 2006, 26), and thus it surpasses all the categorical 
distinctions (Ferguson, 2006, 26). For instance, Grasseni (2004) distinguishes between the practice 
of vision and visualism, understood as an ideology and a means of understanding, thus 
characterised by an ethnocentric rationalism. In particular, ‘the guiding metaphors of the 
humanities and the social sciences have been visual ones […]. […] ethnographers have been 
participant observers who reflect on their visual experiences and then write texts that represent the 
Other’s pattern of kinship, exchange or religion’ (Stoller, 1995, 15). Writing, in this way, ‘exhausts 
life’ (Derrida, 1997, 17), as it substitutes life in its creative characteristic. Writing, thus, is a 
synonym of divine law and, because of that, is revered (Derrida, 1997, 17). 
Things, according to this phenomenological anthropology, acquire meaning only as 
‘manifestations of our engagement in the world’ (Lindsay, 1996, 210), as results of Gellian 
distribution of personhood spatially and temporally. This thought recurs also in the so-called new 
animism, where an object is considered alive only when interacting with a human (Paine, 2013, 9). 
We can, therefore, affirm that even phenomenology, understood as a distinct discipline, is not 
immune from the process of purification from fetishism experienced by the modern sciences: the 
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nonhuman is always considered as dependent from the human. However, I concur with Merleau-
Ponty (2002 [1945], 375) in noting that a human body becomes a distinct being only when 
approaching a thing: ‘we grasp the unity of our body only in that of the thing’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002 [1945], 375). If phenomenology is understood as the engaging hybridism between the 
nonhuman and the human, with the consequential corollary that the former is not a projection or 
ancillary to the latter, it fully achieves avoiding factish theories. Reality, then, is seen as a 
continuous interaction between the nonhuman and the human and humans’ need to fetishize or 
project onto the former. 
As Paine (2013, 9) rightly states, the religious objects reveal ‘dramatically’ the problem of 
materiality in terms of the distinction between a person and an object. Darśan, as simultaneously a 
religious practice of seeing and also the belief in the capacity of the material to be imbued with life, 
enriches the ethnology of the Moderns’ museums. Darśan identifies the mechanisms of reification 
of theories and, at the same time, of rejection of the fetishisation of the museum artefacts. The 
entirety of Hindu theology can be understood, indeed, as a reflection on the problem of the divine 
nature, which can be represented and contained by the material object (Malamoud, 1994, 263). The 
chapter, then, engages a detailed account of the phenomenon of darśan as well as its implications in 








The act of looking-at has been explained by distinct religious cultures. Looking is not an 
activity detached from the senses, but rather is the means by which establishing a physical contact 
with the supernatural. Within Hinduism, it has been included within a philosophical system in 
which a phenomenology of vision plays a significant role in defining the relationship between the 
worshipper and the god worshipped. This is called darśan. This phenomenon relies on the 
activation of images, a ritual operation by which the image is considered imbued with life by the 
divine, so that the image becomes or coincides with the entity which imbues it. By becoming a 
simulacrum of a person or an anthropomorphised deity, the image has the power of re-enacting 
the presence of a departed person, and then is connected with the funerary cults. As Freedberg 
(1989, 98) observes, the consecration demonstrates ‘the potentialities of all images’ in the fact that 
they already work before being consecrated. For instance, Indian comic books depicting Hindu 
deities, even though not subjected to a ritual consecration, have been venerated as religious icons 
and a new and subtle form of cult has developed, as explored below (section 3.2.4). Both Hinduism 
and Orthodox Christianity consider the act of painting to be divine because of its creative power. 
Hindu and Orthodox Christian cultures have compared the painters of icons to priests: they must 
have a theological knowledge and an iconographic training of what to depict, and they must 
follow a pious and pure life (Laeng, 1990, 45; Uspensky, 1976, 10).  
According to this religious understanding of the visual, seeing is not a passive and distant 
contemplation, but rather a form of engagement and relationship with the seen object, by 
experiencing its essences and properties, by touching it (Hadders, 2001, 32): 
In English, the verb behold suggests this relationship between sight and touch. To see can 
mean “to want to touch” or “to want to be touched by another”, especially if one means “to 
expect”, “to seek out”, “to long for”. The element of desire is evident in each and that is one 
reason why cultured despisers of imagining from Plato to Calvin have commonly attacked the 
practice of making or admiring images: they invite the indulgence of desire. Seeing is 
dangerous because it leads to touching (Morgan, 2012, 111). 
Darśan is, or may be, characterised by the same features of phenomenology, specifically that 
peculiar mixture of knowledge and experience as a subjective form of engaged embodiment. If 
Latour’s conflicting split between factish concepts and fetish objects is reconsidered here, darśan and 
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the artefacts which stimulate it emphasise the interpretative conundrum to which museum 
curators are subjected in their activities. The open question, then, is how reconcile a museum’s 
didactic goals with a phenomenon that constantly undermines the idea that artefacts are either 
reified documents of a scientific theory or else works of art. 
The following sections explore the phenomenon of darśan in its applications and usages in 
the Indian storytelling context, understood as the wider world comprising bards and new forms of 
mass media, such as comic books. Far from establishing darśan as unique, with the subsequent risk 
of reinforcing the idea of the West as the unopposed domain of the Moderns, this section 
concludes (3.2.4) by comparing Indian cults of the heroic martyrs, particularly in Rajasthan, as well 
as Asian funerary cults, with the Western cult of icons. This cult emerges from the forms of 
veneration focused on the early Christian saints and the Roman emperors (3.2.4). 
 
3.2.2 Defining a visual phenomenon: the darśan and its application in the storytelling scrolls 
3.2.2.1 The darśan 
 
Since the experience of darśan involves a cognitive effort towards the understanding of the 
phenomenon of immanence, its individual and private dimension is somehow transcended. Then, 
the term darśan also means a theoretical knowledge (Grimes, 2004, 531). Deriving from the Sanskrit 
root drś (to see), darśan includes both vision, intuition, etc. and the instrument to reach them, as 
well as theories and systems of belief, etc. (Grimes, 2004, 531).48 Furthermore, darśan is conceived as 
a doctrine of different sources (not only religious, but also more generally intellectual; Hulin, 1996, 
4): ‘looking (drishti) […] is integrally linked with cognizing form (rupa) […]’ (Coorwala, 1996, 19). 
The darśan, in classic Sanskrit literature, has the goal of demonstrating the importance of the Vedas 
(Hulin, 1996, 5, 6). For instance, while the Mīmāmsā postulates the validity of every representation 
(Hulin, 1996, 10), the sāmkhya explains the phenomenon of manifestation (Coorwala, 1996, 25).  
There are two Sanskrit terms to indicate an image: pratimā, meaning reproduction, reflection, 
portrait and mūrti, meaning bodily form restrained into limits, condensed presence, stopped 
movement (Malamoud, 1994, 263, 264). In this second meaning, the proper darśan takes place. In 
the contemporary age, the advent of the Internet has brought new types of deities’ images, 
although nature of them as mūrti is controversial, because of their unstable availability, due to e.g. 
                                                          
48 ‘The verb dṛś- also occurs in connection with the mutual relation between gods and the inspired seers and 
poets’ (Gonda, 1969, 69). 
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informatics crashes, etc. (Karapanagiotis, 2013, 72). In both of these concepts, the divine has a 
double realm: the superior, indefinable and without limits, and the inferior, where it manifests 
itself through the image (Karanapanagiotis, 2013, 264), which reveals and conceals at the same 
time (Morgan, 2005, 48). 
The moment of dialogue between the superior and the inferior realm is darśan: 
Living human beings can give darshan, as well as gods; a guru gives darshan when he or 
she makes an appearance before a gathering of disciples (see Babb, 1987), and the same is true 
of an important politician appearing before an assembly of supporters, who have come to see, 
as much as to hear, their leader. Darshan is a gift or an offering, made by the superior to the 
inferior, and it consists of the ‘gift of appearance’, imagined as a material transfer of some 
blessing. 
[…] 
Darshan is thus very much of a two-way affair. The gaze directed by the god towards the 
worshipper confers his blessing, conversely, the worshipper reaches out and touches the god. 
The result is a union with the god, a merging of a consciousness according to the devotionalist 
interpretation. 
[…] 
The eyes of the god, which gaze at the devotee, mirror the action of the devotee, who 
gazes at the god. Sometimes (as in Jain temples) the eyes of images are set with little mirrors, so 
that the devotee can see himself or herself reflected in the image’s eye in the act of looking. Even 
in the absence of actual mirrors, the image, so far as its ocular activity goes, reflects the action of 
the devotee (Gell, 1998, 116, 117, 118; see also Eck, 1998). 
Darśan, then, is an exchange of gazes between the devotee and the deity: while the latter 
gives darśan (darśan dena), the former brings darśan (darśan lena) (Mallebrein, 1998, 8). In fact, the 
mirror has an important function: ‘The mirror is a metaphor for the viewer and their inner image: 
it is in fact, the mental mirror reflecting external sensations that matters’ (Belting, 2012, 410). In 
Gell’s agency paradigm, darśan ‘is something given by the god, a mode of god’s agency in the 
world, and the worshipper is a patient’ (Gell, 1998, 116). According to the Veda, the eye is the 
fundamental element of seeing, since it would illuminate the object. It is considered as an active 
force which transmits living essences, such as good or evil, hence the identification between glance 
and ‘tejah, i.e. fiery and brilliant energy’ (Gonda, 1969, 5-6). In the ceremony of the ‘gift of eye’ 
among the Santals, which will be described more thoroughly below, the eyes are the metonym of 
the entire body, and the painting of the eyes on to an image or a sculpture stands for the bestowing 
105 
of life into a dead corpse (Hadder, 2001, 102-103).  
Seeing pictorial representations of gods is an auspicious act. This is evident in the case of the 
murals of the Mithilas or kohbars. The kohbar stands for the girl’s marriage proposal and it is 
characterised by Tantric symbolism, specifically the penetration of the yoni by the lingam 
(Véquaud, 1977, 17). It decorates the room where the just-married couple spend four nights 
without intercourse (Véquaud, 1977, 18), and represents deities which, after having been invoked 
during a ritual, are believed to inhabit it (Véquaud, 1977, 21). Symbolically similar to the visual 
production of Mithila women are the aripanas, magic circles on the ground which symbolise ‘the 
dwelling of a god’ (Véquaud, 1977, 28), kin to the Tibetan mandalas. Turning to the main point of 
the discourse,  
The very act of looking away or looking about is quite intelligibly ascribed to the Creator-
god Prajāpati who, being in the beginning alone, looked round about (Vyaikṣata) and saw 
another being (viz. the brahaman); after that he engaged in conversation (JB. 2, 369): again, the 
use of the eye as the first means of coming into contact with the outer world and the priority of 
eyesight […], which is for instance also apparent from identifications of, for instance, the Eye of 
Sūrya with Sūrya himself (Véquaud, 1977, 8). 
Since the ritual words focus on the image of the transformation, which invests the sender 
and the recipient (Severi, 1993, 39), the worshipper chooses an image from the possible mūrtis, and 
begs the god to enter in this mental mūrti by reciting hymns which describe the physical 
appearance of the gods and have the power to make them manifest. In fact, the way in which the 
devotee interacts with the deity is through dhyan sāmadhi, or meditation, during which the 
individual seeks identification and unification with the god addressed. (Jhala, 2000, 119). Thus, the 
worshipper’s body becomes, during this imaginary worship, which precedes the moment of darśan 
(Lal Nagar, 2007, 543; see also DuPertuis, 1986, 121), the deity’s mūrti, where the god breathes his 
life (prāna-pratisthā) (Malamoud, 1994, 266). More specifically, the worshipper 
offers a mental worship (mānasī pūjā) to the deity conceiving his body as a yantra49 for her 
and thereafter takes her ‘glow’ (tejas) out of his heart through his prāṇa (=breath) and places it in 
the image after having abstractly drawn a yantra in it. The sum and substance of this ‘eternal’ 
worship (bahiryāga) of the saguṇa (qualified) aspect of the deity is to treat her as an honourable 
guest who has just arrived at the place of the host, the worshipper (Tripathi, 1978, 289). 
This union between the worshipper and the god, which is the equivalent of bhakti (Tripathi, 
1978, 266), is made possible by nature of the eyes: their pupils are channels, permeable orifices 
                                                          
49 Seat. 
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which connect the inner with the outside (Gell, 1998, 147). It is not the case, then, that the 
ceremony of the painting of the eyes on a statue of a goddess (also called the ceremony of the 
opening of the eyes (nētra moksa, Freedberg, 1989, 86),50 is passage from a mere object to an object 
with life by mixing meaning with the sign and making immanence effective. Rather, this ritual 
should be understood as inaugurating and completing at the same time (Freedberg, 1989, 54, 601). 
Giving life to an image usually means a double practice: on the one hand, some ‘life substance’ 
(brahmapadartha) considered sacred, such as a piece of consecrated wood, is inserted into the statue, 
on the other hand, the goddess’s essence is inflated from the outside during the painting of the 
eyes (Gell, 1998, 145-146).51 Logically consequent to the prāna-pratisthā of an image is its funeral 
once its vitality has ceased to exist. The homuncular belief around the efficacy of an image continues 
to have meaning, however, since the remnants of the images are usually sold to pilgrims, 
following a similar procedure to that of the relics (Gell, 1998, 145-146).52 An icon can also cease to 
be filled by goddesses’ spirits, e.g. when it is used for other purposes, such as aesthetic objects in a 
Western museum, or when a priest fails to worship it. In this case, a ceremony of re-consecration 
takes place. The reduced presence of the gods, indeed, is an attractive incitement to the demons to 
take refuge in the artefact (Davis, 1997, 254). 
Extending the cognitive dimension of darśan, mentioned in the introductory paragraph of 
this section, to aesthetics, the real knowledge of an object is not empirical (pratyaksa), but rather is 
obtained through the encounter between the seer and the seen (anayoradvaita) (Coomaraswamy, 
                                                          
50 The importance given to this rite explains the aesthetic of the statues and the architecture of the temples: 
‘In modern Hinduism the eyes of new images are usually added separately, and often in the form of metal 
plates. Only with the installation of the eyes, according to the fixed rites, does the image become fit 
habitation for the god. The eyes are usually large in proportion to the rest of the body. Grander, and a 
different material, they are immediately visible to the devotee who seeks darshan. Darshan has a significant 
effect on the temple plan, with the result that from the paint where the worshipper crosses the threshold of 
the temple complex, the architecture will channel him towards the culmination of the visit –the ‘taking of 
darshan’- the axiality of the temple plan is therefore a vital element, as it draws the attention of the 
worshipper towards the image of the deity’ (Blurton, 1992, 57). 
51 However, ‘Despite the fact that the new icons have been completely carved, the “life-substance” 
transferred, and the lids consecrated by the Brahmins, they remain essentially embryonic, because the 
wooden structures are considered to be unfinished skeletons of the images. Thus the final two weeks of the 
navakalēvara ceremony are devoted to infusing the images with “flesh” and “blood”. This process is 
completed by Raitā Mahāpatras, temple servants of the Kāyasta caste’ (Preston, 1985, 20). 
52 Medieval sources referred to several practices of preservation of the images from iconoclasm, as Davis 
(1997, 127) attests: ‘Under pressure of iconoclasm, concealment and flight became important means of 
preservation for portable icons. Images might find refuge underground, or they might abandon their 
wealthy and vulnerable temples for more out-of-the-way sanctuaries. The assumption, or at least hope, 
behind these evacuations was that, when danger had passed, the images would return to their accustomed 
homes. Defensive burial was one common practice.’ 
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1976, 20). A spiritually formulated model (antarjneya-rūpa; Coomaraswamy, 1976, 27), then, 
represents knowledge. I see in the Vallabha Sampradaya a holistic example of darśan as a way of 
conceiving the world, as quoted in Woodman (2005, 203): 
Vallabhacharya (1479?-1531) founded his new community, subsequently called the 
Vallabha Sampradaya, through the act of advocating a new ontology. This was the traditional 
method of establishing a new Hindu community, with its unique “world view”, including 
definitions of reality. The new ontology advocated by Vallabhacharya called purified non-
dualism (shuddhadvaita) collapsed previous distinctions made in Hindu and Buddhist 
philosophical systems between the human and divine worlds. In debates against followers of 
the philosopher Shankara, who claimed that the world perceived through the senses was maya, 
or illusion, Vallabhacharya established a logic that insisted not only on the reality of the 
perceptual world but also on the location of divinity within this reality. Vallabhacharya’s claims 
had profound consequences for the ways in which an individual was to perceive and interact 
with the world, as well as for the status of objects and valences given to the visual. This move 
also allowed devotees to participate in the life of the deity on view, which is the prime objective 
of popular devotional Hinduism called bhakti. 
The ontology of purified non-dualism also undermined distinctions made within visual 
culture by traditional Indian classifications of the arts, in which three-dimensional sculptures 
are given a higher status than painting. According to these classifications, painting is normally 
assigned a very low status, where its representational capacity is considered derivative, and as 
mere mimesis, of little intrinsic value. 
As seen in this example, darśan also shapes an art aesthetic. The aesthetic contemplation can 
be summarised by the term rasa53 or an emotion (bhava) experienced as idealised in an impersonal 
way (Chaudhury, 1965, 145). The theory of rasa was born from a 5th century treatise on theatre and 
dance, the Bharata’s Natyashastra, where the emotions, resulting from seeing performing actors, of 
the audience are explored. Later, classical literary critics firstly employed this theory, which, in the 
medieval ages, was applied to religious experience (Woodman, 2005, 206). Rasa means extract, the 
immaterial, and most beautiful, essence of a concrete object, but also a pleasant condition 
experienced by the soul (ananda). The pleasure of an artwork is compared to that of tasting: rasika is 
the one who tastes, rasakanta is the artwork. In the singular form, rasa refers to the internal act of 
pleasure; in the plural, it means the emotive conditions which constitute the art piece (Goswamy, 
1991, 71). 
                                                          
53 ‘The rasa was not at first propounded as a universal principle but was introduced as a characteristic of 
drama. Only in later times did rasa become an aesthetic principle of all arts’ (Nardi, 2006, 143). 
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Turning to the concept of anayoradvaita, the artist has a comprehension of the psychology of 
aesthetic intuition (Coomaraswamy, 1976, 20). Examining the Citrasūtras, treatises on the painting 
dated from the Gupta period (450-650 BCE) to the sixteenth century, the philosophical attitude of 
the painter is amply described. Nardi (2006) argues that the Citrasūtras are conceptual states (24), 
which can be adapted and intertwined with a painter's own idiosyncrasies (Nardi, 2006, 36). The 
word citra also means mental image (Nardi, 2006, 24). The painter, therefore, is supposed to have 
in mind a standard male model (Nardi, 2006, 56) which can be rotated (Nardi, 2006, 88) in his 
imagination according to his own perception of the body. 
 
3.2.2.2 The application of darśan in the storytelling scrolls 
 
As the act of looking is considered a godly skill, the origin of the painting, as well as of the 
painters, can be found in several religious myths. The Vishṇudharmottara is an appendix of the 
Vishṇupurāṇa (5th century BCE), where sculpture, painting, dancing, music, and singing constitute a 
unicum, and the divine origin of the painting (chitra) is described as the fulfilment of rules which 
led to perfect beauty, embodied by an apsarā (Kramrisch, 1968, 3, 4, 34). In the earliest treatise of 
the Citrasūtras, the Citralakṣaṇa of Nagnajit, a myth tells of a wise king who had to face the problem 
posed by the death of a Brahmān's son (Nardi, 2006, 18). In order to avoid the destruction of the 
whole creation through a fight between the king and Yama, the God of Death, Brahmā went to 
Earth and ordered the king to paint a picture of the dead son (Nardi, 2006, 19). On another 
occasion, the king, the same Nagnajit, asked Brahmā how he could achieve the skill of painting the 
human body in proportion. Not only did Brahmā reveal that he himself created painting for 
worshipping, but also that proportion is a fundamental knowledge for giving welfare to creatures 
(Nardi, 2006, 19). Chitrakara, the painters’ ancestor, in fact, is the son of Vishvakarma, ‘the 
architect of the universe’ (Kaiser, 2012, 20). As well as the other artisanal crafts, e.g. sculpture, 
painting, then, was viewed as a necessary cosmological complement of life. Nevertheless, three out 
of the nine sons of Vishvakarma’s were degraded by the Brahmans: ‘Sutradhara because he 
refused to collect wood for a sacrificial fire, Svarnakara because he had stolen money from 
Brahman, and Chitrakara, […], because he ‘transgressed the orders of a Brahmin in respect of a 
picture the construction of which was defective and not according to orders’ (Kaiser, 2012, 20-21). 
As seen above, painting is strictly correlated both to the problem of representing the 
deceased, and to the notion of corruption. It is not a surprise, then, if the painter-storytellers’ 
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activities are associated with funerary cults and the moral necessity of showing the pains inflicted 
on sinners by the gods. Kaiser (2012, 23) connects some painter-storytellers’ activities to that of the 
naraki scrolls, made for Jains and certain Hindu schools, in order to show the punishments of hell 
reserved for sinners. 
There is a reference to a picture showman in the first act of Viśākhadatta’s play 
Mudrārākṣada (The Minister’s Seal) that is invaluable not only because it proves the widespread 
nature of this profession even after about the sixth century but also because it tells us much 
about the method of operation of its practitioners. He is called a yamapaṭṭaka, that is, someone 
who displays yamapaṭa (“pictures [probably on cloth scrolls or hangings of the rewards and 
punishments to be experienced in the realm] of Yama, [God of the Underworld]).” It is most 
noteworthy that the yamapaṭṭaka is actually Cāṇakya’s (minister of the founder of the Maurya 
empire, Candragupta) spy, Nipuṇaka. Remarking that some men earn their livelihood by 
means of discoursing on the very same Yama who slays all men, Nipuṇaka gains entrance to 
the home of Candanadāsa (friend of a minister, who is hostile to Cāṇakya). He is described as 
dancing about in the characteristic manners of an actor and remarks, “I’ll sing my songs while 
showing a picture of Yama (yamapaṭam darśayan gītāni gāyāmi)” (Mair, 1988, 25). 
Painter-storytellers, then, have been considered as intermediaries between men and gods. 
For instance, the patuas’ scrolls or patas (Kramrisch, 1968, 71)54 were perceived as communicative 
channels with the supernatural, and a way to be purified from sins (Singh, 1998, 110). During the 
1930s, each pat ended with a depiction of the final judgment by the King of Death, Yama, and ‘the 
artist invariably ends up chanting the eternal law of the ultimate triumph of virtue and the defeat 
and punishment of vice’ (Dutt, 1999, 72). In addition, ‘[…] they also depict a presiding deity, like 
the image of ‘Bhoot’ or ghost who is the messenger of jom, the king of death in ancient myth’ 
(SenGupta, 2012, 97). Furthermore, many old scrolls have on their backs the inscription of the 
name of who made offerings (dana) ‘to have the pata displayed again and again’ (Chatterji, 2012, 
63). Chaterji adds that ‘the repeated display of the sacred history to the accompaniment of the pata 
song acted as a blessing spreading to all the members of the audience’ (Chaterji, 2012, 63).  
These esoteric skills are distinctly visible among the jado-patuas of the Santal adivasis 
(indigenous community), whose name, according to many scholars, means ‘magic painters’ 
(Kramrisch, 1968, 70). However, Kaiser (2012, 12) and Hadders (2001, 22) have pointed out that the 
jado-patuas do not attribute such a meaning to their name, by denying any link with magic 
activities, and, interestingly, urge the use of the terms jādopatiā, jādobabā, or jādo, rather than the 
                                                          
54 ‘Another term for pata is alekhya or narrative’ (Chakraborty, 1989, 9). 
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Bengali jadū, i.e. ‘magic’. Despite working among the Santals, the jado-patuas constitute a distinct 
religious group (Kaiser, 2012, 13), adopting Muslim practices while professing Hindu religion 
(Hadders, 2001, 14). 
Apart from recounting Santal myths, these scroll-painters travel from village to village, 
carrying ready-made portraits with empty eye sockets (Chaskudan pat, SenGupta, 2012, 97). When a 
family member dies, her relatives pay a jado-patua to draw eyes in a portrait, so that her soul 
cannot wander in the world of the living but, instead, becomes an ancestor (SenGupta, 2012, 71; 
cfr. Dutt, 1999, 80).55 The prayer Balahariman (praise to Hari or Krishna) is written on the pat, so that 
the soul of the deceased can be released to heaven (SenGupta, 2012, 97). The entire mortuary ritual 
is called cockhodān (Hadders, 2001, 3), while the eyes’ depiction is termed caksudān, or ‘the gift of 
the eye’ (Hadders, 2001, 18). It is interesting to see how the jado-patuas borrow Hindu categories in 
order to professionalise their work among the Santal:  
The Jādopatiā claims that he is the Brahman (thākur) and the priest (purohit) of the Santal. 
The work (kāj) and service that he renders the Santal relatives after death is equated with rites 
performed for the dead, and the service offered by other funeral priests after a death has 
occurred. Thus the Santal is compared to the patron (jajmān) of the Brahman and the purohit. 
The gift (dān) the Santals give to the Jādopatiā are compared to the gifts that the Brahman and 
the purhohit receive for his funerary work (Hadders, 2001, 30). 
The first historically documented Indian painter-storyteller is Mankhali Gosala, who 
founded the Ajivika school of philosophy (5th-14th century CE) and whose activity of painter-
storytelling (mankha) is described in the Jain manuscript Mahaviracaritra (12th century), although it 
is not clear what was represented in the pictures and whether they were already considered scrolls 
(Mair, 1988, 20). The painter-storytellers are represented as tricksters between the realms of life 
and death, the sacred and the profane. They allow the visual touch of the deities with the painted 
scrolls and, thus, the scrolls’ animation by the deities’ souls. These are the reason why Indian 
storytellers, despite the different regions of provenance, share common points which are 
structurally substantial. As they allow the transmigration of the deities into the concrete fabric of 
the scrolls, they have quasi priestly functions, in that the audience can have a direct contact with 
the gods’ force imbued in the scrolls. Storytellers’ mythical degradation from a godly duty 
explains why they come from the lowest social or even caste groups and operate within the 
                                                          
55 ‘The  soul hovers in the atmosphere for a maximum of seven days and within these days the soul of the 
deceased person enters into the womb of a married woman of the Patua community only, preferably one 
among the near kin. Pregnancy is caused due to this entry of the soul’ (Bhattacharjee, 1980, 69). 
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humblest populations in India, such as farmers, breeders, etc.  
The garodas represent a useful example. The garodas are painter-storytellers as well as 
astrologists who wander around the area of West India. Their scrolls, tippan, are considered mobile 
temples, since the first six pictures out of the nineteen which comprise the scroll represent praying 
worshippers in front of shrines, as well as the principal Hindu deities (Ganeś, Śiva, Parvati and 
Lakśmi) and the sun and the moon, which have a godly function. In addition, these shrine pictures 
are followed by two local, devotional legends and less well-known religious tales, whose moral 
tone is further strengthened by the story of ‘the selfless King Harischandra, as told in detail, for 
instance in the Markandeyapuranam’ (Mair, 1988, 23). The battle between Krishna and the lord of the 
great serpents (nagas), Kaliya, and episodes from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, whose 
characters are the symbols, as chapter four clarifies, of the moral conduct of humanity in its battle 
against evil, occupy the other scenes. This prepares the ground for the final scene, where Yama 
and sinners’ torturers are the protagonists (Mair, 1988, 23; see also Jain, 1982). The garodas are 
considered as degraded Brahmins for the low castes (Bhangi, Derh, Meghbal, Waghri and the 
Nayakas) for three different reasons which concern an act of pollution. These are: the ancestor’s 
marriage with his teacher’s daughter; the eating of sacrificed animals’ meat and the consequent 
excommunication by the other Brahmins; the establishment of some Brahmins as priests of the lower 
castes (this theory is historically based) by the king of Patan, Siddharaj Jaisingh’s, and the 
progressive isolation of these Brahmins from the others (Sharma, 1993, 29-30). 
The religious function of the scrolls and the priestly activities of storytellers are not isolated 
facts. Rather, a similar habitus can be traced in different folk artisanal traditions in North and West 
India. The Rajasthani puppeteers offer an example: 
In the North of India, to this day, the Rajasthani puppeteer, apart from claiming divine 
origin for his hereditary caste, believes that his puppets are other-worldly beings; they are 
sacred objects. When a puppet is broken and beyond repair, he will not simply throw it away. 
Rather, he will let it float down one of India’s sacred rivers, back to his heavenly origin. 
Traditionally the Rajasthani puppet does not speak in a human voice, but rather in a kind 
of whistle to indicate its supernatural origin. Also their faces are painted in an exaggerated, 
stylized way with overly large eyes and features, again to reveal them as other-worldly beings. 
(Orr’s quote in Mair, 1988, 64) 
The most intriguing examples, especially for the aims of the present thesis, are constituted by 
the temple clothes chandarvos, in Gujarat, the storytelling boxes kavad, in Rajasthan, and the murals 
related to the local god Pithoro, in Gujarat, as they show similarities with storytellers’ 
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performances, particularly those of the Rajasthani bhopas. The chandarvos are realised and used by 
the seminomadic community of the Vaghri in Ahmenabad (Gujarat). The most important common 
points between the chandarvo makers and the garoda painter-storytellers are that they have a 
puranic justification and a local legend, and they are constructed around the central figure of a 
divinity (Jain, 1982, 238, 240). The artist of the chandarvo, indeed, starts by painting the centre of the 
cloth and is cautious in avoiding contact by the feet, considered polluted, with the cloth (Fisher, 
2014, 142). The chandarvos delimit temporary sacred places for the community, to which temple 
spaces are interdicted (Fisher, 2014, 198-199). Since folk deities related to cattle and the principal 
deities of the Hindu pantheon are depicted in chandarvo, wearing it is a way to be possessed by 
gods’ spirits in order to invoke their protection (Fisher, 2014, 200-257). 
The kavad is a portable wooden box used in Mewar (Rajasthan), which is painted with 
sequences of religious and mythic stories. The origin of the word is related to an episode in the 
Ramayana, which is about Shravana Kumara carrying on his shoulder his blind parents on a 
pilgrimage ‘in order to restore their sight‘ (Sabnani, 1989, 95), thereby meaning of kavad ‘as carried 
on the shoulder’ (Sabnani, 1989, 95).56 Storytellers of the kavad (kavadiyas) are said to be Shravana 
Kumara’s descendants, because they display the temple-like kavad to those who cannot personally 
visits the holy temples and sites (Sabnani, 1989, 95). 
The Rathva tribe’s mural depiction of the marriage of their god Pithoro is characterised in a 
precise way:  
 The sacred enclosure contains the pictorial depiction of the mythology and 
cosmography, of the Rathvas. Generally the uppermost section of the enclosure, above a wavy 
line of geometric motifs (looking like a festoon), represents the world of gods, the regions of the 
Heavenly Bodies and the continents of mythical creatures. Just below this line there is the 
procession of the marriage of Pithoro. He is one of the most revered of the Rathva gods and the 
central character of their sacred lore. His birth through an unwed mother Kāli Koyal, the sister 
of the great agricultural deity Ind or Indi Rājā, who finally renounced his kingdom in favour of 
his sister’s son (Pithoro) forms the core of the myth of Pithoro (Jain, 1984, 15).  
The mural shows a bhalon, a vehicle by which Pithoro descends from heaven. In the original 
myth, this is a spider web, but, in contemporary pictorial renditions, the bhalon is shown as an 
aeroplane, as the Rathva started to see aeroplanes flying in the sky and thought of them as divine 
vehicles (Jain, 1984, 39). In fact, the ritual installation of the mural uses two different expressions, 
                                                          
56 The term kavad derives from the word kivad, which means door (Sabnani, 1989, 95). 
113 
specifically Pithoro behādvo, or ‘to get Pithoro seated’, and Pithoro lakhvo, or ‘to inscribe Pithoro’, 
indicating the act of painting (Jain, 1984, 44). These allude to a movement from one realm to 
another and prepare the ground of the trance possession of the badvo (or master of ritual), who 
starts to give names to each character depicted, or Pithoro vācvo (‘to read Pithoro’, or ‘reading 
Pithoro’), after having received offerings and been ritually bathed (Jain, 1984, 56). The spirit who 
possesses the badvo is that of Pithoro’s real father, Kuṇdu Rāno (Jain, 1984, 56). The ceremony of 
consecration of the mural, after having sacrificed goats, ends with the sign made by the badvo’s 
knife in correspondence with the horses’ clogs. By ‘cutting the rope’ the agricultural forces 
represented by Pithoro’s mother can be spread in this world, therefore the use of the rice grains 
offered during the ceremony and sanctified by the badvo in the fields (Jain, 1984, 58). The act of 
orally inscribing the characters’ names marks passage from the oral to the written tradition (Jain, 
1984, 44). In fact:  
All throughout the day, when the painters are busy painting the wall, a couple of singers 
sitting in one corner of the verandah sing, at intervals, portions of the myths of creation, Pithoro 
and Indi Rājā. The singing is done with the accompaniment of dhāk, drum. […] The singers are 
usually the badvas, pujārās (masters of ritual) or rāvals (musicians/healers). The purpose of this 
singing is to inspire the painters and to invoke the presence of the deities on this ritual occasion. 
The myths are composed in meter and orally transferred from generation to generation of 
singers. The song is called gāyṇu and the singers gāyṇi. In the text recorded by Haekel and 
Tripathi there is an interesting reference to these singers who are supposed to come from malkā 
des (magical country), are known as malkā gāyni (magical singers), and are supposed to narrate 
devni vārtā, ‘the divine story’ (Jain, 1984, 71). 
As previously seen, the priestly functions of the painter-storytellers are also shared by bards, 
who are the incarnations of the gods depicted. For instance, the bhopas believe they have inherited 
the paṛs and their robe from their Bhil ancestors, two of Pābūjī’s courtiers who received the cloth 
from Pābūji while he was ascending to heaven, hence the sacredness of the cloth (Wickett, 2010, 5). 
Consequently, the paṛ is treated as a portable temple and shoes must be removed in front of it 
(Smith, 1989, 30). In addition, a symbolic offering of food (akha) must be delivered to Pābūjī during 
a time when the god is believed to not be fasting, particularly not the eleventh day of the lunar 
calendar (Smith, 1989, 11-12). Offering food is important, both because of the corporeal reality 
attributed to Pābūjī, and because of his role in ensuring the welfare of the flora and fauna of the 
Thar desert (Smith, 1989, 12). The bhopas, then, are called to perform in the occurrence of natural 
calamities or animal disease (Wickett, 2010, 4), and Pābūjī is believed to be the healer of animals 
114 
and environment (Wickett, 2010, 11). Remedies are found upon being possessed by his spirit 
during the bhopas’ performance. Furthermore, ‘touching the paṛ cures illnesses’ (Smith, 1989, 30). 
Pābūjī’s epic is also used in every important situation (‘big work’ motakam), e.g. marriage, 
migratory herding and feasting (Srivastava, 1994, 599). However, Pābūjī’s sacredness is reserved 
only to men, as it is forbidden for women to touch the paṛ. Probably, this interdiction is reflective 
of Pābūjī’s chastity.57 
Devanārāyaṇ’s sacredness is much stronger even than that of Pābūjī. Indeed, the cloth is a 
valuable item both for the representation of the sacred images and for the construction of a place of 
worship, besides stressing the importance of the weaver community in Devanārāyaṇ’s cult (Malik, 
2005, 45).58  
The paṛ should be painted by following a prescribed ritual: a propitious day for starting to 
work at the paṛ must be chosen and offerings must be made to Sarasvati, goddess of learning. In 
addition, the first brushstroke must be made by a virgin of the painter’s family or from a high caste 
(Kaiser, 2012, 23).59 Before delivering the scroll to the storytelling bard or bhopā, the painter depicts 
the pupils in the eye sockets of the gods, thereby imbuing life into the god’s picture (Joshi, 1976, 
23). An old paṛ60 is ‘cooled’ (ṭhaṇdī karṇo) by immersing it in the holy lake of Pushkar. If Pushkar is 
too far away, a good well may be used instead’ (Smith, 1991, 67). When a paṛ becomes too 
damaged to be used, it is immersed in the lake Pushkar following a ritual known as Thandi Karna, 
where a ritual bath and an offering of Kansa (sweet dish) is made to Brahmins and Devanārāyaṇji 
(Sharma, 1993, 72). It is understandable, then, why the selling of a paṛ is considered sacrilegious 
(Sharma, 1993, 72). However, in the present day the realisation of a paṛ is influenced by the tourist 
market (Joshi, 1976, 19), resulting in the loss of the ritual procedures during painting. 
A patron usually requests a performance (jāgaraṇ, all-night wake) in order to fulfill a promise 
(bolmā), which has been made with a supplication directed to Pābūjī (Singh, 1980, 119). The 
audience is structured according to the criteria of gender, power and caste pureness, thus women 
are separated from men, untouchables from pure castes, and patrons (jajmāns) from nonpatrons. 
                                                          
57 According to a scholar during an interview. 
58 ‘before using a paṛ for the first time (the term is paṛ bẵcṇau, “reading the paṛ”, or paṛ kholṇau, “opening the 
paṛ”), the Bhopā is obliged to give a feast to all the members of his family and community, and this deters a 
Bhopā from getting a paṛ made’ (Singh, 1980, 163). 
59 Kaiser adds the fact that these operations can be observed among the killekyatha, a Marathi-speaking caste of 
shadow-puppeteers in southern India (Kaiser, 2012, 23). 
60 The paṛ is always rolled from left to right, hence the signs of damage on the right hand side signal the age 
of the paṛ (Smith, 1991, 8).  
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Even menstruating women are separated from the rest of the family (Sharma, 1993, 73). The names 
of donors (dhanis) and the date of purchase of the paṛ are written on ‘the lower corner of its right 
side’ (Srivastava, 1994, 597). Each participant in the performance can make an offering, and the 
bhopa proclaims her name and her offering while blowing on a conch-shell (sańkh) (Smith, 1991, 9; 
cfr. Malik, 2005, 13-14). Before the performance starts, the bhopa worships Pābūjī with a flame 
(ārātī) (Smith, 1991, 8). The audience often interacts with the bhopa during the performance, even 
claiming more knowledge and starting confrontations characterised by critical questions (Malik, 
2005, 14-15). 
In the Devanārāyaṇ’s case, the performance is called jāgran, or night-wake, and implies the 
invocation of Devanārāyaṇ (Malik, 2005, 12). This performance can happen either at a devotees’ 
home, or in front of Devanārāyaṇ or Savājī Bhoj’s temple, or at the community meeting place 
(hathāī) (Malik, 2005, 12). Performances do not take place during the rainy season (caumāsā), 
because the deities are supposed to be asleep (Malik, 2005, 12). During this period, the epics can be 
sung without the scroll in seated postures (baiṭho gāṇo) (Malik, 2005, 12). 
The moral and religious functions of the painter-storytellers, or of the bards who use 
storytelling scrolls, is even clearer if the diffusion of the scrolls from India to the entire Asian 
continent is considered. According to Sharma (1994, 92-106), the spread of scroll painting in Asia 
was due to the diffusion of Buddhism and Islam from the 14th onwards, together with Indian 
immigrations and intermarriages. This diffusion followed precise routes: 
The northern route began in India, skirted the central Himalayan massif and then 
followed the Silk Road through central Asia to China and ultimately Japan. A central route 
went directly from India eastwards and via Burma to Thailand (a minor route led from Bengal 
to Tibet). A third route, finally, led from southern India by sea to the Malay Peninsula and from 
there to Java and Bali (Kaiser, 2012, 25). 
These routes can be associated with the diffusion of the three principal Indian religious 
creeds, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. In terms of Islam, for instance, in Bangladesh the ghazir 
patas represent the ventures of the early Islamic preachers (ghazis) in their goal of the Islamisation 
of the land. It is noteworthy that historical ghazis have been transformed into mythical characters 
with supernatural powers. They are depicted riding a tiger, the god of southern Bengal (Dakshin 
Ray), thus symbolizing the subjugation of Hinduism and folk cults to Islam or to a higher religion 
(Sharma, 1994, 18-19). There are also the Hindu patas, produced by Hindu painters with Acharya 
as surname: ‘The name Acharya for a painter is significant since in rural Ceylon the folk painters 
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are still known as Atcharya, which is derived from the Sanskrit word Acharya’ (Sharma, 1994, 20). 
The Hindu diffusion can be associated with the Indonesian wayang. Wayang ‘derives from a 
root that means “shadow”’ (Mair, 1988, 55) and it was originally based in Java, Bali and Lombok, 
where ‘Hindu influence was most pervasive and enduring’ (Mair, 1988, 56).  
According to Mally Kant-Achilles, wayang bèbèr performances traditionally narrated 
episodes from the cycle of tales about Panji, a Javanese prince from the fourteenth or fifteenth 
century and Pabu, an Indian prince who is the hero in numerous paṛ picture scrolls from 
Rajasthan (Kaiser, 2012, 32). 
Many scholars have affirmed the Indian origin of the wayang, especially because of the 
Mahabharata and Ramayana as sources of inspiration (Mair, 1988, 56). There are several varieties of 
wayang, from the painted scrolls (wayang bèbèr), to the masked actors (wayang topeng) or actors who 
appear like puppets (wayang wong, in Javanese, or wayang orang, in Indonesian), and the cinema 
(wayang gambar hīdup, shadows of living pictures, or wayang gelap, dark shadows) (Mair, 1988, 57). 
The materials used in the wayang, from the box where the scrolls are stored to the scrolls 
themselves, are considered sacred and treated only in a ritualistic interaction (Mair, 1988, 64). The 
dalang or narrator finds his place as a spirit medium and a healer during the ritual performance, 
when he enters into a trance (Mair, 1988, 67; see also Sharma, 1994, 36). 
During the Maurya Empire, King Ashoka (reign 268-232 BCE) established Buddhism as the 
official state religion. This resulted in a campaign of the diffusion of Buddhism by sending envoys 
‘as far west as Athens, to Burma in the far east, to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in the south and 
northwards to Bactria and the Tarim Basin’ (Kaiser, 2012, 25). In the mid-sixth century, ‘Buddhism 
reached Japan from China via Korea in the form of a delivery of presents to Kimmei, the Emperor 
of Japan’ (Kaiser, 2012, 28). While the tradition which reached central Asia northwards was 
characterised by the Buddha’s life and Buddhist concepts of karma and the soul’s transmigration, 
the scroll recitation in South-East Asia has been related to the Ramayana and some Buddhist 
legends (Kaiser, 2012, 29). Belonging to the central Asian tradition is the jātaka. Jātaka images are 
biographical, narrative depictions of Buddha in his path to illumination and have been used as 
temple (stupa) illustrations with didactic functions since the time of Bhārhut (2nd century BCE) 
(Appleton, 2010, 124). In terms of the South-East Asia tradition,  
Chinese Ramayana narratives are based on northern Indian prototypes emphasising 
Rama’s personal integrity, his filial piety and obedience to his father’s wishes. The Ramakian –
the Thai version co-authored by King Rama I between 1797 and 1807 –derives from the 
southern Indian versions of the work. […] In the mid-nineteenth century Adolf Bastian 
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described a form of rural shadow theatre called len nang, for which ‘only scenes from the 
Ramakhien epic were used but no other subjects’ (Appleton, 2010, 147). 
Mair (1988, 1) adds as an example of the Indian influence on Asian storytelling the pien-wen, 
a Chinese vernacular narrative, developed from the Buddhist monks’ promptbooks, and 
characterised by secular and religious (mostly Buddhist) contents. This genre has certainly derived 
from oral storytelling with pictures where Buddhist figures were manifested or represented, 
thereby the expression pien, which means transformation: ‘To “perform a transformation” thus 
signifies the realization or animation by the storyteller –through various devices of his stock in 
trade –of the transformational figures and scenes on a picture-scroll’ (Mair, 1988, 1).61 
 
3.2.3 Pop religion: how deities have been become superheroes 
 
As we have seen, there is great significance attributed to images, in formal practice and folk 
religion. However, darśan operates also in contexts less obvious in religious terms. Due to its 
adaptability, darśan informs popular culture and inaugurates new forms of cult, such as that of the 
comic books. 
The first Indian comic book series published in India, or the Amar Chitra Katha, ‘immortal 
picture stories’ (McLain, 2009, 3), from a publishing house founded in 1967 (McLain, 2009, 2), have 
been based in the pictorial-oral tradition, or chitrakatha, ‘pre-novelistic Indian visual and 
storytelling traditions’ (Sreenivas, 2010, 41-49), to which pats and paṛs belong. This has enabled the 
comic books’ creators to transform Hindu deities, Indian politicians, poets, musicians, etc. into 
national heroes or, even, martyrs in the name of the defence of Indian, nationalistic principles or 
Hindu moral rules, such as the dharma. This process of of comic books’ protagonists’ martyrdom 
recalls a similar path followed by local folk heroes narrated by the storytelling scrolls. In these 
terms, the comic books, as in the case of the scrolls, become cultic objects: the narrative and visual 
renditions of the characters as semi-deities give a sacred tone to the comic book.  
Uberoi (1990, 4) has pointed out how mass media renditions of the deities shift the categories 
of the sacred and the profane by becoming religious icons and decorative posters at the same time, 
                                                          
61 ‘The most common paintings depicted the various tortures of hell. […] pao-chüan’. These hanging scrolls 
are called by the actors sip-tien-chhatla (“pictures of the ten courts [of Hell])” but are more usually 
abbreviated as simply chhatla (“paintings”). It is interesting to observe, however, that they also sometimes 
refer to them as oe angga […] (literally, “painted dolls”), the same word as is used for “comic strips”, while 
shadow figures may be called angzai […] (“babies”). This would seem to indicate that no sharp distinction is 
made between narrative illustrations (whether in panel or scroll form) and puppets of various types’ (Mair, 
1988, 10, 16). 
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with patriotic rhetoric as mediator between the two poles. This is particularly evident in the 
context of graphic novels and comic books. Indeed, 
[…] in spite of the long tradition of pictorial books in ancient and medieval India, the 
modern comic books represent an unprecedented effort to reclaim Indian sacred symbols (such 
as the Swastika), literature, history, mythology, and religion from the grip of the colonial legacy 
of the school system, which was perceived to be still under the spell of Thomas B. Macaulay’s 
infamous 1835 assertion that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth of the whole 
native literature of India and Arabia”, and under the influence of the colonial system (Bhatia, 
2006, 283). 
For instance, Spiderman India (Kang, 2004), with an Indian Peter Parker, Pavitr Prabhakar, 
moved from a country village to the chaotic metropolis of Mumbai, is the perfect example of a 
‘hyperlocalization’ (Bhatia, 2006, 291). Pavitr’s costume is a compromise between that of the 
Marvel’s character and the traditional male dhoti, a compromise which is reflected even in the 
characters’ linguistic register, a combination of colloquial English and Hindi (most of the times 
borrowed from Bollywood movies). The entire plot is, also, a postmodern translation of the ethical 
symbolism and contents of the myths narrated in the written and oral traditional Indian epic. 
Pavitr must fulfil his dharma, as suggested by his uncle’s sentence ‘With great talent, with great 
power there must also come great responsibilities’, which recalls the leitmotif of Peter Parker’s 
story. However, in seeking to follow dharma, he copes with evil forces, which, beyond being 
external menaces, also tempt his soul. This troublesome, spiritual battle should follow, according 
to Pavitr’s creator, Deepak Chopra (2007 and 2008), the collective archetypes which are embedded 
in mythology and should unify humanity in its collective universal desire for an ideal moral guide. 
Superheroes and deities coincide with those guides, if two of Chopra’s assertions are now 
compared: 
Divine and diabolical, sacred and profane, sinner and saints are all to be found here. Our 
challenge is to create new super heroes that will symbolically represent the evolutionary 
impulse on which humanity is currently riding: to take the best of east and west, the Ramayana, 
the Mahabharata, the stories of the Puranas and mesh them symbolically with the great fiction 
characters of the west in order to bring us glimpses of the luminous mystery of both individual 
and collective soul. (Chopra, 2007) 
Gods and Goddesses of Vedic literature are often looked upon as external deities, when 
in fact they are symbolic and specific expressions of higher archetypal states of consciousness. 
When that archetypal state of consciousness is expressed or incarnates through us, we become 
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capable of grand and extraordinary accomplishments (Chopra, 2008). 
As can be noted from the two quotations, there is a strong interconnection between the pre-
existent and local cult of the hero by means of oral mythology, on the one hand, and the 
construction of a collective conscience, on the other hand.  
The analysis of the interactions between comic books and scrolls is intertwined with the role 
of the scrolls in contemporary art, as the painter-storytellers, the patuas in this case, are more and 
more motivated to produce scrolls for the art market or for similar contexts, such as that of the 
graphic novels, as well as to interact with different forms of media. For instance, Bahar Chitrakar 
assimilated the assassination of Indira Gandhi into the mythology of the goddess Durga, with a 
collage of an electoral poster (Jain, 2010, 17-18). It is interesting to note that the coming to terms 
with new media is observable almost exclusively in the patuas’ context, whereas the paṛs have not 
experienced a similar trend, probably because the pats, unless the deities are represented, are not 
strictly identified as divinities’ shrines as in the case of the paṛs. In addition, the literature has not 
yet shown any involvement of NGOs or Western and Indian artists in workshops with the joshi. 
The paṛs today can be made for the tourist market, but the changes concern the dimension and the 
simplification of the scenes depicted, rather than a substantial re-elaboration of the paṛ’s contents.62 
It is methodologically important, in order to better understand the political 
instrumentalisation of the visual and narrative contents of the scrolls by Indian comic books, to 
take into consideration Herzfeld’s reflection on cultural intimacy (1997). This refers to the sense of 
belonging to a nation which has the use of a familiar and metaphorical language, e.g. mother 
tongue, motherland, etc., as a consequence. It is also significant to address attention to some 
theoretical assumptions on religion and nationalism found in Anderson (1991), Arendt (1986 
[1951]) and Weber (2000 [1922]), since this clarifies the specific phenomenon observed.  
While Anderson (1991) conceives nation as a historical transformation of the anthropological 
and social function of religion, Arendt (1986 [1951]) understands nationalism as a pseudo-theology 
where the juridical rationality of the state is transformed into a permanent essence, the nation soul, 
whose sacredness is determined by its divine origins. Arendt identifies in particular the 
phenomenon of tribal nationalism, in political situations of a state not already either centralised or 
structured, and usually born from the decline of a previous empire. In this circumstance, 
nationalism becomes a perversion of the state by claiming its cultural and divine origins, rather 
than the bureaucratic laws, as the criteria of citizenship, with the obvious corollary of a harsh 
                                                          
62 According to an interviewed scholar. 
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critique and negation of the state by the pan-nationalistic movements. In contrast, Anderson starts 
with the premise that nation is a political construct which is imagined by its inhabitants both as a 
limited space and as a community, because of which every social inequality is apparently solved 
by the common feeling of belonging to a social formation. Religion, the previous and not already 
secularised form of nation, realised communities by the centralised powers of a common sacred 
language, a single political figure elected by divine call and a narrative which puts history and 
cosmology, man and world, at the same level. In a certain sense, this communitarian nature of 
religion conceived by Anderson seems to me to follow Weber’s assertion of the substantial 
pragmatic function of religion as a social connector. Deepening my reflection on Weber’s theory of 
power (2000 [1922]), I identify in charismatic power a similar way of participation as that of 
religion and nationalism. This type of power derives from an extra-ordinary quality, which is 
either interdicted to others or gifted by goddesses and whose legitimacy is based on a proof, 
usually a miracle. The common traits in the three authors can be synthesised as the use of 
permanent and quantifiable criteria, which should have a divine justification, as the 
characterisation of one nation instead of another. Lastly, the three reflections show an important 
interrelation between religion and nation, where the nation acquires social functions and contents 
from religion. Returning to the concept of cultural intimacy and Anderson’s work on imagined 
communities, the sacred or magic interpretation of mass media can be considered as one of the 
means of propagation of national values and representations, considering the particular 
interpolation of religious contents with nationalistic aims within the rhetoric of the pan-Indian 
movements. This section will discuss how Indian contemporary mass media gain sources from the 
storyteller’s repertoire, whether a new cultic relationship with the deities depicted is established, 
and how these new forms of cults are employed in the pan-Indian nationalistic movements. 
The founder of the Amar Chitra Katha (ACK), Anant Pai, decided to dedicate a comic series to 
the mythological and religious Indian (mostly Hindu) tradition because of the decline in ‘traditional 
religious instruction’ (McLain 2009, 9). This aim was reinforced by ‘well-orchestrated’ seminars, one 
of the most important of which was “The Role of Chitra Katha in School Education”, with the 
Minister of Education as chief guest’ (Lent, 2004, 58). In the modern Indian nuclear and urban 
family, the ACKs have substituted the grandmother’s function as storyteller and keeper of tradition 
(Sreenivas, 2010, 56-57; cfr. McLain, 2009, 8 and Lent, 2004, 58), as is well represented in an 
advertisement, where the child calls her grandmother and asks for an ACK for his birthday.  
The use of the term chitra, meaning painting, is also important for understanding the 
121 
ideological premises of the ACK, as it embeds the action of continuing the chitrakatha by ‘sanitising’ 
(Sreenivas, 2010, 56) its local variations in favour of a nationalistic and pan-Indian culture 
(Sreenivas, 2010, 56-58). Pai engaged two ‘history experts, others worked in an archaeological 
center, and most had a thorough knowledge of Sanskrit’ (Lent, 2004, 65).63 In this light, Pai’s goal 
was to provide ‘male and female archetypal Indian heroes and heroines’ (Sreenivas, 2010, 53). Pai’s 
account reveals the relation of the cultural background of the ACK with a broader nationalistic 
rhetoric: 
In February 1967, my wife and I were visiting Delhi, and we stopped at Maharaja Lal & 
Sons bookstore. The TV was on in the bookstore –Bombay did not have TV yet, only Delhi, and 
only black and white –and the program was a quiz contest featuring five students from St. 
Stephen’s College. When they were asked, the students could not name the mother of Lord 
Ram. I was disappointed, but I thought, well, that is from a long time ago. But then a question 
came about Greek gods and Mt. Olympus, and the children could answer that question! This is 
the trouble with our education system: children are getting alienated from their own culture 
(quoted in McLain, 2009, 24). 
This quotation entails a precise concept of culture as exceptional and familiar at the same 
time. The incapacity of the children to conform to a binary system, in which Indian culture must be 
recognised in its icons and its bearers, e.g. Ram’s mother’s name, as distinguished from entities 
from foreign cultures, in this case Greek epics, symbolises a cultural estrangement. Without its 
distinct features, Indian culture lacks sense and social functions, since its bearers do not recognise 
themselves as its members or children. Pai’s vision was an Indian culture which coincides with 
Hinduism, as the abundance of stories related to Krishna in the ACK demonstrates. Not only does 
this predisposition towards Krishna propose Vaishnavism as the dominant religious current in 
Hinduism, following the desires for unification and systematisation of Hinduism by leading 
leaders such as Vivekananda and Harishchandra, but it also imposes Hinduism as the national 
religion of India (McLain, 2009, 50-51). In addition, ample space is dedicated to social reformers 
who have tried to unify Indian people from different social and religious background, following 
the nationalistic motto ‘unity in diversity’. 
It is precisely in this emphasis given to social and national reformers in the ACK that the 
                                                          
63 ‘Producer No. 1 recalled that the majority of the visual references came from books, due to budget 
limitations. However, the concern with verisimilitude was so great that he and other members of the staff 
would often go out of their way to acquire visual reference material by visiting important historical and 
religious sites, like the ruins of the Vijaynagara Empire at Hampi and the Hindu cave-temples on Elephanta 
Island’ (McLain, 2009, 36). 
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figure of the superhero finds its importance. In this use of Hindu philosophy for nurturing and 
guiding Indian nationalism, Hindu gods and mythological epic heroes have been given the role of 
national hero (Neumayer & Schelberger, 2003, 62). By using the technique of the ‘poster-like cover 
illustration’ (Sreenivas, 2010, 66), the stories are centred on the charisma of the individual hero. 
The hero combines qualities inspired by both the American comic books of the 1950s and 1960s 
(McLain, 2009, 3) and the chitrakatha. The adoption of the chitrakatha tradition was an attempt at 
cultural translation of the foreign medium of the comics (McLain, 2009, 42). This is even more 
significant if the familiarity of the narrative structure of the ACK with the Rajasthani Chitrakatha is 
considered, since it focuses on the story of a single protagonist, ‘who fell during battle or while 
resisting a plundering raid’ (McLain, 2009, 54). The oral nature of the ACK also reflects ‘a 
resurgence of an oral sensibility’ (Wandkte, 2012, 53) found in the American superhero comic 
books, which resemble the oral performance of the epic poems because of the use of flashback 
techniques and the episodic structure of the narrative (Wandkte, 2012, 38). This parallel is even 
more significant if one considers the inter-textual nature of Indian epic poems with written and 
oral sources (Hiltebeitel, 1999, 8).  
The translation of the epic hero depicted in the scrolls to the medium of the comic book 
determines the cultic and religious tones, as well as usages of the comic book itself. In order to 
assert this, it is necessary to examine the social function of the chitrakatha tradition, in this case the 
Rajasthani Chitrakatha. The epic narration allows a practical intervention into Rajasthani society, 
since the power of the hero, who is intertwined with the ancestors’ spirits and the protection of the 
tribe, is transferred into the bhopa. If considering Miller’s (2000) original study on the epic hero, the 
hero is defined as a mediator between superhuman forces and reality, then his liminal state makes 
him closer to the figure of the shaman. This is in the sense that he is separated from the rest of 
society and operates between different and opposite realms, such as human and animal, life and 
death (Miller, 2000, 298, 303), hence the similar social function of the bhopa and the epic hero. These 
ritual dynamics are preserved in the comic books, which absorb the bhopa’s function and become 
themselves cultic objects. Many readers or their parents tried not to damage the comics by putting 
a cover or ‘special cardboards binders’ on them (McLain, 2009, 18), due to the belief that the 
destruction of the comics might represent a sign of disrespect against the gods. Furthermore, some 
of them have testified a tangible sacred power derived from the ACK: ‘“Whenever I used to have a 
fever as a child or when I was unwell, my parents used to buy about a dozen of these comics and 
give them to me. I used to happily read them and dream about them and get well soon”’ (McLain, 
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2009, 18). 
If we analyse the comic book Mira, these reflections made on the cultic power of ACK acquire 
even more meaning. Not only do several scenes depict the mystical woman in the act of 
worshipping or in ecstatic contact with Krishna, but a Krishna’s statue was cut out from the page, 
suggesting to me that a reader has used it for cultic purposes. Moreover, some of the ACK readers 
have admitted to visualising gods during the pūjā as they are depicted in the comic strips (McLain, 
2009, 16). The multiple meaning of the darśan, thus, has allowed new forms of worship in the age 
of mass media. Lutgendorf, quoted in McLain (2009, 16), has observed offerings and construction 
of shrines on the televisions. Rajagopal (2001, 94) defines these devotional practices while watching 
TV as a fetishisation of the medium. Another important aspect to consider in this phenomenon is 
the democratisation of the cultic rituals, due to the skill of the mass media in disanchoring images 
of the gods from temples or specific spatial sites. For instance, the online darśan of the divine 
images found in the Jagannath Temple has allowed access to those for whom the space of the 
temple is prohibited, e.g. those who are not Indian Hindus (Scheifinger, 2009). The pop rendering 
of religion has thus implied a hybridism between the sacred and the profane, increasing 
familiarisation with magic contexts and supernatural revelations (Brosius, 2005, 101, 103). 
The shaping of a pan-Indian superhero in the ACK is influenced by a specific 
conceptualisation of femininity and masculinity which is recurrent in the context of Indian 
storytelling scrolls. The Hindu conceptualisation of femininity relies on the idea that the world is 
regulated by a binary complex of forces.  
In the Samkhya philosophical school the masculine word purusa refers to consciousness, 
while the feminine word prakrti represents primordial nature. Although often used in technical 
ways that do not necessarily bring attention to the gender of the words, purusa and prakrti can 
represent an oppositional relationship between a masculine principle, associated with inaction 
and detachment, and a feminine principle, representing activity and passion (Brodbeck & Black, 
2007, 14). 
Things become more complex if the feminine regulative concept, Śakti, is analytically 
considered. Indeed, Śakti is not only a creative power. In a cosmological and cosmogonic 
perspective, it is also connected to the knowledge principle of maya, which includes both 
knowledge (vidya) and ignorance (avidya) (Pintchman, 1994, 198). Śakti is, therefore, an ambivalent 
force with both a benevolent and a malevolent aspect. Women are considered either portions 
(amsa) (Pintchman, 1994, 201) or manifestations (Hiltebeitel & Ernld, 2000, 11) of the goddesses. 
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Women, because of their sharing of the feminine principle, are ambiguous human beings 
(Hiltebeitel & Ernld, 2000, 201): on the one hand, they are guarantors of the social order, on the 
other hand, they possess an uncontrollable force.  
In the Manu-dharma-sastra, the woman coincides with the devoted wife, the pativrata (Kinsley, 
1989, 97), ‘one who has taken a vow (vrat) to [protect] her husband (pati)’ (Harlan, 1994, 45), whose 
name means protector (Shah, 1995, 72). In the Mahabharata, the husband is also called the supporter 
(bharta) of his wife (Shah, 1995, 72). Indeed, women are considered in these texts as ‘incapable of 
handling their own affairs and to be socially inconsequential without relationships with men’ 
(Kinsley, 1989, 8), where inconsequentiality always means infertility, the inability to provide the 
husband’s family with heirs (Shah, 1995, 89). The trustworthy wife (sati) embodies this dharma and 
through self-sacrifice promotes birth (Harlan, 1994, 156). The reason for this is that the pativrata, 
because of her eternal faithfulness derived from subjugating every individual need to those of her 
husband and from sexual fidelity, has an inner fire or heat, as in the case of asceticism (tapas) 
(Kinsley, 1989, 97). In this light, even women’s beauty is useless if there is not a husband who, 
according to Hanuman who rescues Sita from her prison, decorates his wife (Kinsley, 1989, 100). 
Beauty is a way to attract husbands and promote fertility. 
The goddess Durga is exemplary of the uncontrolled feminine power. Her beauty has the 
function of luring her victims into battle. Therefore, she does not transfer her Śakti to a husband, 
rather she takes on the male power by killing the gods (Kinsley, 1989, 5). In this respect, Durga may 
be associated with the Rajastani warrior goddesses kuldevi (Harlan, 1994, 71). These goddesses are 
connected to the political power of a kinship (kul or shakh), as they protect a Rajput group by 
appearing to its leader and guiding him in establishing a kingdom or in making decisions in every 
political and military crisis by appearing to its leader (Harlan, 1994, 52). The kuldevis constitute a 
paradox. They are warrior virgins and pativratas at the same time, since they serve an entire social 
group (Harlan, 1994, 71).64 The same awkwardness is felt for women mystics, such as the Rajput 
Mira, who are good examples of pativratas but they do not share their Śakti with a mortal spouse, 
but rather with a celestial one, such as the god Krishna in Mira’s case (Harlan, 1994, 206). 
Assuming the Hindu socio-philosophical conceptualisation of womanhood, the patuas’ 
production can be analysed through ‘a binary opposition’ between devi (goddesses)/sati (the chaste 
woman or pativrata) and the rakshis (female demons)/alakshmi/asati (dishonoured women) 
                                                          
64 It is interesting to know that women re-appropriate the oral tradition on the kuldevi by the kahaniyam, 
where the sacredness of the domestic duties is emphasised (Harlan, 1994, 53). 
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(Chatterjee, 2000, 12). This dual structure is related to the moral general subdivision of women and 
deities into benevolent and malevolent beings on the basis of their relationship with male figures. 
The benevolent women/goddesses are sexually dominated and controlled by a husband who 
domesticates the potentially destructive force of Śakti, whereas the malevolent ones have a free 
sexuality and menace the social world with diseases and the corruption of the caste principle of 
purity (Ernld, 1993, 154; Pintchman, 1994, 203-207). The patuas’ anarchic visual depiction of 
malevolent women/goddesses explains the anarchy caused to the moral order (Chatterjee, 2000, 12).  
In the ACK, the sexualisation of male characters as strong and muscled warriors has, as 
counterpart, a very pronounced femininity for female characters, in part recalling the scanty 
costumes of the heroines of the American comics, e.g. Wonder Woman (McLain, 2009, 53). 
Therefore, the ‘male gaze’ is fundamental in defining the female identity in the ACK (McLain, 2009, 
59). This is not only because of the pativrata/Śakti canon, where ‘the story of Shiva’s marriage is 
symbolic of the perfect fusion of the male and female principles which, according to a Hindu view 
of life, are the moving powers behind the universe (Pai, 1976b), but also because of the aim of 
presenting them as heroic figures. Even Kali in the Tales of Durga is ‘sanitised’ and presented, apart 
from her lolling tongue, as a pleasant woman (McLain, 2009, 109). Ugly or inharmonious bodies 
and vulgar gestures characterise deceitful or evil characters, such as Surpanaka, Ravana’s sister, 
and the maidservant Manthara in Rama (1970), or the evil Sultan in Padmini (1973). In addition, the 
hyper-feminisation of female characters strengthens the hero’s masculine force. Two valid 
examples of this logic can be found in Rama and Shakuntala (1970). 
In Rama, Sita is a marginal and vulnerable character, existing only to justify Rama’s 
tremendous strength used to rescue her. The rejection of Sita is completely avoided in order to 
present Rama as a morally exemplary hero. Sita only watches and whispers while admiring the 
herculean strength of her husband, as is clear from the cover of the comic. Her curves and alluring 
pose make of her the perfect princess worthy of a battle. In Shakuntala, the static poses of female 
characters afford an indulgent pleasure for the male reader and show seductive exchange of glances 
between the lovers, reinforced by the mischievous intervention of Shakuntala’s girlfriends. 
In the mid-1970s, the increase of female staff at ACK brought new female protagonists with 
active postures, ‘martial women’ or ‘the virangana, the woman who manifests the qualities of male 
heroism (viryam)’ (McLain, 2009, 79). As in the kuldevi’s case, these heroines lost their eroticism 
(which stands for their sexual fertility) by being represented as masculine or androgynous. A clear 
example of this gender transformation is visible in Rani Durgavati (1976a). Here, the connection 
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with the kuldevi goddesses is even more explicit, since The Rani is a Rajput. Her heroic and secular 
figure has become legendary in several poems, novels and folk songs. In the everyday speech, a 
little girl with a free spirit or a woman who is ‘too assertive with her husband’ is called Rani (Lebra-
Chapman, 1986, 152). She is compared to Hanuman and Durga and described as riding ‘with the 
horse’s reins in her teeth’ (Lebra-Chapman, 1986, 123).  
As a female warrior, she goes beyond the male/female barriers in order to share superhuman 
features with the gods (Lebra-Chapman, 1986, 123). In the ACK, Durgavati experiences a change in 
her physical appearance: while, as a maiden, she is portrayed as a pleasant girl, according to the 
ACK style, after her husband’s death and her subsequent succession, she gradually loses her 
feminine grace for imperious and harsh traits. Her body is compressed under armour. She partly 
regains her Śakti in her self-sacrifice in battle (‘And like the true Rajputni she was, the proud Rani 
stabbed herself’, 31), but she seems more like a proud male warrior than a chaste Rajput woman. 
The characterisation of women as dual archetypes, firstly conceived as a moral teaching in 
the popular and oral tradition, particularly that of the Indian storytelling scrolls, was further 
adopted by the comic books as a specific nationalistic strategy, that of the use of specific 
metonymies for representing the Indian nation. In Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’s work Hindutva: 
Who is a Hindu? (1923), the nation was ethnically identified with ‘the Holy Land’ (Sreenivas, 2010, 
28) and unified by the fraternity of its members, following the logic of a somatic or biological 
metaphor of society as a body or a tree: a key concept in the ideology of fraternity is the motto 
‘unity in diversity’ (Brosius, 2005, 62). Furthermore, local concepts of devotional love for deities 
have been transferred to the national identity, as Modi’s interpretation of bhakti, the more general 
concept of devotional love in Hinduism, as the alliance between leaders and people (Brosius, 2005, 
82). In particular: 
In Integral Humanism, Upadhyaya politicized the idea of fraternity by providing a link 
between collective awakening and radical political action in the context of nation building. […] 
Both national mind and soul must undergo awakening before dharmarajya (the rule of moral 
conduct in state politics) can be achieved (Brosius, 2005, 63-64). 
Following this reasoning, the nation is defined by dharma as a guiding principle and history is 
used for the purposes of Hindu tradition: ‘Itihāsa, the nearest equivalent for history used in Sanskrit 
literature means “thus it was” or “so it has been”’ (Chakravarty, 1993, 162). The past may not be 
factual or real but rather is constituted by events which can justify Hindu tradition (Chakravarty, 
1993, 162). This idealisation of the past implies an equivalent idealisation of political power. Perfect 
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and ideal sovereignty is connected to the nation and constitutes its inner heart, despite the 
succession of factual and, so to speak, imperfect reigns (Partha, 1995, 115). In this logic, the 
Ramayana is a political text on the exemplary conduct of a king (Richman, 2001, 6) and Rama has 
been seen as the ideal man, who favoured national duties over conjugal ones, a paradox: 
Ironically, then, although women and their conjugal familial role lie at the symbolic earth 
of nationalist ideology, they also must be sacrificed in line with whatever the current “national 
interest dictates” (Richman, 2001, 8). 
Therefore, epics were considered as valid sources of legitimacy of citizenship and political 
power (Mangharam, 2009, 80). As a consequence, the civil society were identified with and 
depended upon these Hindu principles and on this organic conceptualisation of nation, by thus 
identifying the social groups not sufficiently dedicated to the nation (Brosius, 2005, 64), first of all 
Muslims, who are, not surprisingly, often represented as villains in the ACK. As they recognise 
themselves as the transnational community of the Ummah, Muslims represent a menace to the 
concept of organic society (Brosius, 2005, 176). The same Savarkar identified the Hindu community 
with a Hindu woman menaced by the ‘lustful Muslim male’ (Sreenivas, 2010, 28), who successfully 
resisted his aggression, following her ritualistic heroic husband’s sacrifice (Partha, 1995, 123). Very 
close to this process of feminisation of India is the Bollywood utopic vision of the nation as a 
modern nuclear family where ‘ties of blood and genealogy that characterize the traditional Indian 
notions of family’ are fundamental pillars (Chakravarty, 1993, 114). 
In the case of ACK, the new forms of worship and the charismatic power derived from the 
superheroic figures of their characters strengthen a celebration of the Indian nation as a culturally 
united assemblage. Thus, the visual form creates intimacy and establishes itself as an authoritative 
voice, by presenting its contents as uncontaminated truths (Brosius, 2005, 110). The use of the 
chitrakatha tradition as a construction of a pan-Indian narrative in the ACK (Sreenivas, 2010, 56), by 
a ‘sanitisation’ of the local interpretations and versions of the storytelling tradition, represens an 
example of the power of the visual. The pan-nationalistic feature of the ACK is strengthened by the 
metaphor of the grandmother as unique source of storytelling (Sreenivas, 2010, 57) and keeper of 
tradition in the modern Indian nuclear and urban family (Sreenivas, 2010, 56, 57; see also McLain, 
2009, 8 and Lent, 2004, 58), with which the comic series has been compared as a substitute, as seen 
above.  
Representing Hindu gods, epic heroes and nationalistic reformers as sharing the same 
supernatural powers, which are intertwined with a local type of storytelling or, more generally, 
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oral tradition, entails a metonymic connection with the nation (Dittmer, 2013, 25), of which the 
protagonists of the comic books are protectors. This is in line with the Savarkar’s invocation for a 
masculinisation of the state and the Hindu nationalist ideals of masculinity in opposition to the 
politics of a welfare state, for what concerns the resolution of social inequalities (Sreenivas, 2010, 
111). The new forms of worship derived from the notion of darśan, then, allow a glorification of the 
superheroes and a metonymical connection with the nation, whose values are embedded by the 
superheroes. By this logic, the glorification of the superheroes entails a peculiar pseudo-theology, 
as seen in the reconsideration of Arendt’s theories. The Christian Orthodox icons, which will be 
explored in the following section (3.2.4), have been developed from the cult of the Roman hero as 
well. An analysis of these icons will show to the reader that a phenomenology of vision is not 
restricted to the Indian case, but is part of Western religious culture. Observing the icons will also 
prepare the ground for the study of the origin of aesthetics as a process of secularisation to which 
seeing has been subjected in Western culture (see chapter four). 
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3.3 Comparing different visual-religious cultures: the icons 
 
As seen in section 3.2.2, darśan simultaneously represents an embodied relationship between 
the ordinary and the supernatural spheres, as well as a theory of knowledge. Because of its skill of 
giving life to the intangible, darśan intervenes in every situation when incarnation and possession 
by the divine happen. In a more subtle way, darśan is the means by which humans can manipulate 
to their advantage the world of the deceased, as observed in the ceremony of the painting the eyes 
among the Santals. The magic properties of gazing do not represent a case only within Hindu 
material religion. Rather, visual representations share their enacting properties, as Goody (1997) 
stresses. Orthodox Christian icons constitute a significant example of how gazing, the visual, and 
beauty were connoted by ritual and religious meanings, before the advent of the secularised 
discipline of aesthetics, which will be explored in the following chapter (section 4.2). In particular, 
this section reveals how the ancient Roman and Greek funerary cults, usually performed for the 
political authorities, have historically generated icons. In their mimetic and imprinting faculties, 
the icons have been conceived of as the saints’ relics, as carrying both the auspicious and 
miraculous powers of the divine intervention by being reified metonymies of the divine body. 
The devotional practice of the Orthodox icons is a synesthetic experience that involves the 
entire body (Pentcheva, 2006). Not only does the devotee do the proskynesis, which consists of 
bowing and kneeling in front of the icon,65 but she also kisses it (aspasmos), lights a candle, makes 
the sign of the cross, touches, and kisses the image (proskinima) (Cormack, 1997, 24). Furthermore, 
she may offer a tama, 
Which can be anything from a candle or flowers or food to small metal plaque which 
most frequently represents a person or the part of the body involved in the prayer […] Quite 
often, the prayer is also written down on a small piece of paper, which can be posted in a box 
provided or attached to an icon –some even write directly on the icon! (Cormack, 1997, 24) 
Notice how the worshipper’s behaviour towards images is similar to a situation in which the 
deity manifests herself to him. It is as if the deity’s physical existence could be perceived, as in the 
phenomenon of darśan. Some examples can further demonstrate this point. In 1987, the doctor 
Giuseppe Moscati, who passed away in 1927, was canonised in the Church of New Jesus, Naples. 
                                                          
65 Proskynesis is usually translated by the Latin verb adorare, which was a Roman cult of handkissing. Marti 
(1936, 272), through a comparison via different Greek authors, thought that proskynesis is related more to the 
act of handkissing rather than to that of prostration, and is linked to other performances, like that of the 
farewell on the threshold. The origin of the ritual started with the introduction of a Persian court ceremony 
by Alexander the Great (Bowden, 2013, 55). 
130 
His photo was inserted into a gigantic tabernacle. The painted portrait was substituted by the 
photographic medium, which allows a personal encounter with the person portrayed more 
efficaciously (Belting, 2001, 25-26). The ceremony of the Inchinata (‘bowed’) in Tivoli was the apex 
of a procession, in which Jesus and Saint Mary’s icons were bowing opposite one another, as 
though they were living human beings (Belting, 2001, 99). The glittering lights of the candles onto 
the icons’ surfaces give ‘rise to a sense that the image is animated’ (Pentcheva, 2006, 640).  
This coexistence of the divine and the mundane sphere is reflected in the human desire to be 
placed at the centre of the world, as close as possible to the deities (Eliade, 1967, 58), hence the 
iconographic need to paint the world ‘AS A WHOLE’ (Uspensky, 1976, 34). This translates into a 
binary system of painting. What is semantically and, then, spiritually important for the viewer is 
placed in front of him without any perspective, while the space surrounding the viewer and the 
worshipped is three-dimensional (Uspensky, 1976, 35-68). As Weaver (2011, 408) declares: ‘The 
boundary between the image and the living signified (or prototype) becomes blurred, and viewers 
are caught in a liminal merging of art and reality’. Consequently, the abolition of the 
distinctiveness of art and the real world allows a common space shared by the worshipper and the 
deity, which coincides with the ritual space, or passage from the mundane sphere to the 
superhuman one. This is particularly clear when one examines iconostasis and its domestic 
translation into folding icons.  
An iconostasis is a wall of icons in Orthodox churches, which separates the nave from the 
altar. It is a relatively recent architectural feature, evolved in the 15th century, and is characterised 
by the precise order of the icons of which it consists. On the right, we find Jesus’ icon, with an icon 
of Mary carrying the infant Jesus’s icon (Theotokos, from the Greek Theo, God, and thokos, 
childbirth) placed on the left. Immediately above them, there is the Eucharist’s icon. Below them, 
there are three sections: the first one has at the centre the icon of the Deeisis, Jesus enthroned with a 
book in his hands with Mary and Saint John the Baptist. The second is a representation of the 
liturgical festivities and the third is of the patriarchs (Evdokimov, 1990, 160). The religious 
meaning is that the iconostasis is the allegory of the Christian church and its path towards Christ’s 
revelation (Lazarev, 1996, 85). Iconostasis functions both as a stairway and as a doorstep, a 
threshold. While the stairway stands for the break between two different cosmological realms, 
Paradise and Hell, and the consequent possibility of communication between them (Eliade, 1980, 
48-49), the doorstep reveals immediately and concretely the continuity of space and the means of 
passage between two distinct realms (Eliade, 1967, 28). The domestic threshold acquires this 
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meaning, since the icon is placed on the highest and best place of the home (also called red or 
beautiful corner, krasni; see Tradico, 2004, 33), so that the visitor, while entering the home space, 
must bow in front of it (Evdokimov, 1990, 179). We have another, emblematic example of the 
interrelation of sacred and domestic spaces operated by icons in the case of the Russian folding 
icons, where the Church place is recreated: 
When opened up, Russian folding icons, like an Andachtsbild, could look like the cross-
section of a place of worship; when folded they resembled its portal or the ‘royal gates’ of an 
iconostasis. Thus people could see before the ‘door’ to a place of worship, open it and find 
themselves at once in world of angels and saints; there they could be alone and face-to-face with 
God (Tarasov, 2002, 41). 
A similar reconstruction of the temple’s space and worship can be observed both in the 
already mentioned chandarvos and kavads, and in the Rajasthani paṛs as well. Indeed, their rigid 
pattern structure positions the places where Pābūjī or Devanārāyaṇ can be worshipped, as well as 
connecting sacred spaces, such as the lake Pushkar, together with sacred legends. 
Turning to late-ancient Roman art, the icon can work as a signum, meaning something which 
is beyond a mere a portrait and is the double of the represented, similar to the mechanism already 
found in Indian representations where darśan is expressed. The signifier provides its viewer with 
the potentiality of that which it refers to, even though it is not present, and then excludes the 
coexistence of signifier and referent (e.g. the deity’s apparition and a statue of the same deity). 
Interestingly, Fornari (1976, 56) calls this process transubstantiation. As with the Eucharist, the 
artistic sign, as well as the dream image, translates meaning in presence, hence an enchantment 
effect is produced in the viewer (Fornari, 1976, 56). Therefore, the Byzantine concept of mimesis, 
which entails both presence and absence, explains the icons’ performative function (Pentcheva, 
2006, 631). As in a dream, the icon embeds a desire for presence (Faure, 1998, 783).  
Since icons are believed to be filled by charis, divine grace (Pentcheva, 2006), they must be 
‘physically experienced’ according to the model of ‘extramission’, where the believer’s gaze is 
meant to touch icons’ surfaces (Pentcheva, 2006). In the case of Christian Orthodox icons, eikon is 
not just a simple portrait of Christ and the saints, but rather, as we have seen in the late ancient art, 
a double of them (for a historical analysis see Boespflug, 2012, 98). The term typos explains this: 
icons are the prototype’s physical imprints (Pentcheva, 2006, 635-636). In fact, the historical 
predecessors of the icons were the acheiropoietai (Kitzinger, 1992, 44), visual imprints of Christ, such 
as the Mandylion from Edessa (see Gharib, 2000, 45-46) or, in Renaissance iconography, Veronica’s 
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veil (see Clark, 2007, 170 and Faure, 1998, 783). The icon develops this physical imprint by 
substituting it with painting, but the phenomenological process is the same: making the absent, the 
intangible present, tangible, thus the importance of touching the icon by the believer. A similar 
concept can be found in Buddhist culture: 
The art historian Titus Burckhardt has noted the similarity between the Divyāvadāna 
story, the artists are incapable of drawing the Buddha’s likeness. Noting their low level of 
spiritual attainment, the Buddha projects his image on a canvas and commands them to colour 
it in. In another variant, after failing to get the proportions of the Buddha’s body correctly, an 
artist traces the outlines of the Buddha’s shadow on the ground. In both examples, the Buddha, 
like Christ, is personally involved in his own image-making-either actively, […], or passively, 
[…]. Many reizō in Saikoku reijōki are mechanically reproduced in a manner reminiscent of the 
Divyāvadāna story. Most often, an ascetic, seeing an apparition of the bodhisattva, copies or 
carves the form so exactly that it becomes identical to the original (Mac Williams, 2004, 63-64). 
The sacralisation of amulets and Buddha statues, then, must be animated or activated. The 
Buddha statues must undergo the process of the opening of the eyes (bōēkphra nets), as well as the 
transference of the monks’ spiritual virtues to Buddha’s followers and the recitation of the Dhamma 
by them (Tambiah, 1984, 243). When a statue is consecrated, monks and laity bring with them 
other statues and amulets in order to subject these artefacts to the same process (Tambiah, 1984, 
243). A jātaka acquires meaning only after a ritual of consecration of Buddha’s images and statues. 
The moment when the Bodhisattva became Buddha is symbolically recreated in order to imbue the 
objects with ‘buddha-ness’ (Appleton, 2010, 143). This recreation consists of two phases: the 
instruction of the image and the empowering of the image. In the first case, jātakas are used as tools 
for reminding the image or the statue about ‘who he is’, then a man becoming Buddha, thereby the 
recitation of biographical episodes. In the second case, the image must be filled by the Buddha’s 
essence, hence the recitation of texts on a Buddha’s qualities (Appleton, 2010, 143-144). The 
installation of Buddhahood into the image by the recitation represents also a paradigmatic moral 
example to which devotees must aspire (Appleton, 2010, 144). 
Returning to Christian contexts, the mechanism of imprinting recalls that of the divine 
incarnation of Christ: as Christ is God’s immanent presence, so are the icons. As a consequence, the 
icons are treated as sacred books, from which some prescriptions and interdictions are derived, for 
example the kissing of icons is analogous to kissing the Gospel, their placement in a holy niche of 
the home, the prohibition against throwing away an icon or book which has fallen into disrepair 
[…], and so on’ (Uspensky, 1976, 10). In this logic, icons both demonstrate the authenticity of the 
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mystery of incarnation and lead worshippers to discover that they embed the same divine grace 
(Bernardi, 1998, 59-60; see also Evdokimov, 1990, 187).66 Emblematically, baptism is characterised 
by showing the face of the baptised baby towards the joined community in order to remember that 
every human being is in the image of God (Goa, 2000, 40). The notion of enhypòstatos explains how 
the worshipper invokes the presence of the prototypes by using their images (Evdokimov, 1990, 
198). The result of this is the union between the worshipper and the god, made possible by nature 
of the eyes: ‘Instead of looking into the icon to discover something new, you, the gazer, discover 
that the icon is gazing at you’ (Chambers, 2012, 21).  
In Christian Orthodox painting, each phase has a religious meaning. A piece of cloth is put 
on a wooden panel and several layers of chalk are applied on the cloth. The pattern of the drawing, 
then, is carved on the surface and the colours are laid on by starting from the darkest to the 
lightest. It is not the case, therefore, that the entire technique of icon painting is called illumination: 
icon making is an allegory of the spiritual path from the darkness of ignorance and sin to the light 
of the discovery of grace and the mystery of God’s incarnation (V.A., 1989, 17). However, the 
following quote establishes more strongly the link between the icon painter and God: 
To apply the gold leaf to the icon, I quickly took the board from the fridge and set it up 
where I could efficiently reach the gold leaf. Porter showed me how to lean it and blow from the 
bottom of my lungs (“as if cleaning your glasses”) onto the surface intended for the gold. […] 
As I asked Porter about the spiritual significance of this part of the process, and she said that the 
iconographer’s breath is the creative breath of God blowing over the surface of the deep, like in 
Genesis. In this drama of icon creation, the iconographer plays the role of God, while also 
reflecting on her own death (Chambers, 2012, 24). 
Thus, painting an icon is just the beginning of a complex ritual system, which includes both 
the experiential and theological phenomenon of deities’ transubstantiation into a material artefact, 
and the creation of a new, holy space shared by worshippers and gods. Moving from the 
performative aspects of seeing icons, the ontological ambiguity of the presence of an absent entity 
is now explored by using an anthropological-historical perspective. 
Icons, as recipients of living entities, can be compared to funerary urns, as Faure (1998, 770, 
793) suggested. Following the work of the Russian theologian Florenskij on Christian Orthodox 
icons (1977, 54; 2008, 145), icons are opposed to masks, because masks are empty of the spiritual 
                                                          
66 In the apocryphal Acts of John (second century CE), it is written that one of Saint John’s disciples 
commissioned a painter to make a portrait of his master. Saint John reacted by saying that the portrait did 
not reproduce the human soul, rather it was just a portrait of somebody without life any more (Laeng, 1990, 
44-45). 
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grace of the former, rather they just imitate faces. The only context where masks can be considered 
as icons was the ancient funerary cult. The term mask derives from the Latin words larva,67 which 
means both theatrical mask and the dead’s errant soul (Bronzini, 1992, 63-64), and persona, which 
referred both to the full status of Roman citizen as belonging to a lineage (gens) and to ‘the facial 
disguise that actors put on their face’ (Poppi, 2001, 132). Indeed, ancestors’ death masks, stored in 
the family ancestral altar (lararium), were worn by professional actors to perform the ancestors’ life 
histories on the occasion of a funeral (Poppi, 2001, 133). It may not be a case, then, that ancestors’ 
icons are venerated as saints in the Christian Orthodox domestic cult (Tradico, 2004, 33). A similar 
use was destined for the Roman Egyptian mummy portraits (Thompson, 1982, 24), which have 
often been compared to the Byzantine icons (Velmans, 2002, 10). 
The concept of larva follows the ancient creed that human shadows stifle their person’s’ 
essence, as in the myth of the potter Butade, who made a clay statue of his daughter’s beloved by 
using her drawing of the boy’s shadow, in order to console her for his abandonment of her (Bettini, 
1992, VI). According to Homer, the thing that leaves the human body to descend into Hades 
belongs to the category of eidola, or a person’s double, i.e. oneiros, phantoms who, sent by gods, 
appear in dreams, or phasma, a replica of a living person made by gods (Vernant, 1992, 3). 
Continuing with the Christian icons, scholars have traced their evolution back to the early 
Christian funerary images of the 3rd century (Velmans, 2002, 9-10), which had the same function of 
the prayer commendatio animae, specifically the invocation of God’s benevolence to the dead 
(Grabar, 1993, 27). In addition, the portraits of Christian apostles and bishops (from the 3rd and the 
4th century) were influenced by the Roman typology of the imago clipeata, which had been used as 
triumphal and sepulchral art (Winkes, 1969, 101). The cults of saints and relics provides a second, 
fundamental influence on icons (Belting, 2001, 107). In particular, there is the well-documented 
thesis that the first icons were portraits of saints distributed or sold to pilgrims during the 5th 
century (Velmans, 2002, 12). 
Similar uses of images of the deceased and conceptualisation of the soul as the primary 
essence of corporeal human nature can be found in contemporary Japan. While the Japanese dead 
person’s soul (hotoke) maintains human worldly needs, such as company, care, and food (Irizarry, 
2014, S161), it is not considered sufficiently ready and formed to join the realm of the household 
ancestors (senzo daidai shoshōrei) (Irizarry, 2014, S182), and thus can be considered as being between 
the supernatural and the ordinary. One meaning of hotoke is related to the historic figure of the 
                                                          
67 For the debate on the origin of the term mask, see Bronzini, 1992, 62-64. 
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Buddha Shakyamuni. Because of the enlightenment achieved by the dead during the funeral, the 
euphemistic expression ‘to become a Buddha’ (hotoke ni naru or jōbutsu suru) is now customarily 
used in Japan to indicate death. The interactions between the hotoke and its still-living beloved 
occur in the household altar (butsudam) (Irizarry, 2014, S162). It is here, after the funeral, that 
memorial pictures of the deceased are placed. After a period, the hotoke becomes a tutelar ancestor 
(senzo) and the memorial pictures lose their efficacy and can be removed from the altar (Irizarry, 
2014, S182). 
The former can be subdivided into two types, the iei, where the deceased, depicted alone, 
looks at the camera (Irizarry, 2014, S182), and the ihai, where two or more persons are 
immortalised (Irizarry, 2014, S164). In both cases, the persons depicted are divided from the seer 
spatially and temporally. 
In the memorial photograph the deceased is both there and not there: “a photographic 
print simultaneously evokes presence and absence. It constitutes on the one hand a compact 
and proximate object, yet it manifestly depicts something separated from the viewer in space 
and time” (Schattscheneider 2003, 204 in Irizarry, 2014, S163). 
 In the China of the 4th century CE memorial pictures become tools for elite Buddhist priests’ 
memorial rituals. From the 5th century CE onwards, the pictures were believed to contain the living 
essence of the portrayed (Irizarry, 2014, S165). The use of the pictures was integrated with the 
Confucian practices of the cult of the ancestors, such as the so-called spirit tablets (Irizarry, 2014, 
S165). Five centuries later, when the memorial pictures had already been diffused in Japan, these 
visual objects were turned into relics or icons, as they could operate in the ritual context as 
substitutes of the depicted subject (Irizarry, 2014, S165). 
If we compare Chinese memorial portraits with Indian funerary cults, there is the common 
belief that the dead must follow ritual steps. The deceased is a body in construction, constituted by 
ten parts, or pinds, to which specific offerings and debt repayments are connected (Parry, 1994, 
196). The soul is surrounded by an aerial body, which is able to perceive the future torments of 
hell, which await her (Kaiser, 2012, 17). On each day, a new organ of sense (Indira) is created, 
culminating in the final step, the creation of the digestive system on the eleventh day (Parry, 1994, 
196). At this stage, 
A funerary priest, a mahabrahman, accompanies mourners the whole time to ensure that 
the rites are correctly performed. On the eleventh day, the priest assumes the role of the 
deceased. He is said to be possessed by the spirit of the deceased, and the words from his 
mouth are messages from the deceased (Kaiser, 2012, 17). 
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If the deceased is a sinner, he is now ready to face Yama’s judgment, based on Chitragupta’s 
notes, by reaching Vaitarani, the river of blood and excrement that forms the final barrier between 
the world of the living and that of the dead (Kaiser, 2012, 17). In Jain and Vaishnavist funerary 
cults, the priest also recites the book of Pretakalpa and illustrates it with pictures on paper called 
narak chitra (Pictures of Hell) (Kaiser, 2012, 17).68 
The completion of the pinds removes the deceased from its state of ghost (pret yoni) and leads 
to that of ancestor (pitr) (Parry, 1994, 75, 229). While the world of the ancestors brings fertility and 
prosperity to the descendants, ghosts represent a persistent threat to the productive and 
reproductive forces of the household (Parry, 1994, 75, 229).  
The imago clipeata (referred to above) introduces a third inspirational source of Christian 
icons, particularly the emperor’s portrait in Late Antiquity. According to the archaeologist 
L’Orange (1965, 128), the political need to a reconstruction of what had been destroyed under the 
Principate is reflected in a type of art which stressed the sacral nature of the emperor and, at the 
same time, places him in an immutable order. The gaze is emphasised and is bigger in proportion 
to the rest of the face, although is not directed toward the viewer, but rather upwards (ano blepon). 
This model was introduced by Alexander the Great in order to represent the emperor’s divine 
inspiration (thèia epìpnoia), one of the principal features of his incarnation of the highest authority 
(divina maiestas) or supernatural power (Pucci, 1992, 108, 113, 116; see also Belting, 2001, 162-163, 
who quotes L’Orange). With the saints’ cult, then, the meeting of the cult of the heroes and that of 
the Christian martyrs abolished the fear of contamination which underlays the ancient, rigid 
distinction between the world of the dead and that of the living (Brown, 1981). We can find a 
similar mixture of funerary and heroic cults in the Indian folk epics. In the case of Bengali patuas, 
particular pats are dedicated to folk-deities who are usually associated with martial medieval 
heroes, as discussed previously. 
This chapter has argued that specific religious phenomenologies develop from visual 
representations. Far from being a passive and intellectual activity, seeing is a fundamental means 
of the physical coming into contact with the divine. It has focused on the phenomenon of darśan as 
an apt example of a material agency independent from anthropomorphisation, as well as of a 
challenge to the discrete categories of human and nonhuman, two aspects at the core of the main 
argumentation of this thesis. The chapter has analysed how darśan adapts itself to different 
                                                          
68 Pictures ‘which Victor Mair compares to the vast board of picture scrolls discovered in the caves of 
Dunhuang in China. Such scrolls are believed to have remained popular in China until the mid-twentieth 
century’ (Kaiser, 2012, 17). 
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contexts of usages, from bhopas and patuas’ participatory performance, to the urban dimension of 
the Amar Chitra Katha. By comparing the phenomenon of darśan to that of the Orthodox icons, this 
chapter has shown how Western culture presents similar cases of material empowerment. The goal 
of the following chapter is tracing the historical coordinates of the process of seeing in the West. In 
particular, it will focus on the gaze as disembodied and abstract, a type of seeing which defines 
museum and aesthetic experience. In addition, the chapter will observe this process of 








Thus far in this thesis, I have addressed the issue of the humanist paradigm operative in the 
social sciences through attention to the theoretical framework, in the first chapter, the 
methodological approach, in the second chapter, and the dyscrasia between the hybridism of 
human and nonhuman actors in social phenomena, e.g. darśan, and the Western reification of 
social theories as self-evident facts, in the third chapter. The present chapter furthers the task of 
thinking about possible ways of conceiving material agency as independent from the human by 
analysing the historical processes which have produced this dyscrasia in the phenomenon of 
seeing, which is particularly at stake in museums as mouthpieces of the new, scientific and 
aesthetic gaze, completely detached from its sensuous context. The analysis of three temporary 
exhibition occurred during fieldwork, where this secularization and aestheticisation process is 
clearly exemplified, follows the historical advent of the museums as cultural institutions. 
As the third chapter has illustrated so far, seeing has played a fundamental role in the ritual 
context of the West. The cult of the icons, for instance, attests how seeing allows an identification 
with the deity depicted, so that viewing an image means being related with the deity. The 
relationship between the devotee and the deity shapes the ritual space. Instead of being a purified 
fact, in Latour’s words, incorporated into scientific theories, looking-at meant touching and being 
touched by the divine. The darśan represents an efficacious example of the power of materiality in 
shaping and defining the circumstances of the communication between the human and the 
nonhuman. This enchanted encounter with religious materiality or, using a Latour’s expression, 
this fetishism to which materiality is conceived in religious phenomenologies is substituted by an 
intellectual enrichment in the Moderns’ institution of the museum. Consequently, seeing, in 
Western modern culture, is often identified with the secular and the sensuously detached activity 
proper to aesthetics and museum experience. 
Latour’s process of purification is, therefore, particularly prominent in museums, where 
objects are neglected in their autonomy as well as in their intertwining with sensing humans in 
order to be presented as exemplifications of intellectual theories. The antiquarian Richard Payne 
Knight (1751-1824) and the theologian Rudolph Otto (1869-1937) are two examples of the usage of 
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religious objects in museum collections in order to develop a theory of religion (Paine, 2013, 106-
107). In addition, the constitution of Western aesthetics as a distinct discipline has developed the 
aesthetic approach in museum context, so that museum artefacts are considered as objects of a 
disinterested, self-evident and ennobling beauty. The museum usually absorbs the living context 
of the production of the artefact and displays that knowledge in a way which would be very 
similar to that understood when reading a book, and then with the risk of losing the precise social 
and systemic function of the object. In other words, the museum ‘adds a false prestige to their true 
value by detaching them from the chance circumstances in which they arose’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973 
[1969], 73). Furthermore, objects are not presented as active creations of the artisan but as the 
property of the museum itself (Herzfeld, 2007, 42). As a consequence, museums have established a 
cultic veneration of the image (Benjamin, 2011 [1936], 13), which is useless for any purpose other 
than its contemplation (Duncan, 1995, 14), so that ‘arts have taken on many of the characteristics of 
religion’ (Paine, 2013, 71), especially in terms of moral or spiritual elevation (Paine, 2013, 74): ‘to 
write about art at all is, in fact, to write about either religion, or in the substitute for religion which 
those who have abandoned the outward forms of received religious content themselves with’ 
(Gell, 1998, 97). This spirituality stimulated by museum artefacts can be considered as a post-
secular characteristic, as it is detached from any belief in a supernatural being. Instead, museum 
artefacts are reified factish ideas of what is institutionally established as culture. In them ‘there 
resides the principle of the True and of the Good’ (Gell, 2006, 161). It is precisely because of this 
connection between Western aesthetics and Western fundamental and revered values that an 
anthropology of art has not been fully developed, as it would require a negation of the legitimacy 
of those values, thus resulting in a ‘methodological philistinim’ or ‘an attitude of resolute 
indifference towards the aesthetic value of works of art’ (Gell, 2006, 161). In the creation of art as a 
quasi-religion, there is the implicit postulate according to which technique is dissociated from its 
magical enchantment: technicity is just a mechanical execution of the creative and higher values of 
the artist (Gell, 2006, 178). 
Derrida (1995) has singled out the two-fold nature of the museum, particularly its authority 
and its capacity of classifying and formulating general theories, by analysing the word arkhē. Arkhē 
contains both the principle of the commence and that of the command, thus the order originated by 
archē is both a historical, temporal succession and given by law (Derrida, 1995, 1). In this second 
meaning, archive directly derives from ‘the Greek arkheion: initially a house, a domicile, an 
address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded’ (Derrida, 
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1995, 2). Domiciliation is precisely the instrument to guard and interpret the documents of the 
archive for public purposes, by specifically locating the law (Derrida, 1995, 2-3) and gathering, 
unifying and classifying the documents, which compose the archive itself. The gathering together, 
the elimination of any heterogeneity and secret (in meaning of secernere, then of separating) is the 
fundamental principle of the archive, that of consignation which is, at the same time, the act of 
depositing and that of ‘gathering together signs’ (Derrida, 1995, 3).  
If we turn our attention to the historical formation of museums, we can see a progressive 
independence of the collections from the religious sphere. The first type of collection, from the 6th 
century, was the treasure, both sacred and profane. It was not an individual possession, rather an 
institutional one, in order to express and manifest its power, whose origin is divine. At the same 
time, the treasure objects were lent to people in order to perform cultic ceremonies (Pomian, 2004, 
296). With the advent of secularisation, the religious was confined into the realm of subjective 
belief, whereas the secular was considered universal, objective and authoritative (Duncan, 1991, 
90). Therefore, the secular sphere bound the entire human community in a civic body by 
identifying its highest values and characteristics. Museums were, then, ‘preservers of the 
community’s cultural heritage’ (Duncan, 1991, 90-91). From the mid-19th century, the museum 
became a secular institution where objects from the past were preserved as they were found and 
transmitted to an undefined future. Thereafter, museums depended on ideology instead of 
religion. The sacrifice realised in museums is that of the contemporary generation to future 
generations (Pomian, 2004, 15). In the pedagogical premises of the museums as educational and 
social institutions in the 19th century, learning through images, objects and legends was established 
as a supplementary tool for the cultural formation of people, especially those who could not have 
access to a superior education (Hooper-Greenhill, 1991, 9). The nation-states established, thus, a 
social contract with their inhabitants by means of the intellectual authority of museums, which has 
been based on talking about the past and the authenticity of the objects represented (Crew & Sims, 
1991, 163). 
This chapter begins from Gell’s assertion that Western concept of art is a historical and 
cultural process by means of which the enchantment of technology has been dismissed in favour of 
a quasi-religious devotion of art as the expression of transcendental and supposedly universal 
values. The following section addresses the interrelations between Western aesthetic philosophies, 
collecting and museum practices, and Western perception of Indian art and its artistic rendition of 
deities from the classical ages to the colonial period. The account I am about to present here 
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describes the historical-cultural background of contemporary curatorial practices and Western 
ways of seeing religious objects within museum cabinets. In addition, it delineates the reasons why 
darśan and similar phenomena are approached in an aesthetic and secularised fashion. The 
following section, thus, prepares the ground for the curatorial practices observed during fieldwork 
towards Indian scrolls and, more generally, objects through which darśan occurs. In fact, the 
curators interviewed, especially those from art museums, think about Indian storytelling scrolls in 
aesthetic terms.  
The process of gaze’s disenchantment from its ritual origins (see 3.2.4) can be clearly 
observed through an examination of the Western literature relating to monsters and the 
monstrous. Historically, the concept of beauty has repeatedly referred to an almighty and godly 
perfection from which all other beings and forms of nature derive. Seeing was, by this logic, 
assumed as an interpretation of the divine operation, whereas collecting was the fundamental tool 
from which to start the process of contemplation and classification of nature imbued by divine 
will. In contrast, ugliness and monstrosity defined the objects of God’s wrath. Deformities were 
used to describe the Otherness of entire geographical regions and populations, such as India and 
Indians, which were not identified with Christianity. As Todorov (1984) explains, in the case of the 
discovery of the Americas, perceiving Otherness did not mean a truly phenomenological 
perceiving, as explored in chapter two, but rather a demonstration of Christian, stereotypical rule. 
In sum, while monsters and deformities were used in the Medieval period as a way to demarcate 
the Other as the totally alien from the ordinary and as a clue of the divine’s intervention within 
nature, nature started to be viewed as having an independent life from the supernatural forces 
and, thus, could be observed and categorized by using the so-called objective methods. Monsters 
became, then, the results of quantifiable and understandable rules.  
Source (Danto, 1986; Findlen, 1989; Findlen, 1994) has shown that, with the progressive 
detachment of aesthetics from theological influence, the abstract world of ideas substituted the 
divine, creative perfection. Perceiving was now conceived as the preliminary step towards the 
comprehension of an abstract structure, often identified with rationality, disinterested beauty, or 
science. In all the three cases, the divine attributes of perfection are subsumed into these categories 
of human thought, hence a substantial ambiguity in dealing with religious art, as something not 
reducible to rational terms. Because of the relativisation of the divine in aesthetics, museum 
practices became a scientific procedure from which to demonstrate abstract theories, such as the 
universalist and evolutionary derivation of cultures. Indian art, from being a marvelous, 
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monstrous thing, was used, instead, as a demonstrative example of scholarly debates. Meanwhile, 
popular accounts continued to refer to the exotic appeal of India in terms of fascinating 
monstrosities. 
Source (Danto, 1986; Findlen, 1989; Findlen, 1994) has also shown that a postsecular and 
semi-spiritual adoration, that proper of the world of art, substituted the astonishment at 
materiality described by Ferguson in the previous chapter (section 3.1). In museums, therefore, a 
substantial conflict occurs between the fetishisation of the material, which has come to be 
considered alive and with human characteristics, and its factisisation, particularly the idea that 
thoughts and theories are independent from human relations and are objectively true and self-
evident (see 3.1). In fact, darśan is reinterpreted in the light of the educational mission of the 
museums, an aspect that will be further explored in the last section of this chapter (4.4). The clash 
between these two different experiences of materiality was even greater in the early museums 
founded in India during the colonial period: curators tried to subtract museum spaces from the 
believers’ touch and superstitious gaze.  
In Christianity and Hinduism, the act of looking has been firmly associated with that of 
touching. Indeed, ‘The Greek verb, haptein, means to seize, to grasp, or to touch. The origins of 
‘haptic vision’ lie in early Greek optical theory in which sight was a materially based experience’, 
where a material change occurred in order ‘to link seen objects to the eye’ (Pattison, 2007, 42). Two 
theories developed from this concept of haptic vision: intromission and extramission. The theory 
of intromission, formulated by the Atomists, is the idea that eidolon or simulacrum, ‘an effluence or 
skin formed of consolidated air’ of the seen object, would come into contact with the eyes. The 
theory of extramission, developed by Plato, supposed the existence of a fire which came forth from 
the eye and formed a stream along the direction of sight, striking the external object, and 
afterwards returning into the body to produce sight in the soul (Pattison, 2007, 42). 
Ritual activities were not referred to by the term mimesis during the time of Plato 
(Tatarkiewicz, 1993, 307). From the 5th CE the term imitation referred less to worship and more to a 
philosophical concept, indicating the external world (Tatarkiewicz, 1993, 308). Along with this 
transformation of the term mimesis, it must be borne in mind that the verb ‘to see’ had two 
concepts, eidos and eidolon. Eidos is seeing by sensible perception, which reproduces the external 
things, while eidolon is seeing as active contemplation in order to gain an objective form through a 
spiritual act (Cassirer, 1998 [1922], 15). Just as Danto (1986) has interestingly titled his work 
disenfranchisement, the history of aesthetics is precisely the description of the gradual removal of 
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aesthetic pleasure from bodily experience to the reaching of an intellectual perception of beauty, 
whilst maintaining the ritual origins of the arts.  
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4.2 The disembodied beauty: Western aesthetics 
 
From Plato onwards, there were two metaphysics of beauty: the first conceived beauty as the 
cosmos and the world, while according to the second concept beauty consists of ideas. In this 
second case, Plato thought that perfect beauty is in the realm of ideas, whereas imperfect beauty 
corresponds to the senses. In contrast, Plotinus claimed that ideal beauty should be an archetypal 
model of the sensible world, which is a reflection of the perfect beauty. In medieval times, beauty 
became an attribute of God (Tatarkiewicz, 1993, 157). Plotinus put forward a theory of unification 
with the object of knowledge: the soul cannot see beauty without having itself become beautiful, 
just as the gaze cannot see the sun before having turned into something similar to it (Plotinus, 2002 
[c. 3rd-4th BCE], 201, 777). 
According to Danto (1986, 7), Plato disenfranchised art from sensible reality by identifying 
the former as ontologically alien to the latter and rationalising aesthetic ideals by moving them 
from the domain of feelings into that of conceptualisation. Beauty is a property which is possessed 
by each object independently and, at the same time, by the collectivity of the objects, then it is 
something essential (Ippia major) (Plato, 1974 [c. 4th BCE], 33). Therefore, seeing as an aesthetic 
appraisal of beauty was disconnected from the very act of looking. 
[…] theologians in the Roman Catholic tradition have widely agreed that works of visual 
art can become books of the illiterate (libri idiotarum) and that religious pictures can constitute a 
Bible for the poor (biblia pauperum). While seeing a need to visual arts, such an approach treats 
religious art as a convenient and sometimes necessary tool of instruction, rather than as a 
unique means of ongoing spiritual formation and of spiritually elevated piety and prayer –
something more evident, to be sure, in the Baroque art of the Counter-Reformation. Defending 
images this way excuses those who are better educated and spiritually advanced from any need 
to look (Brown, 2000, 33-34). 
The division between the fine and practical arts follows a similar logic of that used in putting 
women at an aesthetic distance by labelling them as belonging to the fair sex:  
the metaphysical pedestal upon which art gets put –consider the museum as a labyrinth –
is a political translocation as savage as that which turned women into ladies, placing them in 
parlours doing things that seemed like purposive labour without specific purpose –viz., 
embroidery, watercolour, knitting: essentially frivolous beings, there for an oppressor’s 
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pleasure disguised as disinterested (Danto, 1986, 12-13).69 
The concept of purity, initially employed by the religious sphere, is adopted by Platonic 
aesthetics and its theory of knowledge (Cassirer, 1998 [1922], 36). The artist is compared to the 
wizard, as they both work in the subjective sphere of the changeable. In contrast, the philosopher 
shows the darkness as it is, by filling it with its substance (Cassirer, 1998 [1922], 37-38). The 
scholastics tried to confirm the positivity of creation even in its dark aspects by using the concept 
of transcendental properties as conditions concomitants of being (Eco, 1997, 28). The philosopher, in 
Scholastic terms, must be able to read nature in order to find the light of the divine participation 
and to confer ontological value to it, and then to abstract objectivity as ideal revelation (Eco, 1997, 
78). Therefore, visio is knowledge, as it is the perception of an immanent project (Eco, 1997, 109): 
It was St. Augustine who, in his eminently influential expositions of nature of Christian 
caritas, or love, early in the fifth century, was more than anyone responsible for this fusion of 
the Christian God and the classical Absolute (Abrams, 1985, 28-29). 
We move on to a more radical disembodiment of art with the German Enlightenment and 
Romanticism. According to Eagleton (1990, 14), the elaboration of an aesthetic theory in 
eighteenth-century Germany was stimulated by the need to political unity in a territory 
fragmented by a myriad of feudal-absolutist states. Kant, in fact, found in aesthetic pleasure the 
metaphorical glue between particularism/subjectivism and universality, where the social 
consensus is not coercive, but rather is derived logically and spontaneously from the awareness of 
belonging to something nonfinite: the universal applicability of aesthetic pleasure (Eagleton, 1990, 
98-99). Judgement has the aim of determining the universal laws, without which nature cannot be 
understood and thought and which are aprioristic, since they are separate from the sensible 
sensations. Rather, these laws are intellectual categories (Kant, 1997 [1790], 35). The pleasure of 
beauty is the pleasure of reflection. Indeed, aesthetic judgement has the goal of perceiving the 
representational status (Kant, 1997 [1790], 261-262). Pleasure is not founded on subjective 
inclinations or personal interests, but rather is organised by laws, which are present in anyone. As 
a consequence of this universality of pleasure, the aesthetician talks about beauty as an ontological 
quality of the object and taste as a logical capacity or criteria (Kant, 1997 [1790], 89). Synthetically, 
the contemplation of beauty is a judgement (Berteilung), not a pleasure, or, more precisely, is a 
                                                          
69 ‘In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and 
passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled 
accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with 
their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-
ness’ (Mulvey, 1989, 19). 
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universal pleasure. This universality is free from utility (Kant, 2009 [c.1776], 38). 
Kant is at a confluence between the British tradition of natural law, where society’s bounds 
are created independently from a coercive politics, and the German rationalism of Leibniz, Wolff 
and Baumgarten, according to which aesthetics ‘is bound up with the ideologies of legality of an 
enlightened absolutism’ (Eagleton, 1990, 116). According to Wolff and the theory of pre-
established harmony, soul is active and free, by finding its meaning from its inside, 
representational content (Bianco, 1992, 56). In particular, by comparing his theories with those of 
Confucius, Moses and Christ, Wolff arrived at the conclusion that we can reach a moral principle 
without a revelation and with natural capacities alone (Casula, 1973, 38). In Baumgarten (1992 
[1750], 27), so-called beautiful intelligence is predisposed to abstract both from his past memories 
and from his external sensations and to focus on an abstract and artificial state which is projected 
onto the future. Intelligence is able to explain this by using reason and to perceive by intuition 
what is good and what is evil. Perfect contemplation, thus, is coincident with a universal entity, 
through which plurality is abstracted towards the complete perception (Baumgarten, 1992 [1750], 
235-236). 
The thought of Hegel best fulfilled this peculiar mixture of sympathy and rationality 
(Eagleton, 1990, 146). Art, by conceptualising truth as an absolute object, belongs to the sphere of 
spirit. Therefore, art finds its content from the same ground of religion and philosophy. Religion is 
the transfer of the objective sphere to the interior, where the absolute spirit is intuited as an 
objective manifestation. In contrast, art is the moment where the object is conceived as essential 
and absolute. Thus, in the path towards absolute spirit, art is the first step of conceptual thought, 
whereas religion is the second and philosophy the last (Hegel, 1967 [1835], 200-201). The unique 
divine substance is divided into a multiplicity of deities, which are independent on their own 
(Hegel, 1967 [1835], 200-201), but can be universalised by love, the intimate concept of the free and 
absolute spirit (Hegel, 1967 [1835], 605). Natural beauty is inferior, then, to aesthetic beauty as it is 
generalised and revitalised by the spirit, thus by liberty (Hegel, 1967 [1835], 6). 
Despite the rationalist framework in Baumgarten’s thought, his aesthetic is strongly 
influenced by a spiritual tone. Not only does Baumgarten define knowledge as constituted by 
three catholic graces (beauty of things and of thoughts, beauty of order, and beauty of significance; 
Baumgarten, 1992 [1750], 21), but the aesthetic impetus is also compared to divine spirit, therefore 
the aesthetician is ‘kidnapped and touched by the Muses’ (Baumgarten, 1992 [1750], 39-41). More 
particularly, the aesthetician must have aesthetic training, according to which intellect and 
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temperament are shaped and work together towards a given theme (Baumgarten, 1992 [1750], 29). 
We find a similar aesthetic training also in Schiller (2005 [1795], 24), where destruction of 
subjective feelings occurs in order to aesthetically experience an object. In fact, the aesthetician 
must transcend reality (status of nature) in order to go beyond the level of morality (status of 
morality; Schiller, 2005 [1795], 26), thus actualising a revelation. 
Clearly modelled on the Christian epic, Vasari’s is a narrative of disclosure and 
revelation, stipulating the end of a history, defined by the cumulative effort to achieve a 
perfection artists are incapable of without the revelation through example of a divine 
intercessor, born, like a savior, in Florentine precints: a Florentine among Florentines, as Christ 
was a human among humans. I employ the term “revelation” here as implying knowledge of 
the highest importance which we would be incapable of attaining through the common 
cognitive routines (Danto, 2000, 417). 
Indeed, Baumgarten’s thought, as well as Wolff’s, is indebted to the German Pietist 
environment. Pietism was a reform movement inside the Protestant Church, which spread in 
Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, engaging both the Reformed Church and the Lutheran 
one, and was characterised by the effort to return to a pure Christianity. This meant a practical 
piety and a moral conduct centred around the believers’ communities or collegia pietatis and guided 
by personal love for Christ, which was near to being mystical (Casula, 1973, 34). Man can reach 
Christ’s example and God by using his own intellect. 
The German Enlightenment aesthetic corpus, drawing inspiration from Plato, who was 
necessarily received via Scholasticism, eventually crystallised into the theory of art-as-such, whose 
experience is ‘typically a museum experience’ (Abrams, 1985, 27) and, therefore, has characterised 
the museum approach to art works. More specifically, the theory of art-as-such is characterised by 
the assumption that 
the highest human good is to lose the sense of self and of the world in the absorbed 
contemplation of a metaphysical absolute or deity whose perfection consists in being totally 
other-wordly, serenely self-contained and self-sufficient, and for those reasons to be revered 
purely for its own sake (Abrams, 1981, 102). 
Developing from the aesthetic philosophies traced here was a Cartesian idea of sight, which 
is split between inner visual experience, or introspection, and an external reality, which can be 
only objectively experienced and understood, then completely separated from the introspective 
aspect of mind (Pattison, 2007, 35). It was in the 19th century that the pre-eminence of sight within a 
scientific world-view produced a separation between tangibility and visuality, therefore the 
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dominance of sight ‘understood as a pure, abstract vision in the society of spectacle which elevates 
sight above touch’ (Pattison, 2007, 44). As Ferry (1993) argues in his work, modernity has seen a 
subjectivisation process, of which the Cartesian procedure of doubt is the apex. Human subjects 
would constitute the only and absolute principles of reality and truth. Leibniz’s contemplative role 
of humans towards God’s point of view of the totality is substituted by a relativisation of that 
absolute into its relation with sensible, human consciousness, first with Kant, and then further 
with Hegel, where God is humanized into the sensible material (Ferry, 1993, 65, 77, 114-147). 
According to Guha-Thakurta (2004, 12), the modern way of vision, strictly interrelated with the 
scientific sphere, was characterised by a fixation of reality into an immovable picture by which the 
gaze could apprehend its properties. Therefore, there was the concept of learning by viewing, or 
the pretence of freely perceiving reality accompanied by its representation. 
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4.3 Collecting the nonhuman and the Other: the rise of the museum, the Homo 
monstrum and Indian art 
 
The historical development of an aesthetic philosophy reflects collecting practices. In the 
Middle Ages, collecting meant considering nature as a book which bore witness to its ‘omnipotent 
creator’ (Daston & Park, 1998, 76), thus collected objects coincided with objects of and for 
meditation. This concept of nature derived from the Great Chain of Being, characterised by a 
specific hierarchy. On the top of the Chain, there was the creative entity which, first postulated by 
Plato, must become transient after starting from its original, metaphysical condition. Following the 
Being, Aristotle categorised the manifest world into a system of classes, which remained static in 
their positions. This view was dominant until the scientific thought of the 18th century, which 
introduced the notion of progress over time, hence a living being can ascend through the hierarchy 
and reach, by evolutionary means, the Perfect Being (Mitter, 1977, 209). Here it can be noticed that 
the analysis of nature, specifically the act of classifying it by collecting, was firmly interrelated to 
the interpretation of the sacred scriptures, hence a specific pictorial representation of the collector 
in Renaissance times. 
While not an image produced in Italy, the Flemish artist Jan van Kessel’s Europa (1664) is 
nonetheless one of the most comprehensive images of Italy as the site of collection […]. One of 
four panels depicting the four continents, Europe is represented specifically by an image of 
Rome. In the center stands the collector (in contrast to the images of the other three continents, 
which are peopled only to fulfil their ethnographic intent). Displaying a frame of butterflies, he 
is surrounded by the objects he has assembled: objects of leisure such as the backgammon 
board, playing cards, and tennis racket in the foreground; objects of curiosity such as the 
mandrake and monsters revealed behind a partially drawn curtain in the left corner, the insects 
arranged close to the ceiling, and the shells spilling out onto the floor; and objects of power, 
signified by the quantity of armour, drums, the flag, and shields, removed from the context of 
battle, and the papal tiara and sceptre, lain discreetly on the table at which Roma sits, holding a 
cornucopia upright. Only two books are prominently displayed: Pliny’s Natural History and the 
Bible. 
In the background, the shadowy images of classicized female figures, set within their 
niches, alert us that the collector and his entourage inhabit the temple of the Muses (Findlen, 
1994, 44). 
The space devoted to collecting, the musaeum, was, quite logically, an ‘epistemological 
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structure’ (Findlen, 1994, 49), a system of translation and encounter between monastic 
contemplation and the humanist collecting by reading the world, with the aim of ultimately 
reaching mastery of the universal rules and truths which regulate it (Findlen, 1994, 60). In these 
terms, nature was reduced into an abstract model in order to confirm ‘a philosophically ordained 
pattern’ asserted by Aristotle (Findlen, 1994, 61). Nature was itself a museum, as ‘the principal 
haunt of the Muses’ (Findlen, 1989, 60), hence the encyclopaedic design of Renaissance gardens, 
e.g. Giardino dei Boboli in Florence. This strong interconnection between collecting and interpreting 
godly words was explicit in the Bolognese collector Aldrovandi, who described his Natural Biblical 
Theater as an ‘elucidation of the Sacred Bible’ (Findlen, 1994, 66-67). The historical change of 
theories of sight and aesthetics, with their progressive abstraction from the sensible, which, 
conversely, coincided more and more with the Medieval Perfect Being, moved the museum away 
from its monastic dimension. Furthermore, the monastic feature of museums was detached from 
theological and religious aims to serve abstract principles such as scientific knowledge, on the one 
hand, and aesthetic, disinterested beauty, on the other hand.  
Writing around the same time as Hegel, Goethe explicitly compared the viewing of art in 
museums to a religious experience. 
[…] 
In drawing an explicit correlation between a museum and a church or temple, Goethe 
asserts that objects in museums should be approached with the same reverence afforded to 
icons in churches (Robson, 2010, 124-125). 
The Romantic feeling of the sublime was no longer taken into account, but instead relegated 
first to the field of personal perturbation, and then as something ephemeral to the highest, 
educative and aesthetic purposes of museums. Interestingly, the relation of museums to the 
mystical, human experiences was stronger in colonial contexts, such as that of Indian museums. 
Museums in India were conceived as collecting depositories for the use of ‘the small initiated circle 
(then exclusively Western)’, rather than displaying spaces open to ‘the wondering gaze of the lay 
spectator’ (Guha-Thakurta, 2004, 47). Nevertheless, the Indian Museum, Calcutta, and the Madras 
Museum were called ‘tamasha (show) houses’ by Indian audiences, enacting, then, a paradoxical 
situation (Guha-Thakurta, 2004, 80). On the one hand, the staff of Indian museums must preserve 
their elitist status as ‘specialized cells’ by denouncing and despising mass pilgrimages which 
coincided with festivals; on the other hand, museums must be ‘popular educational bodies’ for the 
visitors, especially in view of the colonial task ‘to educate the “natives”’ (Guha-Thakurta, 2004, 
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80).70 Western museums were used as comparative measures, according to which Indian museums 
were always incomplete (Guha-Thakurta, 2004, 53). 
The colonial narrative of “failure”–that is, the failure of the museums in India to replicate 
the pedagogic outcome of the Victorian institution, or more precisely, the failure of the colonial 
museum to become the British museum or the Louvre outside London and Paris –has long 
haunted the story of the museum in India, and indeed, in many parts of the Third World (Desai, 
2007, 150). 
The harsh division between a so-called superstitious audience and an elitist museum staff is 
still vivid today, as Elliott’s fieldwork (2006) has demonstrated. For instance, the Indian Museum 
of Calcutta is referred to as ‘jadughar or ‘house of magic’71’ and it is considered by mass visitors as 
one of the ‘tirthas (pilgrimage sites)’ (Elliott, 2006, 66-67). 
Following this historical genealogy of Western aesthetics and collecting practises, it is 
interesting to see how examining a non-Western form of art, such as Indian art, has been 
approached by Westerners based on Western aesthetic principles. Indian art was at the centre of a 
controversy among supporters of the monogenesis-polygenesis explanation of the diffusion of 
culture. The History of Ancient Art (1764), by Winckelmann, a historian of the Göttingen school 
which generally held that Greek arts tended to perfection because of the climate conditions, 
contested le Comte de Caylus’ conviction that Indian art had a generative role in the origin of 
architecture (Mitter, 1977, 192). According to these universalist theories, India served as a 
primordial expression of art, an ‘infancy’ before ‘the rise of taste’ (Mitter, 1977, 201). However, 
especially in German Romanticism, the supposed primitivism of Indian art was approached as a 
historical example of the irrational and intuitive feeling of the sublime (Mitter, 1977, 202). For 
instance, 
Schlegel’s fascination with Sanskrit literature reflects his longing to find in India a 
response to the challenge to Romanticism: a unifying spiritual revolution, outside traditional 
classical and Christian frameworks, that might synthetize religion philosophy, and art (Cowan, 
2008, 322). 
According to this last view, Indian artistic symbolism and cosmogony, used for didactic-
religious purposes, were considered as the first steps towards the mystical symbolism of Romantic 
                                                          
70 The condemnation of Hindu worship as ‘superstitious’ and ‘dirty’ was a colonial troupe. Not only did the 
division and the competition between Hindu worship and scientific investigation occur in archaeological 
sites (Sutton, 2013), but at the same time, British collectors also clearly despised Hindu customs in accounts 
and diaries, such as in Horniman’s case (Levell, 2000).  
71 With similar terms, the museum is described in Kipling’s novel Kim (Kipling, 1981 [1901]). 
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art (Mitter, 1977, 204).72 These usages of Indian art were a direct influence of the Neoplatonist view 
of art as an interpretation which uses an inner, transcendental ideal (Mitter, 1977, 273). For 
instance, Havell saw in Indian aesthetic philosophy the confirmation that the spiritual and 
transcendental world was hidden by an illusionistic, material nature: ‘Significantly, Havell had 
chosen the Vedānta school which considered the world of perception as illusion or māyā’ (Mitter, 
1977, 273).73 
Hegel’s evaluation of Indian art as an incomplete manifestation of the Idea or of the Spirit 
differed, in some respects, from the previous Neoplatonist approaches to symbols, despite his 
sympathy. However, his attempt to assimilate Indian art to the classical canon of art echoed the 
epistemological operations, which had given rise to the perception of Indian gods as monsters 
(Mitter, 1977, 218). 
As well as philosophical treatises on Western interpretation of Indian art, the prolific 
narrative genre of female travel accounts described Indian art in the same way as antiquarian 
curiosities. According to Hulme and Youngs (2002, 192), travel writing promoted British rule in 
India by advocating Mughal’s political and military deficiencies. It was strongly associated with 
the political and economic conditions of the Indian regions, unlike the descriptive subject matter of 
the female writer. Indeed, in the introduction to Graham’s travel account of India, it is written that 
curiosities and what ‘is interesting to a contemplative spectator’ (Graham, 1812, iii) were generally 
under-examined by the majority of Western ‘well-educated individuals’ (Graham, 1812, iii), who 
were absorbed with their affairs as soldiers, colonial officers or traders. However, according to 
Nayar (2005, 214, 216), English travel accounts were an ambivalent combination of scientific 
rationality and belief in the supernatural, hence this literary genre can also be called ‘scientific 
marvellous’. In this way, the scientific attitude was an attempt to demystify the traveller’s 
fascination with the exotic and the supernatural in order to defend the integrity of Western 
epistemological identity. However, objective and rational analysis could not be fully achieved: 
‘Michael Adas points out that even the better-educated European traveller and those most 
                                                          
72 An example is offered by Creuzer’s Symbolik, beginning of the 19th century: ’Elaborating his doctrine that 
all pre- and non-classical civilizations were the repository of ancient wisdom, as expressed in their symbols, 
Creuzer further defined Hinduism as a religious philosophy in which profound moral truths were revealed 
through the veil of symbols. The profound and enigmatic symbols in Hinduism were seen in the two images 
most frequently, and with some justification, given a symbolic interpretation by Europeans […]’ (Mitter, 
1977, 206). 
73 See, for instance, the concept of māyā declined in Schopenhauer philosophy, Koßler (2013) and Gupta 
(2013). 
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informed about Asian sciences were concerned primarily with religion and not with science’ 
(Nayar, 2005, 216). This resulted in a theological explanation of the marvellous, particularly of 
Indian excesses attributed to moral deficiency (Nayar, 2005, 217-218). In this respect, it is 
particularly interesting to examine manuscripts such as that of Fanny Park (1850), entitled 
Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque, during four-and-twenty years residence in the East: 
with Revelations of Life in the Zenana, in which Indian art is approached with the spirit of a 
whimsical, medieval collector. 
Despite the book’s title, the real object of this pseudo-pilgrim’s ‘wanderings’, it quickly 
becomes clear, is not so much the picturesque proper (had not Southey insisted that there was 
nothing ‘more anti-picturesque… than the mythological personages of the Brahmins?) as the 
curious. Ganesha’s object-status as a ‘curiosity’ is granted more importance than his 
mythographical meaning as a deity of violent hybridization and writing. The orientalist 
vagueness underpinning ‘the pilgrim’s’ self-description as ‘the Haji of the East’, and the Islamic 
‘Salam! Salam’ which sounds her praise to a Hindu deity, only betray her text’s devotion to the 
god of a random, syncretizing, and accumulative curiosity (Leask, 2002, 30).74 
However, Indian art was not approached solely for its exotic allure or its philosophical 
usefulness for a certain current of thought. Its iconography also had a ‘dreadful’ impact on 
Western eyes. Travel accounts reporting Indians as monsters, started very early in the history of 
anthropological contact between West and East. As Rossi-Reder (2002, 53) explains, classical and 
medieval travel literature offered to colonialist ideology the tools for thinking about non-
Europeans.75 If we employ Kristeva’s analysis of the abject (1982, 5, 38), we can see in the 
monstrous accounts a coming to terms with the threat of being annihilated by something 
impossible to decipher, as being simultaneously in relation to the human and yet in strong 
opposition to humanity. Depicting the monstrous is a phobic language, where the evasive fear 
removes the possibility of expression of any epistemological and human reaction towards the 
monstrous. In Greek monsters, for instance, it can be observed that their descriptions are a collage 
of anthropomorphic characteristics, an amalgam of body parts not usually connected with each 
other, and a symbolic reminder of the opposing categories such as life and death (Strauss, 1993, 
106). 
In one of the most famous medieval travel accounts, the Travels of Sir John Mandeville, the 
                                                          
74 See the invocation to Ganeś in Parks, 1850, XV-XXI. 
75 An interesting study on the British literary representations of Indian culture during the British Empire can 
be found in Torri (2013). 
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audience is strictly identified as a religious community, and then the book’s authority came 
precisely from its belonging to Christianity and from having the goal of protecting it (Macleod 
Higgins, 1997, 54). Therefore, describing the Other entailed an identitarian strengthening of what 
Christians should be, as well as a demarcation between the Christian community and the rest of 
the religious landscape, rather than an anthropological curiosity towards otherness. Therefore, 
early travelers’ accounts were not an objective witnessing, but rather a quotation of the bestiaries 
and treatises on monsters, in order to ‘reflect certain prejudices stemming from Christian 
background […], which were further reinforced by a total ignorance of Hindu iconography’ 
(Mitter, 1977, 2-3).  
By means of Aquinas’ theology, monsters were absorbed into the Christian cosmology as 
testimonies of God’s omnipotence (Mitter, 1977, 8), in that monsters were God’s warning to sinners 
to repent and thus prevent a collective catastrophe (Daston & Park, 1998, 181): ’The body of a 
monster demonstrates the violation of moral law by a corresponding breakdown in the laws of 
nature –the monstrous body thus serves as “a moral and theological cipher”’ (Davidson, 1991: 48; 
quoted in Graham, 2002, 49).76 Nevertheless, their place in the human imagination impeded debate 
about their natural essence. This is evident in Isidore de Seville’s Etymologies, in which mythologies 
and obstetrician literature are fused together (Mitter, 1977, 8). The Physiologus, the Greek treatise 
on which the following bestiaries relied, is not organised according to zoological principles, but 
rather on the moral lessons the reader could extract, and therefore it can be considered as a 
pamphlet on virtues and vices (Baxter, 1998, II-37). 
Park and Daston (1981, 22) trace three tendencies in the earlier tradition of monster literature. 
The first was related to the biological writings on monsters by Aristotle and Aristotelians 
(especially Albertus Magnus). The second, from Cicero to Augustine and his followers, focused on 
                                                          
76 According to Wilson (1993, 6), who reports the vocabulary entry of Lewis and Short, monstrum derives 
from the verb monere, which can be translated in English as ‘to warn’. The monsters’ accounts were indeed, 
used as exempla in sermons between the 11th and the 13th century (Baxter, 1998, 192). ‘Luther broke the 
medieval tradition of bestiaries and monstrosities as signs of prodigies or misfortunes by using it as a 
religious-political attack on the Church. His short pamphlet written with Melanchthon, Deuttung der czwo 
grewlichen Figuren, Bapstesels czu Rom und Munchkalbs zu Freijberg ijnn Meijsszen funden, published in 1523, 
began with two woodcuts, one of the “monk-calf”, an actual calf born several months earlier in Freiburg 
with what looked like a cowl around his neck […] and the other, by Cranach, of the “pope-ass”, a composite 
and clearly fictitious monster reputedly fished out of the Tiber in 1496 […]. The pope-ass, in Melanchthon’s 
interpretation, represented the “Romish Antichrist”, its various bestial parts corresponding accurately to the 
bestial vices and errors of his church. The monk-calf, according to Luther, symbolized the typical monk –
spiritual in externals, but within brutal, idolatrous, and resistant to the light of Scripture. Both monsters were 
prodigies prophesying the imminent ruin of the Roman church’ (Park & Daston, 1981, 26).  
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monstrous births as divine signs or portents. The third was characterised by anthropological and 
geographical accounts of the supposed monstrous races settled in Africa and Asia. In this last 
trend, the grade of monstrosity corresponded to the level of divine grace granted to each 
population (Austin, 2002, 28), thus literary works such as Wonders of the East reproduce the order of 
creation, a plan of godly salvation (Austin, 2002, 48).  
The bestiaries after the 12th to the 13th century ceased to be only theological descriptions and 
magnifications of the omnipotent God and his creatures, and came to give increasingly more space 
to the monstrous races at the beginning and end of the texts. As these new creatures challenged the 
sacred scriptures because of their hybridity, the bestiaries started to be characterised more and 
more by nontheological content, such as breeding horses or training hawks, as well as by a general 
simplification of the exegetic language (Laudando, 2002, 38-39).  
A notable example is the Homo monstrum by Marco Polo, which was influenced by Christian 
scholarly treatises, such as the works of St Augustine, and other classical sources, especially the 
cosmological notion of terra incognita, the complementary half of the Oikoumene, the known 
hemisphere. According to this notion, the properties of the Oikoumene, including human anatomy, 
would have been reversed and inverted in the terra incognita (Islam, 1996, 147). Most of Western 
knowledge of India derived from the Indika of Megasthenes (approximately 350-290 BCE) and the 
Alexander Romance by Pseudo-Callisthenes (approximately third century BCE) (Felton, 2012, 126). 
In Marco Polo’s writing (approximately 1298), we see from the beginning the traveller’s sense of 
religious responsibility and duty to disseminate as widely as possible his discoveries as 
testimonies of God’s power (Marco Polo, 1975, 3). However, Marco Polo’s principal aim is to offer 
a detailed description of his travel from a maritime trader’s point of view, therefore the 
ethnographic accounts are concise and inserted into the narration as amusing curiosities for the 
reader (see in particular Marco Polo, 1975, 238-239).  
Mitter (1977, 16) regards Ludovico de Varthema’s Itinerario (1510) as the starting point for all 
the subsequent depictions of Indian deities.77 It is evident that not only is the Calicut deity a 
specimen of the monstrous literary tradition, but also a transposition of Western hell imagery 
(Mitter, 1977, 17). 
                                                          
77 However, ‘When Martin Fernandez de Figueroa published his Conquista de las Indias in 1512 subsequent to 
his visit to India between 1505 and 1511, he did not forget to summarize Varthema’s description of the devil 
of Calicut. While the picture of anti-Christian demons posing as Indian gods continued to haunt the pages of 
travelers, each traveler began to enrich the tradition by adding elements from his own experience in India as 
well as from his knowledge of the medieval demonological iconography’ (Mitter, 1977, 19). 
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E questo Deumo, il re di Calicut lo tiene nella cappella del suo palazzo in questo modo. 
La cappella è lunga due passi sui quattro lati ed è alta tre passi, con una porta di legno tutta 
intagliata con figure di diavoli in rilievo. Nel mezzo di questa cappella sta un diavolo fatto in 
metallo e seduto su una sedia pur di metallo. Questo diavolo tiene una corona fatta, a modo 
della tiara del Papa, di tre corone, e tiene anche quattro corna e quattro zanne in una 
grandissima bocca, un naso e occhi veramente terribili; le mani sono fatte come uncini, i piedi 
sono come quelli di un gallo. Cosicchè a vederlo è un’immagine spaventevole. Tutto intorno a 
questa cappella le figure sono tutte di diavoli. Ed in ogni lato di essa sta un Satanasso che siede 
su una sedia, e questa sedia è situata sulle fiamme di un fuoco, ed in questo vi sono delle anime 
in gran numero, lunghe mezzo dito o un dito della mano. Questo satanasso tiene con la mano 
destra un’anima in bocca, e con l’altra mano piglia un’altra anima di sotto (De Varthema, 1991 
[1510], 111, 112, 113).78 
Here we find a similar description in John’s Apocalypse is examined (chapter 13):  
And I saw a beast rising out of the sea; and on its horns were ten diadems, and on his 
heads were blasphemous names. And the beast that I saw was like a leopard, its feet were like a 
bear’s, and its mouth was like a lion’s mouth. And the dragon gave it his power and his throne 
and great authority. 
And again in Dante’s Inferno (Canto XXXIV): 
Lo ‘mperador del doloroso regno 
da mezzo il petto uscìa fuor da la ghiaccia,  
e più con un gigante io mi convegno, 
che i giganti non fan con le sue braccia- 
vedi oggimai quant’esser dee quel tutto 
c’ha così fatta parte di confaccia! 
S’el fu sì bel com’elli è ora brutto, 
e contra ‘l suo fattore alzò le ciglia, 
ben dee da lui procedere ogni lutto. 
Oh quanto parve a me gran maraviglia 
                                                          
78 ‘ …And the king of Calicut keeps this Deumo in his chapel in his palace, in this wise; this chapel is two 
spaces wide in each of the four sides, and three paces high, with doors covered with devils carved in relief. 
In the midst of this chapel there is a devil made of metal, placed in a seat also made of three crowns; it has 
also four horns and four teeth with a very large mouth, nose, and most terrible eyes. The hands are made 
like those of a flesh-hook and the feet like those of a cock; so that he is a fearful object to behold. All the 
pictures around the said chapel are those of devils, and on each side of it there is a Sathanas seated in a seat, 
which seat is placed in a flame of fire, wherein are a great number of souls, of the length of half a finger and 
a finger of the hand. And the said Sathanas holds a soul in his mouth with the right hand, and with the other 
seizes a soul by the waist’ (Mitter, 1977, 17). 
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Quan’io vidi tre facce alla sua testa! 
L’una dinanzi –e quella era vermiglia – 
l’altr’eran due, che s’aggiugnìeno a questa 
sovresso ‘l mezzo di ciascuna spalla, 
e sé giugnìeno al luogo della cresta: 
e la destra parea tra bianca e gialla – 
la sinistra a vedere era tal, quali  
vegnon di là onde ‘l Nilo s’avvalla. 
Sotto ciascuna uscivan due grand’ali, 
quanto si convenìa a tanto uccello: 
vele di mar non vid’io mai cotali. 
Non avean penne, ma di vipistrello 
Era lor modo –e queste svolazzava, 
sì che tre venti di movean da ello: 
quindi Cocito tutto s’aggelava. 
Con sei occhi piangea, e per tre menti  
gocciava ‘l pianto e sanguinosa bava. 
Da ogni bocca dirompea co’ denti 
Un peccatore, a guisa di maciulla, 
sì che tre ne facea così dolenti.79 
Through analysing the demonical studies of the Devil’s iconography, it becomes 
understandable why Varthema fused together monsters and descriptions of hell. In medieval 
imagery the Devil is part of the divine power (Link, 2001, 42), and Link compares his constant 
presence to that of a microbe (Link, 2001, 42). The Devil’s appearance shares several features with 
the classical deity Pan and the satyrs, not only the fur-covered body (sair in Hebrew means ‘furry’), 
                                                          
79 ‘The emperor of the empire of despair/ Rose from mid-chest above the ice all round/ I bear comparison to 
giants more/Readily than giants do to this one’s arms:/So now consider what the whole is like,/Imagined in 
proportion to those limbs!/If he was once so beautiful as he/Is ugly now, yet flouted his Creator,/No wonder 
he’s the fount of misery./I found he had three faces on his head,/Which was not something I had seen 
before!/One was in front, and that one was bright red;/The other two were joined onto the first/At just about 
the mid-point of each shoulder;/And all were joined together at the crest:/That on the right was white to 
yellow, while/The one upon the left had complexion/Of those who live along the Upper Nile./Under each 
face two monstrous wings were spread,/Proportionate to such a monstrous bird:/I never saw sails on the sea 
so broad./They were not feathered, but of such a kind/As bats have –and the fiend was beating them/So that 
he blew at once three blasts of wind:/And hence Cocytus is all frozen over./With six eyes he was weeping; 
down three chins/The tears were dripping, mixed with bloody slaver./In every mouth, as with a rake or 
comb,/The teeth were scraping, grinding up a sinner:/There were three simultaneously in pain’ (Dante, 2010 
[1321]; translation Nichols, J.G.). 
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but also the goat tail, ears and hoofs (Link, 2001, 48), hence ‘furry’ and ‘buck’ were translated into 
satyr or devil. According to Link (2001, 213), since the role of the Devil as rebel angel and that as a 
microbe could not coincide, the Devil could not be perceived as a person, but rather as an abstract 
evil force. By this logic, the Devil is the Other par excellence and shows common traits with 
monsters. By describing a Hindu god through the apparatus of demonic iconography, Varthema 
wanted to demonstrate to his readers the total extraneousness of Hinduism to the humankind of 
the time, namely Christians. 
From the middle of the 17th century onwards, Western interest in Indian iconography and 
mythology returned with a new significance: monstrosity is no longer related to the medieval 
Western imagery of the bestiaries and demonic iconography. Instead, it is something apparently 
irrational, which must be deciphered, in a similar fashion of the scientific observation of nature. 
Taking inspiration from the Greeks, Renaissance Neoplatonists, such as Vincenzo Cartari and, in 
particular, Pietro della Valle, regarded Egyptian hieroglyphs, Indian deities and other ‘pagan’ 
manifestations of cults as concrete, yet mysterious, tokens of an ancient religion and truth which 
needed to be unraveled. In these terms, Indian monstrosity was conceived as a misleading façade 
beyond which interpretations could be drawn (Mitter, 1977, 27-29). This conviction was rooted in 
the traditional Western interpretation of symbolic images, normally subdivided into two attitudes. 
The first one, drawing on Aristotle, approached images as didactic and illustrative tools, 
complementary to the written word, especially the sacred scriptures. By this logic, images cannot 
speak for themselves and the interpreter must refer to a higher source of knowledge. The second 
tradition, in the Platonist and Neoplatonist mode, saw a substantial identification of the beauty of 
images with the perfection and beauty of the Divine, and thus comprehending images 
automatically lead to a comprehension of the higher, spiritual world (Mitter, 1977, 30). Applying 
these stances to the theme of monstrosity, monsters can therefore be either signs of the almighty 
God, or an epistemological conundrum which cannot be accepted as real creatures, but rather as a 
stimulus for ‘a higher spiritual significance’ (Mitter, 1977, 30). In Pignoria’s republication (1615) of 
Vincenzo Cartari’s Images of the Gods, Ganeś is brought back to ‘Egyptian idolatry’, in the general 
attempt to explain the different, pagan religions as having an Egyptian origin (Mitter, 2012, 9). 
The archaeological and comparative concern for Indian deities followed the general trend, 
between the 16th and the 17th century, of the attitude towards monsters shifting from being 
manifestations of God’s wrath to being clues of nature’s fertility (Park & Daston, 1981, 23). 
Philosophers such as Bacon saw monsters as the perfect realisation of the protean capacities of 
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nature, often personified as an ‘indigenous craftsman’ (Park & Daston, 1981, 43). By the end of the 
17th century, studies on monsters coincided with the discipline of embryology (Park & Daston, 
1981, 23). Nevertheless, Western imagery and perception of Indian art still relied on the medieval, 
monstrous representation. For instance, Schopenhauer had an ambivalent and rather intolerant 
reception of Indian arts, defining them as ‘tasteless and monstrous’ (Willson, 1964, 125).80 Parallel 
to the cultural literature on monsters, the monstrous continued to be connoted by religious and 
superstitious features in popular pamphlets and ballads (Willson, 1964, 24).81 An appealing 
example of the usage of the monstrous trope in popular literature is offered by the Italian novelist 
Emilio Salgari (1862-1911), famous for having written his works by consulting geographical and 
cultural sources on India at the libraries of his hometown, Verona. In Salgari’s works, the 
description of Kali, with her bloody thirst signalled by her lolling red tongue, adopts language 
taken from the monsters’ accounts (see, for instance, Salgari, 2004 [1887], 121).  
As seen in literature concerning monsters, in the rise of aesthetics and Western reception of 
Indian art, the encounter with the nonhuman has been progressively detached from its 
perturbative and quasi-magical discovering developed in interacting with the human. Rather than 
attributing a fusion between the perceived Other-than-human and the perceiving human, as 
described in chapter two, the nonhuman has become a reified property, interdicted to human 
characteristics, first of all agency. The discipline of aesthetics and its correlated practice of 
collecting and museography have been justified by this separation between a human fully entitled 
by agency and a passive materiality with fixed and distinguishable properties. The following 
section analyses how this modern ontology influences curatorial practices in handling objects, 
which, on the contrary destabilise the dichotomy human/materiality because of the phenomenon 
of darśan. 
  
                                                          
80 ’Out of a pantheon of “monstrous” and “barbaric” Hindu gods, some of the Buddha images alone invited a 
sense of analogy with classical Greek art. […] This mounting interest in Indo-Greek antiquities had its high 
point in the discovery of the Gandhara school of Buddhist sculpture, with its marked Greco-Roman 
influences’ (Guha-Thakurta, 2004, 36). 
81 Initially, my intention was also to examine the existing literature on penny dreadfuls, in order to see how 
monstrosity was generally represented and used in narrative and whether this literary genre might have 
inspired Anglo-Saxons’ renditions of Indian deities. However, due to the scanty material related to penny 
dreadfuls, I was obliged to abandon this investigation.  
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As previously seen, museums as institutions originated in the process of secularisation of 
beauty and aesthetics, with the subsequent post-secular veneration of arts as a spiritual and 
cultural elevation from the ordinary. If artefacts, once they enter museums, are detached from their 
original and sensuous context, an aestheticisation of their characteristics also occurs, resulting in a 
double process of alienation. In the case of the religious objects, they cease to be worshipped as if 
they are the contents of the divine and start to be the material representation of something higher 
and purer, which speaks for itself as in Latour’s factish entities. Museum artefacts, then, reify 
social constructs and the Western ideal of beauty at the same time. In the contemporary museum 
context, by starting with the premise that the means of apprehending is the body, the aesthetic 
attachment, understood as visual appreciation, to objects is considered as the first form of 
knowledge which visitors experience in front of the cabinets. Interestingly, a curator has used the 
expression ‘ethnocentric’ in order to explain that the audience cannot be familiar with technical 
terminologies. To put differently, curators should begin from their own bodies and create 
exhibitions as if visitors discover things completely new to them without being guided by an 
explanation on the objects’ original context of usage. Terminologies, without a phenomenological 
framework, become a means of discrimination and exclusion which is contrary to the pedagogic 
goals of a museum. Considered as a universal experience, vision reduces the differences in social 
and cultural background, and then exhibitions must be shaped accordingly in order to render 
museum spaces and narrative accessible to every kind of audience. Darśan, due to its link with a 
phenomenological appraisal or experience, is used as a valuable source of empathy established 
between the visitors and Indian artefacts. 
we have to be ethnocentric, because we are indigenous people too. We have many 
schools here, we are the second museum for young audience, school audience, I try to talk to 
the wider audience as much as possible and I am sure that twelve-year-old kids do not care […] 
about the context, but to my opinion it is easier and more interesting to begin from the object 
and to do the experience of the eye of the visitor and it is very relevant, especially for Indian 
arts, because of the, you know, the darśan is just the first sensitive experience of the object, you 
do not have to know all the Puranas or read some Sanskrit to know what is the darśan and what 
the visitors want to see in the image and what they see first. I try to explain some concepts and 
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just to explain how to see and what is interesting to see in this object. […] it is very easy to say 
nothing about an object and just to have some Sanskrit words and do not say anything else, it is 
easier to show the objects. I do not like this, just because, not because, not only because it does 
not give any information about the object for the main audience and it is, because… For me, 
when I visit some museum, I do not know anything about Italian paintings from Renaissance, 
for example, and when I see a text like this which says, yes, some words in Italian, Latin words 
just to explain ‘Yes, a nice contrapposto’, I do not know, it really means I do not have anything to 
do in this museum, it means, yes, it is not for you and it is a kind of violence, it is just… It is 
closed the museum, it is public and our function is to open the museum, not to close for 
specialist audience, you know, I really hate that very much. 
For the above reasons, darśan has started to be a curatorial guideline for realising exhibitions. 
I did a complete exhibition about this [darśan], but not in this museum, […] and we 
focused on the use of objects, fixed temple sculptures in the iconographic program and mobile 
sculptures, bronzes. We try to display just as an experience for the public, just to see different 
parts of the body, the breath, prajñā, the eyes and to see in a special order, just to go around the 
lingam and, after that, we tried to explain that mobile images can go outside the temple and can 
move outside the temple with the chariots and, after that, the god, who is inside the house, with 
the domestic altars. […] I am aware of the way we display, the relations between the objects, 
especially the height. […] I cannot put something at the head of the Buddha, which can be very 
bad for Buddhists. I try to put the Buddha higher than the other things or, even Hindu 
divinities, I know that the distance and the height is very important and I think we should be 
aware of this, just because the objects are better seen if put in context and, for example, if you 
see Buddha like this, you do not see as it should be […]. It is made to be seen in this way, even 
in an aesthetic point of view it is better to respect this use or hierarchy between objects 
Nevertheless, darśan, in a curatorial perspective, is divorced from its ritual connotation for 
being treated as a general, aesthetic engagement. This is particularly true in art museums, where 
the veneration of the art-as-such is particularly at stake. This section examines the new dimension 
to which darśan is collocated through the analysis of three temporary exhibitions which occurred 




4.4.2 Aesthetic appreciation of Indian folk artefacts between modern art and soteriology: 
the first exhibition 
 
The first exhibition was on the ritual cloths used in Gujarat. I decided to focus my interviews 
on the exhibition theme, as the temple cloths (chandarvos), depicting mostly local deities, are 
produced and consumed by the marginalised social strata of the semi-nomadic community of the 
Vaghri, for whom access to the orthodox Hindu temple is prohibited. The cloths are used like 
canopies or tents to demarcate the sacred spaces from the others and are believed to ensure well-
being for the worshippers. The sacred functions of the cloths, then, are similar to those of the 
painted scrolls, which have come to be considered as portable temples. The second exhibition 
compared different Indian folk art traditions, from Mithila paintings to Gond art works. Despite the 
huge difference between each tradition, the exhibition intended to connect them together through 
the label of storytelling. The third one was hosted in a cultural event space rather than a museum, 
and intended to provide a general idea of Indian art.  
This exhibition on the chandarvos followed a repetitive pattern: each cloth was explained by a 
sketch of it, which resembled a sort of map, since only the main features of the cloth were 
reproduced. The labels were like an architectonic layout, because they reproduced the temples 
where the main goddesses are placed. There was, thus, an ‘infra-structural’ description of the 
cloth, by which the cloth was deciphered. On the last day of my fieldwork, while waiting to 
interview some people from the audience, I discovered that the exhibition was a huge 
reconstruction of a ritual canopy, not only because of the reconstruction of a shrine in the middle 
of the gallery, but also because of the ‘cellar’ installation. The main axis of the gallery, which could 
be considered as the main corridor, divided the exhibitive spaces into five cells, with each one 
resembling a shrine, since the cloths were hung from each side. The idea of a tent was reinforced 
by two cloths hung above the main space and at the beginning of the exhibition 
I noticed that the anthropological and contextual information was given briefly on the walls 
of the ‘main corridor’. I was impressed by the fact that the term ‘ritual function’ was given only at 
the end rather than at the beginning. On the opposite wall there was a label concerning the 
material aspect of the cloths or, in other words, their production. A second observation I made was 
that the information had been kept to a minimum compared to the rich description of the ritual 
given in the catalogue. 
After two readings by using the ‘map’, I could decipher the cloths on my own by using the 
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distinctive features, e.g. cobra means ancestors. My previous knowledge of the Hindu pantheon 
and of the Ramayana and Mahabharata was extremely useful. Nevertheless, it was like living under 
the tyranny of the labels: my eyes were attracted to reading the labels first, and viewing on my 
own the cloths after that. If it was not so, I often tried to grasp on my own the ‘infrastructure’ of 
the cloth by finding the temples and, hence, the main goddesses.  
Since two visitors had entered into the shrine, I timidly entered and noticed that there was a 
brief explanation of the reconstruction, but in a marginal place. The music came from the inside of 
the shrine. In the labels, two verses of the ritual song were written, but I could not manage to 
figure out if the written verses corresponded to the music. The visitors were tyrannised by the 
labels as well. Their eyes moved from the cloth to the map more than one time. Entering the shrine 
meant that they could admire the cloths as freely as possible without any explanation. A man, 
whom I later interviewed, took notes and did sketches of the pictures in the cloths, as if to 
appropriate them and deepen his understanding by fixing the cloth patterns in his memory and 
hands, thus making the visit more personal. 
At the beginning of the installation, there was a video on the phases of the creation of the 
cloths, as well as the rituals and ceremonies in which the cloths were used. The video was a collage 
of the photos of the catalogue without any anthropological explanation, along with rather brief 
descriptive sentences. In this part of the main corridor, the labels were concerned with the 
goddesses. Since these pieces of information were put at the beginning of the exhibition, the 
emphasis was more on the goddesses than the anthropological phenomenon of the cloths. The 
introductory label reported the circumstances of the museum’s acquisition of the cloths. The 
chandarvos were given to the museum by Eberhard and Barbara Fisher in 2009 and attested 
Eberhard’s scholarly commitment to Indian textiles, supported by his teacher Alfred Bühler, the 
director of the Museum der Kulturen.82 The cloths were acquired by Fisher during his stays in 
Gujarat in 1965/66 and from 1968 to 1971 (from the label). 
My impression was that of visiting a modern art exhibition. The exhibition is centred on the 
figure of the owner and the iconographic deciphering of the cloths. Understanding the 
iconography of the cloths and their aesthetic dimension of wonder and pleasure was more 
important than portraying the ritualistic dimension of their usage. Therefore, the exhibition began 
with the name of the goddesses rather than the ritual use, which was put, in contrast, at the end. 
                                                          
82 Eberhard Fisher ‘set up a department for the Documentation of Indian Handicrafts at the National Institute 
of Design (NID), and a few years later he collaborated with both the Calico Museum of Textiles and the 
Tribal Research and Training Institute’ (from the label). 
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The labels provided the interpretative keys for understanding pictures or works, the iconography 
of which viewers had no knowledge, such as in some modern art installations where the leaflets 
are central for bearing in mind why the works displayed are considered art by the curators. My 
idea was confirmed by the words of one of the curators: 
There is a different approach depending on the museum profile, before I mentioned we 
consider ourselves to be a museum of, an art museum, we do not refer ourselves as an 
anthropological or ethnological museum, so approach is a bit different. We can also be criticised 
for this. If you go to the session of African art, you have wonderful sculptures that, you know, 
we talked about the artists, we talked about how they influenced European art at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, but not of the ritual context, it is in this way lost. You can never read 
on a label: ‘OK, this is a mask used or worn when people go to the fields and, you know, pray 
for a lot of crop’. So this, you know, we put things at pedestrians, give them the way, but we do 
not recreate the whole original environment of them, that, yes, of course, rises some question 
mark, but it is our point to fence. An ethnological museum would present things, or tries to 
present things, differently.  
The last curator quoted here told me that most of the paintings, which he called ‘traditional’ 
(mostly Mughal paintings), came from the art market and European collections. He made a 
distinction between paintings and sculptures: while sculptures are usually transferred from a 
geographical site, usually a ritual place, paintings cannot be claimed for repatriation by the Indian 
government, since they belong to European collections or to specific patrons, Indians and others, 
who passed them from hand to hand over time. Therefore, the value of Indian paintings would be 
only aesthetic. Nevertheless, to my question of his personal idea of sacred art, he answered by 
saying that everything can be considered sacred from a certain perspective, even the paintings of 
Indian manuscripts because of the concept of darśan. This general ambivalence towards the 
sacredness of Indian art can be ascribed to the foundational premises of the museum.  
If the history of the museum is analysed, the pure aesthetic contemplation of Indian objects is 
enriched by a soteriological vein, which, in some way, reinforces the aesthetic attitude. The 
donator of the museum’s collection, the German Baron Heduard von der Heydt (Illner, 2013), was 
hugely influenced by Schopenauer in his concept of Asian art. That was echoed by the thoughts 
and reflections of one of the most generous contributors to the museum’s Indian painting 
collection, the Italian-Swiss painter Alice Boner. According to her, the art objects should reveal a 
symbol which transcends reality and connects it with the ‘cosmic forces’ (1949, 43), hence the 
emotional and ecstatic reaction of the seer, who is in contact with these supernatural forces and 
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feel herself blessed by them. Alice Boner’s diaries, written from the 1940s to the 1960s, give strong 
examples of what she conceived for aesthetic contemplation, such as this excerpt: 
While my servants were talking to the Brahmins, I rushed upstairs into the big hall, took 
off my shoes and, stepping into the hall which was in dim twilight, I perceived the Shiva-
Lingam deep in the recess of the central shrine almost coming forward to meet me… I was 
overwhelmed with such unspeakable emotion that I started crying… I felt as I was in the arms 
of a loving father… I now understood meaning of the Lingam as a symbol of the very Heart of 
things and as the innermost pillar of the universe, as the anchoring pole of every human heart… 
(Boner, Soni & Soni, 1993, 97) 
Further, she described that one day she had experienced a vivid vision of herself building a 
temple with different deities’ shrines and images, with the final intuition to build a temple by 
using the technique of mosaics. She declared to have experienced the same feeling of joy when she 
had seen, for the first time, the mosaics in Rome, Naples and Ravenna (Boner, Soni & Soni, 1993, 
118). 
The curators’ aesthetic approach to objects has led to an extreme care in delineating the 
artistic lineage of the Indian paintings of the collection, particularly Pahari paintings, by focusing 
on ‘few families’ of ‘high quality paintings’83, especially by analysing the registers of the families’ 
workshops, in order to identify the development of a particular style or use of colour. In terms of 
museum installations, this aesthetic view was reflected by the fact that the medieval Indian 
miniatures are displayed in frames which are easily reachable by visitors, so that they can be best 
viewed. Quite intuitively, the curators’ standpoint towards Indian folk art is rather ambivalent. To 
a certain extent, so-called tribal art, especially for one curator, should receive more attention in art 
museums. Nevertheless, the selection criteria must follow a strict, Western aesthetical canon of 
beauty. I think it is not the case, then, that museum storage presents only storytelling scroll made 
by the garodas from Gujarat, to which Jain (1982) has dedicated a study. 
The risk of these aesthetic operations is to make the visitor lost in front of the details that 
must be deciphered instead of grasping the entire context. The leaflet at the beginning of the 
exhibition, which is on the myths related to the gods depicted, reinforces this alienation from the 
context. Once more, the protagonists of the exhibition are the representations of the gods, rather 
than the visual renderings and the materiality and rituality of the cloths. The only device that 
might stress more the ethnological functions of the cloths is represented by the video at the 
                                                          
83 Expressions used by one of the curators during the interview. 
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beginning. However, it is just a collection of photographs with scanty means of contextualisation, 
and lasts too long for the standard time of a visit. 
 
4.4.3 Indian storytellers as contemporary artists: the second exhibition 
 
According to the curator of the second exhibition, storytelling is what mostly identifies 
Indian culture, especially because of the Purana tradition, to the extent that even traditional local 
dances were performed within the exhibition’s space. Each section identified a Hindu deity, which 
was described with immediate and catchy adjectives, e.g. ‘impulsive, lover of sweets, generous, 
and a great scholar too!’ for Ganeś, and was represented by some of the folk art traditions. In some 
cases, as in the pithoro paintings, the predominant tone was given by the symbolic importance of 
horses in the local communities, or of the sacred trees. In other cases, such as for what concerned 
patuas and Kalighat paintings, these introductory symbols or divinities were not used and the labels 
directly described the folk art tradition. 
An important feature of the exhibition was the importance given to the contemporaneity of 
these traditions, the presentation of them as living and vibrant. For instance, in the case of the 
patuas the artistic lineage was emphasised, then shown along with the scrolls of one of the main 
patua from the Naya village, Mantu Chitrakar, was a small pat realised by Mantu’s primary school 
age daughter, Sonia. The patas were inside glass frames and only a small area was shown, with 
visitors having access to the entire scroll and the story related to its scene via a flipbook placed 
under the exhibited scrolls. Although there was particular emphasis on contemporary patas, some 
of them were related to patuas’ classic themes, such as The Wedding of the Fish84 and Gazi Pir. Mantu 
Chitrakar wrote each story contained in the flipbooks. 
In the presentation of the Kalighat paintings, the emphasis was on the social changes which 
have become of interest to the Kalighat painter, such as the dating web sites accessed by Indian 
women in search of a husband. In addition, each section, both with filmic captions and written 
labels, focused on the biography of each folk artist, with the overall impression that the exhibition 
itself was something in between a modern art installation and ethnographic documentation. The 
curator confirmed to me this first impression, by stating the wish to collect material which was not 
                                                          
84 ‘The story hints at the uneasy relationship between the zamindar (a landlord of whom the big fish is a 
symbol) and the small peasant farmer (the smaller fish). In a way, this folk story tells of the struggle between 
the two without being too critical of the “big fish” who will get you no matter what you do!’ (from the 
flipbook). 
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‘purely ethnographic’ (from the interview with the curator). The curator’s intention was to bridge 
the gap between outstanding artists or members of an artistic movement and nameless artists, 
undervalued as anonymous folk artisans in Western perception of Indian art. Therefore, the 
curator’s intent was to reconstruct an art history of folk artists by relying on the biographical 
aspects of their apprenticeship. 
Six artists were involved in the project, which laid the ground for the exhibition,85 and some 
of them, for instance Mantu Chitrakar, are perfectly aware of the demand from the art and tourist 
market, to the extent that they do no longer perceive their activities as related to the ritual and the 
religious aspects, e.g. the darśan:  
[…] television has changed things for us –now our traditional audiences the villagers do 
not have the time or the desire (iccha) for our performance. However, in the big cities, there are 
people who appreciate our performance. So you see now we have to travel really far from your 
village to find our audience.86 
The perception of the folk artists as emerging contemporary artists is well attested in the 
tapes of the films made for the exhibition.87 Each film starts with the artist’s biography and the 
apprenticeship or circumstances which led the folk artist to begin the activity and to perceive 
herself as a valued artist. Subsequently, the artist shows her works and how they are usually 
created, and concludes with the national and international awards and acknowledgments she has 
received. It is clear, then, that the aim of these documentaries is, on the one hand, to trace an 
artistic lineage of these folk traditions, as in the curator’s words, and, on the other hand, to try to 
escape from the stereotype of folk as unknown and to present the folk artists as rooted in an 
artistic career. Another interesting aspect to notice is the fact that the artistic propensity and the 
beginning of the apprenticeship with a master or a talent scout is often delineated as an 
exceptional event, with quasi-magic properties, such as a hagiography.  
One day, a young man I knew told me what I was doing digging mud when I was such 
an artist and fine singer. I told him that art would not fill my stomach and I needed to work for 
                                                          
85 The project was a three-year research and collection in partnership with an Indian cultural organisation, 
which has always focused on the contemporary folk arts and tried to support artistic development, as well as 
to stimulate and promote the national and international interest in folk arts. The museum gave a funding 
budget for each artist involved in the project in order to produce the artefacts, which would be exhibited in 
the museum itself, while the cultural organisation had the task of selecting the artists and recording their 
activities, both by means of fieldwork notes and by filming the artists in action. 
86 From the transcribed tapes of the films realised for the exhibition. 
87 The curator told me that the contents of each film were negotiated between the artist and the members of 
the cultural organisation. 
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my living. I used to live in Chamanpura then and Haku Shah used to come there to meet a 
Bhopa artist who painted Pābūjī phads.88 I wanted to meet Haku Shah so I asked the artist to 
introduce me. He refused but I persisted in becoming his friend. After two years, one day, he 
suddenly turned to me and said he was going to meet Haku Shah, would I like to go along? It 
was a blistering hot afternoon and I was barefoot – I did not wear shoes then. […] Haku Shah 
was shocked to see my feet. […] I told him I sang and showed him my instrument the sarangi 
and that I worked as a labourer […]. He invited all the people in the office to come hear me 
sing. […] I asked him what I should draw. He said I should never ask him that question and 
should draw whatever came to my mind. So I stopped asking him and began thinking of a 
bhajan (religious song) dedicated to Lord Shiva. Quite automatically, I began translating the 
song into drawing. Haku Shah was very happy. He then asked if I could draw a story. I did not 
know what story to do so I did my own life-story. This was published in Germany. Then Teju 
and I also worked on a Bollywood film Mirch Masala and some TV serials. Now we sing and 
we paint. My whole family paints (Rajasthani artist). 
 
4.4.4 Two paṛs among Maharajas’ treasures: the third exhibition 
 
A well-known gallery owner and art collector and a university scholar created the third 
exhibition. The radically different background of the two curators influenced nature of the 
exhibition.  
The elaboration of an exhibition requires a lot of confrontation. My colleague is a scholar, 
[…] has a little bit of an abstract approach to culture, to art and to the art representations in an 
exhibition, whereas I, because of my work, because of all the exhibitions I created and I have 
seen, have a much more pragmatic perspective. In addition, [naming the colleague] wanted to 
join several elements, for instance putting a necklace, a piece of jewellery together with a statue, 
a miniature and a textile. To be frank, I did not like this approach, as I have a more rigid, 
rigorous perspective, as antiquarian. The artwork can be contextualised, but it cannot be 
polluted by objects of thousands of years of difference, otherwise we have an anthropological 
exhibition. 
The exhibition consisted of four parts. The first one was an introduction to the different 
Indian religions, with a particular focus on Hinduism, as the scholar was interested in showing the 
symbolism hidden inside the art object, and chose Hindu sculptures with this precise purpose. In 
                                                          
88 It is interesting to note the fact that this bhopa actually paints paṛs. This contradicts the literature on the 
topic, and what I was told by some scholars, who have done years of fieldwork among bhopas. 
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fact, the exhibition opened with a statue of Ganeś. The high aesthetical premises, as well as the 
focus on iconographic and abstract concepts, were evident from the choice of putting this very fine 
sculpture at the entrance of the gallery. This interconnection between plastic features and Indian 
aesthetic and religious concept was highlighted in the second section of the exhibition, which was 
about the erotic dimension of the body, hence the explanation of concepts such as that of rasa to the 
visitor who, at the same time, because of the well-orchestrated usage of light and background 
colours, was tempted to aesthetically contemplate the voluptuous forms of the sculptures. The 
third section abandoned for a while the interconnection between art and sign for the aesthetic and, 
at the same time, antiquarian view of the Marahajas’ art court. Before reaching the final section of 
the exhibition, the Italian cultural and literary interest in India throughout history, the exhibition 
showed two paṛs, chosen by the curators as the joining link between the first three sections. In fact, 
not only were the paṛs conceptualised by the two curators as part of the courtesan environment of 
the Maharajas, but they are also Pābūjī’s manifestations, and thus they hid a symbolic and religious 
content as well. It is interesting to note the fact that the two paṛs were the only artefacts in the 
exhibition that belonged to the gallery owner and art collector. His words elucidated both the 
criteria of choice of the two scrolls and the circumstances of their acquisition. 
For what concerns me, one time I assisted in the first run of the so called desert festival, it 
must have been in the 1980s, near Jaipur, where several artists and musicians from the local 
tradition were invited, as the festival, before increasing its touristic features, was a very local 
event, despite its aim to spread knowledge throughout Rajasthan. On that occasion, a family of 
storytellers were invited. I know Pābūjī’s story from a Stella Kramrisch’s book, which had been 
published some years before. […] Then, as soon as I realised that the festival was making Pābūjī 
performances, I participated with even greater interest and I took photos of that performance. It 
was realised by a traditional family of bards, of storytellers, but at the same time it was made 
within a context which was not properly that of a local village, where it is usually happened, so 
that performance was a middle way. After this event, by traveling extensively in Rajasthan, I 
was able to acquire some of these scrolls, one of which is exhibited [...]. It is very old, as far as 
the end of the scroll is partly damaged. The other one is much more recent and it is complete, 
because I needed to understand which differences might exist with the older scroll. […] these 
things were purchased from a local producer who made the transaction between the purchaser, 
the salesperson and the local world. I think that these paṛs were bought… Well, the recent one 
has been made based on the developing tourist market. The other one has been sold because the 







The description of the three exhibitions reflects the different curatorial positions towards the 
tribal art’s status. As seen in the case of the first museum, the curators have started to focus on so-
called tribal art. However, Indian folk art is interpreted within a rigid Western aesthetic canon of 
beauty, therefore folk objects are conceptualised according to the values of a modern art exhibition, 
with the final result of alienation from the original context. In addition, viewing non-Western art 
with the criteria of Western art has given importance to the artists’ lineage. A similar concern has 
developed in the temporary exhibition on ‘storytelling’, where the folk art is interpreted through 
the lens of the artists and the criteria of their work. Furthermore, the biographical data, as 
previously seen, are a sort of hagiography, stressing, then, the exceptionality of artistic talent. The 
use of folk art in the third temporary exhibition had a completely opposite goal, particularly to 
illustrate the broader, historical context of the Maharajas. Exhibiting the paṛs has entailed, in this 
case, a clash between scholarly attention on the iconography and antiquarian aesthetic pleasure. 
This chapter has advanced the aim of this thesis—finding a way of approaching materiality 
and material agency without reproducing the notion of personhood—by arguing that the act of 
seeing as a museum practice is the result of a process of secularisation and the progressive 
detachment of seeing and the material artefacts from their ritual connotation, which invested 
Western culture. The theological meaning of beauty was substituted by a post-secular approach, 
according to which beauty should reflect moral values and intellectual ideas, at the cost of totally 
dismissing the embodied relationships activated by the act of seeing. The authority of museums 
has risen from this process of decontextualisation of materiality, so that the material artefacts 
become properties of the museums and are repository of curators’ theories. Especially in the case 
of art museums, then, the particular stress given to the aesthetic dimension of the religious objects 
neglect their anthropological and sociological contents. This aestheticisation of the ritual objects 
culminates, in my view, in the comparison with Western artists of the calibre of Leonardo da Vinci 
and in the will to reconstruct an artistic biography or artistic phases.89 While these parallels with 
Western art history are plausible to some extents in the case of Mughal art and Indian medieval 
miniatures or paintings, they also run the risk of being anachronistic, not only from a historical 
                                                          
89 A curator said, more explicitly, ‘it is the same in the European context, you would talk about different 
phases in Picasso’s work, so for some of the painters in India we have also discussed the early works, the 
mature works and the late works, so it is also interesting to see how the span of one artist’s life how things 
developed’. 
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point of view, but also from an anthropological one. This is followed by the quasi-dogmatic 
assumption that the aesthetic properties and beauty of the artefacts must be acritically accepted as 
a matter of fact. The following chapter will explore the problematics which arise from artefacts that 
were originally part of a ritual environment, where seeing is an embodied and sensuous activity 
between the superhuman and the human, being put inside a space, a museum, where the Western 
scientific and aesthetic gaze operates. 
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Chapter 5 
The overlapping of the sacred and the profane in religious artefacts within museum 




So far, the scholarly conundrums in the debate on material agency, initially explored from 
theoretical (chapter one) and methodological (chapter two) points of view, have been 
contextualised within the historical process of secularisation to which the act of seeing has been 
subjected (chapter three). The detachment of the gaze from its ritual connotation has resulted in an 
aestheticisation of non-Western material artefacts, as curatorial practices analysed during 
fieldwork (chapter four) have shown. In order to advance my argument that curatorial responses 
towards religious artefacts do not reflect the idea that material agency is dependent on the human, 
this chapter first explores the scholarly literature which has examined the intertwining of religious 
and museum studies. In doing so, the chapter comes to an understanding of the scholarly context 
of the debate I and the curators I interviewed work in (section 5.3). Second, the chapter analyses 
some of the fieldwork data (section 5.4) in order to deconstruct and problematise the assumptions 
of the scholarly literature. An ethnographic account, a mixture between excerpts from interviews 
and participant observation in the galleries, follows this theoretical section. 
As seen in the previous chapter, Western museums historically originated from the process 
of secularisation of the act of seeing. Material objects ceased to have a magical life on their own, 
they were no longer considered as divine interventions in the world. Instead, they become the 
reification of scientific concepts or notions such as that of beauty, which are self-evident. 
Nevertheless, museums are still viewed as places where a post-secular attitude occurs. The 
separation of the museum artefacts from their original contexts of provenance is seen by some 
authors, such as Paine (2013), as the building of a nonordinary space. Artefacts cannot influence 
the human existence in a sensuous way. Touching becomes a taboo activity, forbidden within 
museum spaces. According to these authors, then, museums inaugurate a type of purification 
different from that of the ritual, but with similar effects, specifically the transformation of the 
objects used in this dynamic. We can see, therefore, that materiality’s agency is once again denied 
and subjected to that of humans. What the fieldwork undertaken for this study revealed, in 
176 
contrast, is that museum artefacts continue to have an existence independent from curators’ 
practices.  
The following section (5.2) gives some understanding of the museums analysed for the 
present study, by offering three examples of curatorial responses towards the scholarly debate on 
the role of materiality. As seen in the first chapter, materiality has been seen as ancillary to 
humans. Even in Gell’s paradigm, one of the few examples which gives a distinct agency to 
materiality, the nonhuman mirrors humans’ engagement in the world. According to this view, 
curatorial practices guide visitors’ interactions with museum artefacts. However, Gell indirectly 
acknowledges the fact that materiality resists humans. This resistance is particularly at stake in 
materiality’s enchanted technology. In fact, museum artefacts observed during fieldwork represent 
sources of ambiguity. If, on the one hand, they stand for curators’ interpretations and didactic 
mission, on the other hand they interact with visitors and with the curators themselves in 
unexpected ways, such as making curators reflect on the similarities and differences between 
museums and religious spaces. My analysis of fieldwork data, as the conclusions will further 
discuss, proposes solutions to the humanist framework of Gell’s theory and its subsequent 
anthropomorphisation of materiality by pinpointing what Gell already found, particularly the link 
between materiality and nature in its magic becoming. Phenomenology highlights the resistance of 
the matiére brute, its inscrutability. Section 5.4 will move from the three cases described in the 
following section (5.2) in order to analyse museums in which artefacts express their agency 
without being human projections or the results of anthropomorphisation. The reconstructions of 
religious spaces within exhibitive galleries, in fact, arouses reactions radically different from those 
expected by the curators. 
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5.2 Three curatorial responses to the role of materiality 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
New studies on the confluence of religious subjects and museum operations have influenced 
curatorial practices, especially in the US and in the ex-British colonies. In New Zealand, 
awareness of Maori beliefs regarding their taonga has led to greater respect being shown 
by Pakeha (non-Maori) curatorial staff. Pieces of greenery, the foliage of trees, are placed in 
front of, or, on, Maori taonga in museum displays, put there as offerings by Maori staff or, in 
their absence, by Pakeha staff. […]. In some museums one might also find a bowl of water at 
the entrance to the gallery or the stores where Maori taonga are located, available for those 
who wish to use it to sprinkle water on themselves, after coming into close contact with the 
strong spiritual forces of the taonga. (Simpson, 1996, 197) 
or again, 
In Los Angeles, a 2003 exhibition at the university Fowler Museum of Cultural 
History associated with the Senegalese Sufi saint, Amadou Bamba (1853-1927), 
witnessed visitors touching the portraits and examples of the writing of the saint, then 
touching their foreheads. The curator of the exhibition explains, ‘The images transmit 
Baraka, so to touch such an image is one of the most effective ways to obtain the 
blessing power’ (Nooter Roberts 2006, quoted in Pattison, 2007, 52) 
The ICOM Ethic Code reflects this new awareness regarding religious objects: 
Collections of human remains and material of sacred significance should be acquired 
only if they can be housed securely and cared for respectfully. This must be accomplished in a 
manner consistent with professional standards and the interests and beliefs of members of the 
community, ethnic or religious groups from which the objects originated, where these are 
known (ICOM, 2013, 3) 
Contemporary museums, then, try to engage with material culture studies by doing their 
best to respect and appreciate the specificity of the exhibited artefacts. For instance, museums offer 
very often a detailed account of the life of their artefacts before and after their entering into 
museum spaces, as fieldwork data attest. This is particularly evident in the museums, included 
within this study, which engage with their local communities: the Museum der Kulturen in Basel, 
the World Museum in Liverpool, and the Oriental Museum of the University of Durham.  
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5.2.2 The Museum der Kulturen 
 
The Museum der Kulturen exhibits nonconsecrated artefacts on the request of the local 
communities, and by creating occasional self-reflecting exhibitions, which make clear the different 
interpretational strata given to the objects. Furthermore, the local communities collaborate with the 
museum’s activities, by entering into the storages, by touching museum objects, and by discussing 
their usages, their owners’ stories, etc. Despite this, a similar effort towards the Asian material of 
the museum has not been made until now. The Museum der Kulturen has no permanent collections, 
but rather cyclical exhibitions, which last for five years, with different topics. At the time of my 
fieldwork, there were three subjects, one for each of the levels of the museum: What next? The 
Insurrection of things in the Amazon; Expeditions: The world in a suitcase and Make up: Shaped for life? 
For the purposes of this thesis, I focus on the first two exhibitions. In the case of the first exhibition, 
it ‘addresses the relationship between museum holdings and historical events in the Amazon 
region’ (Museum der Kulturen, 2014, 1).  
The majority of the museum’s acquisitions of Amazonian material coincided with the 
development of a high-impact politics of settlement in the Amazon by the Brazilian government, 
which led to important cultural and social changes in the local communities (Museum der 
Kulturen, 2014, 1). The main corpus of the collection derives from the collecting of the Swiss 
anthropologist Franz Caspar, in the 1940s among the Tuparí (Museum der Kulturen, 2014, 21), and 
of the anthropologists Harald Schultz and Vilma Chiara, among the Waurá during the 1960s. In 
this last case, their fieldwork was the first study on the Waurá with a worldwide coverage 
(Museum der Kulturen, 2014, 5-6). A third wave of collecting came from the Brazilian 
anthropologist Vera Penteado Coelho in the 2000s among the Waurá, who asked the museum to 
return their objects. The decision taken was to donate the collection to the museum at the 
University of Saõ Paulo. In addition, in 2006 a delegation of Waurá visited the collection of Harald 
Schultz and Vilma Chiara in order to express the importance of their living cultural patrimony 
(Museum der Kulturen, 2014, 5). This resulted in a video installation in the exhibition, which 
compared the contemporary environment of the objects and some members of the community 
visiting the storage spaces and explaining meaning and use of the objects. Some objects have been 
repatriated to Brazilian museums and there was a tag replacing them. According to the 
community, some other objects should not have been exposed, such as some drums which must 
not be touched by women. Some religious/ritual masks represented the most interesting aspect of 
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the exhibition: some of them have not been completed to the end, in order that they can be given to 
the museum. Sacredness can otherwise be wasted or become dangerous. With this logic, the other 
masks were made just for the museum. On a wall of the room, there were some pictures drawn by 
school pupils. The student said that this was part of a project on deforestation, but they appeared 
to me to also represent the children’s reading and interpretation of how they see Amazonian 
objects within museum spaces. For instance, there was a drawing of several masks displayed 
inside a repetitive frame, reminiscent of museum cabinets.  
The second exhibition was about the past curators of the museum and their fieldwork 
expeditions. In a second respect, the exhibition was about the cultural construction of space, 
specifically the space of meaning of the curators, what their eyes actually saw in their encounter 
with the Other. Another important aspect was the negotiation with the local inhabitants on the 
appropriation of the objects. For instance, copies of Cameroon sacred pottery substituted for the 
originals. One installation was particularly evocative. A telescope was placed in front of a window 
of the room. If approached, its spectacles reveal photos taken during the expedition in Africa, 
which hang from a wall of the museum external building. This was comparable with a cage, where 
drawings and short descriptions, probably from the museum database, were placed in order to 
form a huge rectangular pattern. While the exhibition on the first floor showed the point of view of 
the analysed communities, this exhibition showed the other gaze of the encounter, that of the 
museum curator/anthropologist. A room was dedicated to a random collection of objects from all 
over the world. 
 
5.2.3 The World Museum 
 
The gallery of the World Museum is introduced by a video of a local and world-famous 
storyteller and poet, who gives his personal view of the permanent collection in rhymes, while 
pictures of the artefacts are moving in the background. It is interesting that he starts his 
storytelling by saying ‘We will take you in a mystical journey’. The curator, who started to work at 
the museum after the decision of using a storyteller to introduce the collection, made me notice 
that the storyteller’s words do not coincide with the curators’ aims. The introductory panel to the 
Asian section of the collection is, indeed, focused on the objects according to the views of material 
culture studies rather than a more philosophical or soteriological rendering. Thus, the emphasis is 
on their realisation and usage, how they arrived in the West and came to the museum in the 19th 
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century, as well as the type of issues arising from them which are still taken into consideration 
today. The connections between Liverpool’s role in the British Empire, in political and commercial 
terms, and the museum’s acquisitions is well-defined, as in this label 
The ‘Fernie’ cabinet 
Miss Jane Fernie gave this cabinet to the Museum. She was the sister-in law of Charles 
Bell, the British political officer based in Tibet. 
The objects in the cabinet are from the Dorothy Worral China trade collection. Many of 
them belonged to Liverpool families, who had connections with maritime trade in Asia in the 
19th century. 
The interactions between the West and Asia are stressed by some Asian craft objects, realised 
in the 17th century, which are Asian interpretations of the West’s cultural habits and imagery, e.g. a 
statue of Saint Marie, etc., followed by Sir Douglas Crawford’s collection (20th century) which is 
placed under the label European images of Asia. A space of the permanent exhibition is dedicated to 
the Chinese community of Liverpool, which controlled the trade with Hong Kong and Shanghai 
after 1834. Each cabinet is named by the Western collector who acquired the exhibited objects. 
Throughout the gallery, not only in the Asian section, the information about each object shown is 
provided in booklets placed at the bottom of the cabinets, thus allowing a more contemplative 
view of the objects, as well as being more participatorily engaging for the visitor. 
The other sections,90 respectively dedicated to Oceania, North and South America and Africa, 
focus more on the artistic and anthropological aspects of their collections, as, especially in the case 
of Oceania and Africa, in the West there has risen a substantial critical debate around the status of 
so-called primitive art.91 While in the Oceania section the labels are more concerned with the 
impact that Oceanian art has had on the art market,92 as well as the influences on the Oceanian 
artistic style resulting from the encounter with the West,93 the African section discusses the colonial 
                                                          
90 Each section has a touch-screen with interactive games centred on some of the themes presented in the 
section itself, and a panel with the description of a workshop, called Get Connected, realised in 2007, which 
had the aim of the reinterpretation of chosen objects of the section. 
91 ‘Sculptures taken from Benin by the British in 1897 were bought by European museums. In their realism 
and skill in casting, they were compared with the art of the European Renaissance. But this did not 
immediately change 19th century ideas about West Africa as “primitive” because most scholars explained 
these qualities as the result of Portuguese or Egyptian influence. Today, royal Edo arts are recognised as 
indigenous and regarded as a major worlart tradition’ (excerpt taken from a label). 
92 For instance, in the New Guinea sub-section, it is written: ‘This museum bought most of the pieces in this 
display from specialist collectors or from Sales Rooms such as Sotheby’s’. 
93 ‘The colonisers forced New Irelanders into a money economy. They also introduced metal tools, which 
meant that carvers could make malagan sculptures more easily. Together with the demand from art collector 
overseas, this led to malangans being sold rather than destroyed.’ 
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legacy of some objects which are usually identified by practitioners as exempla of primitive art. 
These objects are, for instance, the Kongo and Edo’s artefacts, whose acquisitions were deeply 
entrenched with the colonial politics of destruction in order to flourish the palm oil trade, in the 
case of Edo Kingdom, and to impose the control of the local, political power, in the case of Kongo 
population. In particular, the Oceanian section focuses on the way of collecting the material 
exhibited and how collectors negotiated the acquisitions with the local communities, as is written 
in the label quoted below. 
Here you can see some of the artefacts collected by Reverend John Henry Holmes. 
Reverend JH Holmes was not able to collect some objects because they were still considered 
sacred. […] As one member of the family […] remarked “If we had sold it to you and you had 
sent it to Beritani (Britain), our totem-ancestor would have known, been angry, and […] we 
should all have died. 
The North-American section, on the contrary, highlights through the artefacts exhibited the 
cultural resistance and resurgence of the American Indian populations. Particular care is paid to 
Indian names. 
In honour of these traditions, indigenous words are used to emphasise the continuing 
importance of languages. Native groups are also identified by the terms they choose to use for 
themselves. 
The overall impression of the gallery is that the museum is centred on the communities 
behind the objects exhibited, as a final label establishes. 
But that they [the museum objects] speak to you should be a potent reminder of the 
humanity you share with the men and women that made them. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, 1995 
 
5.2.4 The Oriental Museum 
 
The Oriental Museum is divided into three levels. The first level presents the space for 
temporary exhibitions, as well as permanent collections. At the time of my fieldwork, there were 
two small temporary exhibitions on the works realised by the North East Artist Network (EDAN) 
with the inspiration of the South-Asian artefacts of the Oriental Museum. The two permanent 
collections are on China and on Ancient Egypt. In the case of the first permanent collection, the 
intention of the exhibition is to show some Chinese religious and cultural customs and to give, 
hence, a brief introduction to Buddhism. A second feature of the exhibition is the focus on the Silk 
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Route, considered important as a means of circulation of ideas, cultures and religions in South 
Asia. The Ancient Egypt gallery is one of the most ancient acquisitions of the museum, but, despite 
its pedigree, it is shaped in order to ‘meet the needs of thousands of school children who visit the 
museum every year’, thus it has an interactive approach, which is present throughout the 
museum. The curator told me that this approach was thought also to satisfy visitors’ feedback, 
hence the deleting of labels and the use of a leaflet with explanations for each object. Therefore, the 
Oriental Museum, apart from the temporary exhibition whose artefacts are still illustrated by labels, 
is oriented towards the materiality of its objects. This is strengthened by the presence of chairs, 
which visitors can use to watch objects at a closer distance. For the other types of visitors, there are 
some explicative panels on the history of the collection, the result of the union of The Wellcome 
Collection (from the American gentleman Henry Wellcome, born in 1853) and The Northumberland 
Collection (from Lord Algernon Percy, the second son of the second Duke of Northumberland, born 
in 1792). This last collection was originally displayed at Alnwick Castle until the late 1930s, and 
was then in storage in the British Museum. At the end of the Second World War, the Lord’s family 
decided to sell the collection to the University of Durham. The research and storage room is placed 
between the exhibition on China and the Egyptian gallery, in an attempt to get the public involved 
in the museum’s activities. Not only can the visitor watch researchers and members of museum 
staff at work, but she can also book an appointment to view the objects in the storage. 
The second floor hosted a temporary exhibition on materials from the South-Asian and 
South-East Asian collections of the museum. As the museum has the purpose of highlighting the 
commitment between local communities and contemporary objects, I could observe contemporary 
Korean books and music, together with the historical collection made by the Anglican missionary 
Putt (1925-2011), as well as a Japanese gothic lolit dress. It is telling that even contemporary 
artefacts were dated according to the BCE/CE notation. I found this approach as a way for the 
museum not to freeze the past, but rather to make past and present in dialogue. The focus 
remained, however, on the different religious customs and creeds, thus, along with Japanese 
martial arts and mangas, there were Buddhist and Shinto family altars, together with the tools 
used in the tea ceremony. 
The third level displays two permanent exhibitions and collections, those made by Malcolm 
MacDonald, a British diplomat in the Far East between the 1920s and 1940s who collected Chinese 
ceramics, and by Sir Charles Hardinge (1878-1968), who collected Chinese jade artefacts. Each of 
them decided to sell his collection to the Oriental Museum. Particularly, MacDonald 
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did not however stop collecting, and almost as soon as the collection arrived in Durham 
he began to add pieces with the aim of creating a fully comprehensive Chinese ceramic teaching 
collection. 
5.2.5 Storage precautions 
 
Concerning storage precautions, the majority of the curators I interviewed reported that they 
do not use specific ones with religious objects, rather they care for these objects in the same 
respectful way they do the other museum artefacts. One curator represents the only exception: 
In terms of what we are doing in the stores, […], particularly the Buddhist figures, 
Buddhist statues […], we placed them in the order that they would be placed on a monastic 
shrine and, so, the hierarchy of sacredness is maintained, so the Buddha goes on the top shelf, 
the bodhisattva would go on a shelf down from that and […] the peaceful and powerful 
protectors would go again in their respective shelf levels.  
It was interesting to debate about storage precautions with scholars who have done a lot of 
fieldwork with the bhopas. As already discussed in the first chapter, the paṛ is considered a 
religious shrine and temple, and is treated with all the care due to a sacred object. The paṛ, then, is 
given away only on the premise that it is treated with religious respect. In particular, it must not be 
damaged—cutting is sacrilegious—and must be kept in a clean, ‘purified’ space. The bhopa, before 
installing the paṛ in a place, cleans it with extreme care. For instance, the scholar must not simply 
ask his wife to sew a damaged paṛ. Instead, the bhopa would do the sewing in a purified context, 
taking off his shoes, etc. In a certain sense, then, the owner of the paṛ (museum curator/gallery 
owner, etc.) might partially assume the function of the bhopa. According to one scholar, bhopas 
perceive museums as suitable places for the paṛs. However, the lack of a complete certitude around 
the correct use of the paṛ makes the bhopa act a series of ritual procedures, which are similar to 
those adopted when selling a camel to a purchaser who is external to the community. 
A museum can be considered a place, I am not telling sacred, but destined to gather 
specific art works. Probably, the guarantees that purchasers gave to the bards were to put the 
paṛ in a place which is worthy of the scroll. Clearly, it is the task of the purchaser, because you 
can give all the possible guarantees, but, once you are at home, you can cut the scroll, you can 
treat it without the promised respect. As a Raika cannot conceive the killing of an animal and, 
nevertheless, sells his animals. Due to the fact that they have passed from the camels’ breeding, 
even if there is somebody who eats camel’s meat, to that of sheep and cows, they are perfectly 
aware of the fact that the male cattle, they do not sell female one, which they sell goes to the 
slaughterhouse, then how do they sort out this problem? By doing a sacrifice. They do a pūjā 
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every time they sell a cow, they do pūjā in the evening, they light a sacred fire where they pour 
down gee, clarified butter, millet’s seeds, and every elements which constitute bloodless 
sacrifice. […] the bloodless sacrifice is transformed into a symbolic sacrifice by putting a 
piercing in the animal’s ear. When the latter is dead, it is buried with a ritual and it is believed it 
belongs now to the deity […]. In a similar way, the paṛ is sold with the awareness that it will be 
put in a respectful place. If the paṛ is not sold, it is thrown away in the sacred lake or buried or 
burnt in a sacred fire during a pūjā. […] It is rare the fact that the paṛ is sold (from an interview 
with a scholar). 
In contrast, another scholar reported that bhopas do not feel that museum curators do not 
respect paṛs if the scrolls are not treated as bhopas usually treat them. The scholar explained that the 
paṛs lose their religious characterisation, as they are supposed to be viewed and studied by 
nonbelievers. The bhopas’ tolerance has, however, some limits, as the scholar reported to me. 
Q: Which are their opinions and reactions towards the musealisation of the paṛs? 
A: Most are unaware of it. […] my chief informant, was once shown five or six paṛs laid 
out on the floor of a huge room in the Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam, to allow him to compare 
them. He said that “really” a paṛ should not be treated like that, but understood completely why 
we had done it. He did get a little upset on finding that one of my colleagues had a commercial 
paṛ-piece on display in his bathroom. 
 
5.2.6 Concluding observations 
 
The three curatorial responses elaborated upon in this chapter have provided ample 
evidence to demonstrate that a new sensibility towards religious materiality has been aroused in 
curatorial practices. Nevertheless, the scholarly literature on the subject still focuses on religious 
objects as means of empowerment and constructions of intersubjective relations for humans, it 
does not offer an account of these objects possessing agency independent from the notion of 
personhood. Museum artefacts, by this logic, should speak only because curators decide that they 
can speak and reveal certain aspects. Museums become, according to these scholars, gigantic 
bubbles where objects are immobilised in just some features of the wider spectrum of the possible 
relationships with humans, whereas the context outside of the bubble is transformed, as the utopic 
environment which museums try to imitate. In other words, the so-called original context is 
viewed as the unique circumstance in which objects can reveal to humans all their complexities 
and meanings, as if objects cease to have their agency once they enter museum spaces. In order to 
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be consistent with the criterion of authenticity, museum curators look at the original context as the 
source according to which they shape their exhibitive representations. The adoption of the 
Durkheimian categories of the sacred and of the profane, therefore, reflects the idea of museums’ 
separation from contexts, thereby causing museums to function as locations of sacrality. What the 
discussion of darśan in the previous chapter has revealed, however, is that religious materiality 
does not disappear as far as contexts change, but rather actively adapts its agency, e.g. the cultic 
veneration of the comic books in an urban environment. Rather than viewing scrolls as secondary 
products of human agency, what I seek to stress is the resistance of materiality to human 
manipulations. I concur, therefore, with Knott (2005, 94) that what is important to bear in mind is 
not the fact that a space is religious or secular, but rather the fuzziness of the location of the 
religious and of the secular, which characterises religious materiality.  
I am not denying that the general idea that objects can speak only about or for humans 
affects curatorial practices. Quite the contrary: as seen in chapter four, curators appreciate Indian 
storytelling scrolls and, more generally, religious objects, either as examples of ethnographic 
theories, or as pure art works. In addition, curators’ words reflect, in many respects, the existing 
scholarly literature, especially concerning the importance attributed to the original context and the 
loss of meaning which occurs when artefacts enter museum spaces. Nevertheless, my own 
fieldwork demonstrates that curators do not have full control of the artefacts, which have an 
independent life disjointed from the intersubjectivity installed with humans. Curatorial practices 
towards Indian storytelling scrolls are not isolated facts but intersections of a heterogeneous array 
of policies, which give some indications of how the religious and ritual are received by the 
curators. Starting with this holistic approach, I decided to analyse the practice of the recreation or 
the installation of Asian temples and altars within museum spaces. I found these reconstructions 
fundamental for my phenomenological and ethnological critique of the above-mentioned 
literature, as they offer an explicit manifestation of the debate: temple and museum spaces are, in 
these cases, copresent and fused together. In particular, in this chapter I will single out four 
examples: the Buddhist temple at the Penn Museum, constructed by Maxwell Sommerville (1829-
1904),94 the Tibetan protective chapel at the World Museum, a reconstruction of a Buddhist altar in a 
temporary exhibition at the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University of 
Cambridge, and a temporary exhibition on Hindu shrines at the Oriental Museum. Curators have to 
                                                          
94 In the current gallery of China and Japan, Sommerville’s Buddhist Temple is only partially assembled and 
the visitor can just have a vague idea of what the temple looked like at the time of its inauguration. 
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deal with the uncontrolled impact of the recreation of religious spaces within galleries. The 
response is not guided by curators’ didactive purposes, but it is quite unpredictable and in 
continuity with the so-called original context. What is at stake, then, is not a discrepancy between 
museums and religious spaces, but rather a complex and nuanced continuum, to which 
Durkheim’s descriptions do not readily apply. The categories of the sacred and profane are the 
very essences of abstract and simplified categories that should be abandoned in favour of 
phenomenology, in my opinion. A phenomenological lens is, in fact, a more realistic device for 
grasping museum reality, as phenomenology pinpoints phenomena in themselves, in their 
continuous becoming. 
The following section will explore how the literature understands religious experience and 
how this experience can be identified by that of the museum. More specifically, the section will 
analyse the reasons why some scholars have compared museum spaces to those of the ritual. In so 
doing, the section will prepare the ground for the more detailed navigation of curatorial practices 




5.3 A literature review on museums as sacred spaces 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, museums as Western institutions were born from the 
detachment of the act of seeing from ritual functions in Western culture. However, the 
transformative procedure to which museum artefacts are supposed to be subjected seems to 
reproduce the separation between ordinary and nonordinary realms enacted by the ritual. The 
museum experience is then compared to that of the ritual in this section. This is important in the 
light of a better understading of the flourishing of the literature on the intertwining of religious 
and museum spaces. In addition, this comparison prepares the way to a problematisation of the 
categories of the sacred and of the profane by describing the challenges posed by materiality in 
museum spaces, which will be the argument of the following section (5.3). 
According to Duncan (1991, 95) and Alpers (1991, 31-32), museums are powerful 
transformers:95 the exhibited objects cease to be ordinary tools and become things to be seen, 
socially meaningful icons. Transposing Dal Lago and Giordano’s theories on the modern art 
context (2006, 19; 36-37) onto the more specific area of museum studies, the museum constructs 
more clearly a socially efficacious frame of what it is established as exposable, a justificatory and 
foundational narrative. The social covenants, e.g. the idea of a particular way of exhibiting, the 
purposes of the museum, etc., which compose that foundational narrative are standardised as 
absolute and natural rules, apparently independent from the social and political reasons which 
generated them (Dal Lago & Giordano, 2006, 74). 
In a certain sense, museums, according to Duncan (1995, 1-2), appear as theatrical or 
structured places in view of this transformative operation, which shares many affinities with the 
ritual itself. If Smith’s (1987) observations of ritual are considered here, we can see that ritual can 
be conceived as the process of creation of a controlled environment, which asserts a difference 
between ordinary life and the ritual space. That is to say: ‘Ritual is a relationship of a difference 
between “nows” –the now of everyday life and the now of the ritual place; the simultaneity, but 
not the coexistence, of “here” and “there”’ (Smith, 1987, 110). This phenomenon is fundamental in 
order to give meaning to what is separated from the ordinary, the sacred, in the religious sphere, 
and exhibited in the museum. Benjamin (2011 [1936], 12), in his historical reconstruction of the 
anthropological role of art objects in human society, identified the link between the uniqueness of 
the former, which he called aura, and their ritual function, since he believed that the most ancient 
                                                          
95 Cfr. with Weil’s (2002) quote in Hughes & Wood (2009). 
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art works were realised for ritual purposes. This reflection can be extended to the case of museum 
practices. In its origin, the museum is, indeed, a secret space, a temple dedicated to the goddesses 
Muses, where the Italian humanist of the 15th century, resembling the monk in his cell, recreated 
and meditated upon his work (Lugli, 1992, 58),96 as seen in the previous chapter. Not only do 
museums resemble ancient Greek and Roman temples from an architectural point of view, but 
they also institutionalise a certain type of decorous behaviour. This is successfully reached by 
following some rules (‘dos and don’ts’), which delimit and define the liminality of the museum 
spaces (Duncan, 1995, 10): ‘The situation resembles in some respects certain medieval cathedrals 
where pilgrims followed a structured narrative route through the interior, stopping at prescribed 
points for prayer or contemplation.’ (Duncan, 1995, 12).  
It is from this perspective that the metaphorical function of the sacrifice, as attested in 
Pomian (2004), acquires its meaning. Indeed, sacrifice is meant as the offering to the invisible 
sphere of an object usually employed in the utility sphere. These objects are transformed into 
semiophores, or things without utility. However, they contain a meaning, therefore they represent 
the invisible (Pomian, 2007, 41). This is expressed more clearly in Pearce (1992, 45): ‘The objects are, 
in the language of the older anthropology, external souls: external because physically distinct and 
separate, but souls because meaning projected onto them brings into the interior of our personal 
lives’. Sacrifice happens in structured and protected places, where the sacrificed objects can be 
seen from a distance, e.g. temples, coffins and museums (Pomian, 2004, 10).  
If we insist on the transformative capacities that museums should exercise with regard to 
objects, Paine’s (2013) work is particularly telling. He is implicitly inspired by Kopytoff’s 
understanding of objects’ biographical phases in his comparison between the process of 
museification, the acquisition of an object by a museum, and that of sacralisation (Paine, 2013, 2). 
According to him, both processes entail a separation of the object from exchange and a 
consequential bestowal of uniqueness upon that object. It is not surprising, then, that Paine accords 
great importance to the curators’ power of choice over museum artefacts: curators, in Paine’s view, 
are considered as an exoteric clergy with an ‘arcane knowledge and an authority to control the 
access of lay people to the “sacred things” they control’ (Paine, 2013, 14). Museum artefacts should 
                                                          
96 ’The peculiar expansiveness of musaeum allowed it to cross and confuse philosophical categories such as 
bibliotheca, thesaurus, and pandechion with visual constructs such as studio, casino, cabinet, galleria, and 
theatrum’ (Findlen, 1994, 48). See also Findlen, 1989, 59. More specifically, Chevalier de Jaucourt in his entry 
to the Encyclopédie attested the derivation of musaeum from a Greek word which means ‘to explain the 
mysteries’ (Findlen, 1989, 60). 
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reflect curatorial approaches because of their decontextualisation, as ‘a museum robs them of their 
identity’ (Paine, 2013, 14). In such a schema, the objects are slaves of the curatorial practices, on the 
one hand, and of the visitors’ response, not necessarily influenced by the former, on the other 
(Paine, 2013, 24). Paine to an extent follows Guthrie’s (1993, 30) formulation of religion: religion 
must be considered as a form of commitment, not to something, as in Geertz’s work, but rather as 
the relationship itself. This relational approach finds supporters also in the field of 
phenomenological anthropology. For instance, Jackson (2005, 94), by referring to Winnicott’s 
theory of children’s obsessions, attempts to stress how intersubjectivity is ritualised in order to 
manage it. Things become, then, simulacra of emotions and intersubjective dynamics, in a way that 
children can control. 
The secular basis of museums as institutions seem to clash with the subjective dimensions of 
the visitor and of the curator (understood as a single actor and not as an ambassador of a cultural 
institution such as the museum). Their subjectivities can be conceived of as religious in some 
sense—especially in a sense which is drawn from Otto’s (1958 [1917]) and James’ (1925 [1902]) 
works on the idea of the holy and religious experience. Applying their perspectives is useful in 
illuminating some aspects of museum communication which would, otherwise, remain ascribed to 
the impalpable realm of feelings. I am referring in particular to Greenblatt’s (1991) notions of 
resonance and wonder, the two poles of the communicational strategy of the museum. According 
to Greenblatt, the resonance effect depends on evoking the ensemble of implicit relationships and 
problems, e.g. the representational practices, which have contributed to the realisation and the 
exhibition of the object observed (Greenblatt, 1991, 45), whereas a sense of wonder is obtained 
when focusing on the object to the exclusion of everything around it (Greenblatt, 1991, 49). 
Greenblatt extends the potentiality of wonder by adding its capacity to stimulate the desire to 
possess it while simultaneously forbidding that desire. This phenomenon should derive from the 
magical aura around the object, because of which even the donator cannot possess it (Greenblatt, 
1991, 51-52). 
Resonance and wonder, as well as Benjamin’s aura, resemble Otto’s notion of the holy, 
particularly an irrational, aprioristic feeling of terror and at the same time fascination, by which the 
relationship between humans and the supernatural is expressed (Otto, 1958 [1917], 8-11). However, 
Greenblatt’s reflections consider more the effects and the impact of museum objects on the visitors, 
rather than assuming the visitors’ agency. A sense of wonder or of resonance can be really effective 
only if the visitor agrees with the communicational strategies of the museum, otherwise the 
190 
enchanted vision described by Greenblatt may be replaced by indifference or, on the contrary, by 
an explicit attempt to touch or possess the objects. It is undeniable that the exhibited objects are 
displayed with the purpose of provoking resonance and aura, but the visitors’ reception is needed 
to for these effects to be achieved.  
As previously mentioned, James’ provision can assist us in developing an understanding of 
what happens between museum actors and objects. Let me begin by quoting a definitional passage 
from James: ‘Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine’ (James, 1925 [1902], 31). First of all, by 
substituting religion with museum experience and the divine with the exhibited object which 
inspires aura, wonder and resonance, the singular experience must be brought to attention. Their 
subjective experience is the reason why museum actors might or might not realise a relation with 
an aural object. James suggests here a double mechanism: experience is the instrument to be aware 
of the sacred/aura, and it is a tool for defining a subjective idea of what it is the sacred/aura. 
Clearing this first and fundamental step, nature of the relation between the museum actor and 
what she considers an aural object varies accordingly. Otto understood the relation between 
human beings and the holy in three distinct phases: the element of terror, the feeling of inferiority, 
and that of the ‘wholly other’ (Otto, 1958 [1917], 12-30). I do not focus my attention on the 
evolutionary project of Otto, who tried also to explain according to a positivist attitude the birth of 
the so-called rational religions from the development of the so-called primitive ones. What I am 
concerned with is how objects provoke kaleidoscopic, at times discordant and opposite emotions, 
and this set of feelings can vary following the ideas of museum and exhibited objects, which the 
actor formulates by her subjective experience. 
If this array of phenomena, joining the religious sphere with the museum spaces, is present 
in unspecified types of museums, it acts undoubtedly much more strongly in the case of museums 
of religious objects. In this instance, visitors or, as Davis (1997, 8) would phrase it, ‘communities of 
response’ approach religious objects with two opposite views. On the one hand, some visitors, 
especially if they are Western, do not empathize with the idea that the seen things can be holy 
(Paine, 2013, 8). This attitude is sometimes exacerbated by the alteration of the religious tenor of 
the objects, made by museum curators in order to preserve them as documents of cultural concepts 
or past eras (Branham, 1994/1995, 33). On the other hand, visitors can react to museum 
representations, whether or not they are believers, and this causes varying degrees of conflict. In a 
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nutshell, ‘Whenever museums attempt to recreate ritual context for sacred objects, they run the 
risk of encouraging insiders to perform the ritual (or at least aspects of it). The context also 
empowers outsiders to react’ (Hughes & Wood, 2009, 32). For instance, Viswanathan’s mother, 
having just arrived in the USA as an immigrant from India, touched a bull statue connected with 
the worship of Shiva on display in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA) (Hughes & 
Wood, 2009, 32-36).97 Another telling example is recounted by the anthropologist Irna Qureishi 
(Paine, 2013, 32-33). While taking a group of Muslim women to an exhibition of Islamic art in 
Sheffield, she observed that they wanted to make the usual ablutions and remove their shoes, 
before entering the space, making no distinction between galleries and the mosque. According to 
Paine (2013, 32-33), the reason for that must be the lack of a museum education in this particular 
kind of believers. However, in my opinion, what is important to stress is that the contemporary, 
ritualistic and transformative attitude of the visitors clashes directly with the preservation and 
static immobilisation of the exhibited objects realised by museum curators, as Palumbo (2002) 
noted in the context of Italian Catholic religious patrimony. More clearly, despite the recognition 
by most of museums of the importance of the relationality established between religious objects 
and visitors within museum galleries, that ‘sympathy’ (Paine, 2013, 11) is not fully extended to the 
permanent collections. In addition, Paine (2013, 37, 42) views this empathy as specifically 
circumscribed to the policies of engagement with minority groups and to the extent of illustrating 
religious practices to the visitors, even though driven by the subtle reason of not activating the life 
forces of the objects.98 
As Arthur (2000, 7) points out in his reference to Otto’s idea of the holy, what is overlooked 
by Latour’s Moderns is the irrational dimension of religion, with the final result of rendering it an 
artificial and intellectual entity. In Freedberg’s (1989, 371) view, the repression and censorship in 
the art field is historically linked to the need to separate the ‘unearthly’ from the ‘everyday’ and 
the subsequent tension which has risen from this boundary, which is clear in the case of the 
perturbation aroused by representations of the naked female body. The consequence of this 
                                                          
97 The translation, from the Latin translatio, ‘the transferring of a saint’s relics from one place to another’ 
(Hughes & Wood, 2009, 36), operated by museum curators is not found convincing by the so-called insiders. 
98 However, there are exceptions to the rule, as in the case of the Cambridge University Museum of 
Archaeology and Anthropology: ‘The museum invited a practicing Pa-chyu shaman of the Gurung 
community in central Nepal, Yarjung Kromchhain Tamu, to put together a collection of shamanistic material 
for the museum’s collections. He was then asked to carry out a purificatory ritual by which the special box 
destined to hold the collection was transformed into a sacred space, and to organize a display. The 
collection, which included ritual costume, a drum, and empowered shells and bones, was chosen entirely by 
the shaman, who laid down the rules for their future care and display’ (Paine, 2013, 43-44). 
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modern approach to religion is that curators do not investigate religion in its transcendental 
characteristics as it cannot be an object of scientific interest (Arthur, 2000, 9), by following a 
simplification worthy of Latour’s notion of purification. In this process, there is a mutual desire felt 
by religious and museum spaces of tracing a clear demarcation between what should be museum 
and what should be worship (for instance, the sign ‘THIS IS NOT A MUSEUM’ in Cologne 
Cathedral). This differentiation does not represent the real usage of the spaces, often characterised 
by the merging of scientific and emotional reactions (Arthur, 2000, 11). An analysis of responses 
must count, then, this phenomenological slippage (Arthur, 2000, 12). In addition, the concept of 
religion is a relatively recent idea grounded in the West, which does not necessarily reflect 
indigenous and popular experiences (Arthur, 2000, 19). In contrast, Paine (2013, 37) argues that 
many worship spaces imitate museums as a way to encourage devotion. As it will be clear in the 
following section, museum and temple spaces, far from being opposite poles where the profane 
and the sacred are respectively located, are experienced as blurred zones, in which the ordinary 
and the nonordinary are interwoven together or overlap with each other. Religious objects within 
museum galleries offer resistance, then, to the Moderns’ work of purification of the nonhuman by 
expressing an agency which slips from Gell’s paradigm. 
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The sentence ‘it is not the object which explains religion, it is the context behind the object’, 
often repeated by all participants in my research, despite their diverse backgrounds, suggests a 
commonality of approach towards showing religious objects in museum cabinets. The ‘museum 
effect’ (Alpers, 1991) is perceived as a cleansing away the ‘original’ context, which is violently 
separated from the object, which, in turn, is impoverished of its expressive properties, would they 
be sacred, supernatural or just related to the usage. In this respect, a curator used the strong and, at 
the same time, evocative adjectival gerund ‘dying’.  
For me a religious object is dying as it comes to the storage, because it is not part of the 
performance anymore and I think the sacredness is touched in so far as the dealing with the 
object is necessarily part of being sacred, of seen as a sacred object. If we do not do that, I am 
not sure if the sacredness survives when it is in the storage. Every sacred object needs a special 
handling, offering regularly and we do not do that, for example and so the sacredness might 
diminish step by step by step, but in my eyes the objects are dying step by step, because they 
are not able to speak any more, they are not able to touch somebody anymore and I think it is a 
poor effect of musealisation. 
In the case of Indian religious or ritual objects, according to the participants the godly 
presence in the object can be effective only in the event of a ritual activation, specifically the 
invocation to the deity to move into the object. This fundamental principle is critical in the 
museum context because not only are there no practical means and premises to invite the deity to 
preside in the artefact, but the museum also is supposed to be a place of scientific research and 
knowledge. While the temple, according to one of the participants, does not have the facilities to 
conserve heritage pieces, such as the scrolls kept by museums, museums do not permit the form of 
emotional attachment which can be experienced in a temple.  
We are not able to observe the pūjā or something like that, it is theoretical and it is not in a 
practical way. I would suggest to people to go to one of the Hindu temples […] to see what 
darśan means and to get involved in this process, I think, it is easier to understand than in a 
museum context. 
In addition, museums can make people aware of the cultural and artistic traditions which 
have produced the exhibited objects in a more substantial way than do temples. More clearly, the 
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everyday qualities embedded in the objects prevent the local agents from viewing the former in 
their contextual specificity. Furthermore, the participants often noticed the ambiguous position of 
the temple, which is received not only as a cultic place, but also as a depository of objects with an 
aesthetic value. According to these participants, a beautiful statue of Buddha, for instance, is 
appreciated both for its aesthetic and religious properties, whereas the same statue put in a 
museum environment becomes just an aesthetic piece of work. Some of the participants have made 
a comparison with their religious background. For example, a scholar said that the sign of the cross 
is made in a church, not in a museum. The following excerpt shows these insights with vividness: 
Of course, there is a contradiction. You visit a church, there are beautiful art works, and 
then it is also a museum. Here everything is homogeneous, coherent and organic: the artwork, 
the sacredness, the place constitutes a unicum. It is clear that these art works are hung 
somewhere, are moved from their context, the religious meaning is lost, it is not so strong as in 
a church or in a monastery. […] Let us take as an example a saint. You enter in a church and 
you see a painting of this saint. Inside that context, you admire the beauty of the painting, but 
you also interrogate yourself about the functions and meanings of the saint depicted, you 
contextualise this figure. Decontextualise this saint and put her in a museum. In my opinion, 
people would say firstly if she is awful or beautiful, then they would wonder about her 
meaning. […] Imagine visiting a temple in the south of India, where there are the bronzes of the 
exhibition. During the moment of the pūjā, when the Brahmin and the statue are all dressed, the 
former takes a spoon with some water and puts it on the mouth of the latter, takes a piece of 
Prasad and puts it on Shiva’s mouth, does the abhisheka [pouring milk, yogurt, rosewater, etc. on 
the statue] surrounded by oil lamps and rows of women and men watching and waiting for the 
Prasad, etc., we have a context! If that statue is decontextualized, put in a museum, is no longer 
the god’s incarnation, it is an art object. That is it. 
Despite the negation of any sacred quality of museums, a few participants acknowledged the 
blurred boundaries between temple and museum spaces by narrating their experience in Asian 
situations: 
That is also a paradox, because the statue is really the deity’s residence when two 
operations are realised, first the opening of the eyes, which is a symbolic action, and the prāṇa, 
the vital breath. The statue in that moment is the avatar, the deity’s descent, because there has 
been a ritual operation. The statues need a reconsecration, the bigger ones every twelve years. 
Theoretically, once the statue is taken out from the temple, it is no longer a sacred object. This is 
a paradox, because I noticed in a big museum in Cambodia, the museum of Phnom Penh, small 
altars in front of the statues and the people bow, prostrate themselves. These situations are 
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blurred, and it is this fluidity which allows different usages. 
Interestingly, one of the few visitors whom I had the chance to interview reached the same 
conclusions as the curators in respect of the theme of the ambiguous interrelations between 
temples and museums, as well as the shifting categories, e.g. sacred, not sacred, etc., used by the 
viewer in interacting with religious objects: 
To understand the whole you have to be born, but for me it represents religions art, not 
art in… in general. For me it is how like I go to an old church here and I see the painting on the 
wall for our religion. For me it is the same. Only I know some image what is art, at other I do 
not know, I should be grown in India to understand, to know more about the religion there for 
understand… I see the religion sense. […] I do not think that the museum could become a 
religious place, but I remember another exhibition was here from Bhutan, and now with these 
series of architecture of temple, I saw you can feel a little bit for what it is used or what it was 
used. I saw because when the other exhibition was, also, they had made a small temple in it and 
so it is not only looking to a wall with an image, they find a good thing, but it is kind like going 
to a church. 
In the case of ethnographic or university museums, there is, however, a different sensitivity 
towards the implicit religious potentialities of museums. A curator, for instance, talked about a 
‘feeling of veneration’ in visiting a museum, in staying in front of a cabinet and staring at it. 
Therefore, a parallel between rituals and museums can be drawn. Museums, at the same time, 
should engender feelings for visitors, from laughing to crying, as in the case of ritual situations. 
Some view, then, the ritual operation as a subjective and personal belief:  
The sacredness is something you give to the object and if you are gone, the object does 
not remain sacred. You have to have people who donate, who accord this sacredness to the 
object. If you do not… I mean, if you say [bringing a cup of coffee and places it at the centre of 
the table with strength] ‘this is a sacred object’ and you worship it, for me [turning up and 
down the cup with strength] it is just a dirty coffee pot, you know? So it depends on the 
perspective. If you find two thousand people who follow your opinion and worshipping this 
holy object and you convince them to do this, you convince me I believe ‘OK, this is a holy 
object’, I join you, convince me, but this is a negotiation which is established and it has to do 
with power and hierarchies, and norms, and rules, and things, but otherwise, I mean, if I do not 
believe in God, a church is not a sacred space for me. You know? It is the convention of some 
people, but this is not sacredness such as not existent as you do not believe in it.  
Following this assumption, it does not matter which type of space is considered as sacred. 
On the contrary, the sacredness of a space or of an object depends on the subject’s decision, as one 
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visitor told me. 
Any place can be a religious space, it depends on what is going on inside of you… 
Something transcendentally, you mean… Look… Even worship in the tram or on the train, or 
even when driving, you can make a temple inside of you. 
In fact, another important and common point between the participants is the importance 
given to visitors’ perceptions and ideas about the artefacts. Museum curators must give the 
context, while visitors might interpret it as they wish. In a curator’ sentence: ‘I suppose what we do 
is creating the space where different forms of engagement are possible not to be prescriptive’. 
Consequently, museums are not static entities, but rather changing realities, depending on the 
different forms of relationships activated by visitors. 
I think museums are much more polyvalent spaces than curators would like to think and, 
certainly, the government founders would like to think. […] So, this museum, for example, […] 
is also a ritual site, it is also a library, it is a party venue, it is a place where people to hang out 
and have meetings, it is place to learn, it is a place to get out of the rain, in the same way, I 
suppose, other spaces, for example the cathedral, might be. I think the diversity of forms of 
engagement within the space is interactions with objects, particularly in a museum like this one. 
I think what gives it a distinctive flavour, what is important is the immediacy of engagement 
between people and things, that is, I think, ritual-like, then fair enough. I think, certainly, it 
comes back to one of the most important points that […] curators want to set up in a museum or 
a gallery, it is not curators that can of course experience or interpret of that gallery, it is the 
visitors and they make the museum what the museum is. 
The important role of visitor’s interpretation in the understanding of museum spaces as 
religious ones can be clearly understood through one example taken from my fieldwork 
experience. I visited a temporary exhibition of the Kulttuurien museo made in collaboration with the 
University of Helsinki on the Finnish linguist Castrén’s (1813-1852) studies of Siberian 
populations. The day after my visit, I had a brief discussion with the organiser of the exhibition. 
She told me that the choice of the mannequins, which were not kept in cabinets, aimed to evoke 
the market places where Castrén met Siberian populations and took some photos. I explained to 
her that I thought that this technique was used in order to evoke the past and a sense of nostalgia 
and Castrén’s projection on their preservation as endangered communities. She reacted by saying 
that these were my interpretations and, as visitors’ interpretations, they were acceptable. The 
interpretative work must be done by the visitor. Thus, if the museum transmits some sacredness, 
this is because of the visitor’s personal perceptions. 
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The importance attributed to the public is especially true in the museums which are working 
closely with local communities, either because of curators’ initiative, or because of the tasks 
requested by the museums’ founders. The dialogue with local communities leads to surprising 
results, such as the fact that the South-Asian community wanted to show, in one museum, the 
contribution of India, in particular, and South Asia, in general, to the field of technology, viewing 
the Western appreciation of South Asian culture in religious terms as stereotypical. In the case of 
the Japanese community based in the area of the same museum, families usually bring their 
children, born in England and never having been to Japan, into the museum in order to show them 
their customs. Furthermore, working with local communities stimulates a critical analysis of 
museum practices, for example when the removal of the context from the object impacts on the 
ways local communities react towards museum operations. A curator referred to a talk with the 
Sikh community, as the museum has a Sikh shrine. Since the book, which is part of the shrine, is 
considered a living entity, the curator did not feel comfortable displaying it in a cabinet, as it 
would not be a culturally sensitive operation. As museums can be considered multi-faith spaces, 
the communities are concerned about the way objects are exhibited in spatial terms. This 
constitutes a matter of urgency when museums have exhibitions about religions, and so they pay 
extreme care to visitors’ religious sensitivity. It is interesting to note, in the excerpt below, that the 
curator adopts a classificatory perspective for representing each religion, by putting each religion 
in comparison around specific themes. It is not a surprise, then, that in this holistic approach to 
religion, atheism is exhibited as a particular type of religion: 
Of course a museum is more about science and not about, let us say, for religion, but for 
me I think it would be interesting to merge things a little bit, but, of course, we must be very 
careful and this is also a sensitive question. […] we are going to mix items from different 
religions and put them in the exhibition in a thematic way, so we can have, for example, 
rosaries from different religions and we are putting them together. […] this is also the kind of 
politics we have chosen to show that religions share things, they are not just separate things, of 
course, they are separate but also share things. […] There are two rooms which are displaying 
the Christian history in Finland and some visitors have been complaining about that […] 
sometimes when school children and kindergarten groups are coming to workshops, some 
families, they are not many, but I remember some cases of kids’ Christian families wanted to 
know in advance that, for example, Hinduism, it is not taught to our child, so when we had an 
exhibition about a particular village in Rajasthan […] and we had workshop, storytelling 
workshops with kindergarten groups about Krishna, the story of Krishna, then there were few 
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parents very concerned that not anything about Hindu gods, they did not want anything about 
Hindu gods being told to their children. […] These are faithful Christian cases, I think, that 
every other religion is conceived as pagan for them, so for them it was a kind of sin or bad thing 
to call a Hindu god with the name god, because they do not consider Krishna as god. […] Well, 
religion-as-such is very difficult to define. For example, Buddhism, there is no God, basically, it 
is an atheistic doctrine, but, of course, how people practise it is a very religious way or 
religious-like activity, but if there is a god and the religion is atheistic it has to do with, it has a 
meaning and some atheistic trends, they act like in a religious way, so it is not going to be 
things in the exhibition, but it has to be mentioned, because it is a thing it can be compared to 
more religious religions and many atheistic groups, shall I say, they are so much against 
religions that their all activity resembles a religion, so we give the audience to the idea of 
comparing these things. 
Even when museums are considered multi-faith spaces for the visitors, they are always 
conceived by participants as an abstraction from reality. Therefore, the museum cannot substitute 
the immediate comprehension of a ritual operation such as that of the pūjā or of an aesthetic, 
religious and philosophical concept such as that of the darśan. Instead, museum curators make 
deliberate efforts in giving a sense of the context by using pictures, documentaries, and sounds, 
which are evocative of that peculiar context, together with guided tours, and conferences directed 
to the audience who is not familiar with these ritual phenomena. Sometimes, the distinction 
between museum and temple is transgressed by events of ‘ritual theatre’, as defined by one curator 
in Zürich during the interview. These events are so defined by the curator when a religious 
specialist is asked to perform a ritual by using the artefacts. I would extend the case to local 
communities which, enthusiastic about an exhibition on their religion, bring prayer books with 
them to the museum—as happened in Helsinki with an exhibition on Islam—or, conversely, 
manifest a kind of shyness towards the objects exhibited. The importance of the ‘context’ is once 
again stressed by museum curators, since local communities have the cultural coordinates to insert 
the artefact into their lives, while for the Western visitors what they see is just an art work. 
The role attributed to the original context is particularly explicit when curators recreate 
religious spaces within the galleries. This is exemplified by the Buddhist temple in Penn Museum, 
the Buddhist altar in the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University of Cambridge, 
the Tibetan protective chapel in the World Museum in Liverpool and the Hindu shrines in the 





5.4.2 The Buddhist temple in Penn Museum 
 
The press, invited in 1899 to see Sommerville’s temple, were divided between feelings of wonder 
and of discomfort or confusion (Winegrad, 1993, 69). The objects of Sommerville’s temple were 
acquired in 1895 but were catalogued much later, therefore curators have always found difficulties 
in identifying the items (Winegrad, 1993, 69). Sommerville’s goal was to present a pan-Oriental 
Buddhist temple in order to give an idea of a Buddhist place of worship, for teaching and 
educational purposes. However, ‘through its completeness, Mongolians and Buddhists generally 
will recognize a shrine where they may perform their accustomed acts of devotion’ (Sommerville, 
1904, 3), therefore Sommerville’s temple contains from its foundation a blurred slippage between 
museum and temple practices. Sommerville himself usually wore the dress of a Buddhist priest 
(Winegrad, 1993, 69), and the main photograph related to him and his temple shows him wearing 
these garments and holding some artefacts from the temple. In installing at the entrance temple 
guardians (Zuijin), there was the purpose of shaping a sacred niche: ‘They are presumed to be 
constantly proclaiming: “This is a place of prayer. Leave levity behind”’ (Sommerville, 1904, 5-6). 
His descriptive paper on the temple followed the author’s fuzzy logic. On the one hand, 
Sommerville’s paper reports ethnographic accounts such as the following: 
The Buddhist believes that when one dies the spirit or soul lingers about the dwelling of the family 
seven times seven days, and then on the forty-ninth day it is supposed to leave the house. On 
hearing this matter spoken of among some Japanese, the author heard the daughter of Yana, a young 
Japanese lady, say: “Yes, that is really so, for I remember it was the forty-ninth day when my 
mother’s spirit went out of the house; of course, it lingered for years in the neighbourhood, but we 
supplied a stone lantern which gave it light at night.” (Sommerville, 1904, 29). 
On the other hand, it is a museum guided tour, with very precise descriptions of the dislocation of 
the different artefacts, of their functional and religious meanings as well as the reasons for their 
specific placement within temple spaces. In this respect, Sommerville was very much concerned 
about the realism of his reconstruction, to the extent that he wrote: ’To be thoroughly realistic, 
there should be a number of sandals and shoes at the threshold, for all men entering a temple go in 
their stockinged feet’ (Sommerville, 1904, 5). Strictly interrelated with the effort to give a realistic 
picture of a Buddhist temple, there was also the intention to show the provenance of the artefacts 
as a way to declare their authenticity. 
The Uzumasa or Koryūji temple near Kyoto is said to have been founded A.D. 604 by Shotoku 
Taishi, who consecrated it to certain Buddhist images brought from Korea. Most of them were life-
201 
size. It will be observed that along the wainscoting large gilded Sotobas have been placed; these bear 
the names, in Japanese, of those who have contributed munificently to the erection of the University 
Museum Buildings. On the smaller Sotobas of bamboo and other woods are written the names of 
prominent or celebrated dead. These latter Sotobas also convey petitions to Shotoku Taishi on behalf 
of the departed souls. Pictures of saints, proclamations, and other documents are likewise framed 
and hang on or above the wainscoting. The frames are all of Asiatic cedar (Sommerville, 1904, 13). 
Despite the fact that in the paper’s introduction Sommerville generally referred to ‘many Eastern 
lands’ as the locations of his acquisitions, all the artefacts come from Japan. For instance, 
Sommerville listed the temples where he acquired towels, used for rinsing worshippers’ mouths, 
and painted votives, called emmas, and all them are Japanese temples (Sommerville, 1904, 24, 27). 
In contemporary minds, Sommerville’s thoroughness raises several issues about the legacy of the 
artefacts of his temple. 
Sommerville’s paper is, however, more than a museum guided tour or an ethnographic field note. 
It is palpable that the glyptologist had the need to provide the atmosphere felt by Buddhist 
worshippers and occasional pilgrims: 
Again your attention is called to the earnestness of these holy men during prayers. They become so 
absorbed that they seem not to be of the world of worshipers about them. One can observe an 
expression of exaltation on their countenances as they appear to come nearer and nearer to the loved 
deity whom they are imploring for help. At times a priest becomes so deeply engaged that he has to 
be called away to repose by the one who has arrived to replace him. It is a service that continues 
through several hours, to suit the convenience of many worshipers arriving at different times. 
(Sommerville, 1904, 20) 
 
5.4.3 The Buddhist altar in the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology 
 
In the temporary exhibition at the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University 
of Cambridge, the religious word was treated as a material object, and the exhibition tried to 
establish the ways in which Buddhist words are transmitted, received and worshipped. The 
materiality of books was stated from the beginning: ‘In this gallery we explore the book as an 
artefact, and its relationship to other works of art and technology in Tibet and throughout the 
Buddhist world’. In terms of an interactive relationship with the visitor, the organisation of the 
exhibit coincided with a foundation of a ‘Cambridge Altar’. This altar followed Buddhist 
assemblage of cultic objects by using artefacts of the permanent collection of the museum, 
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characterised by the sum of several college cabinets of curiosities, as well as ethnographic 
specimens collected by students and scholars of the University of Cambridge. 
Scriptures are often placed on altars (choshom) next to images of deities and spiritual 
masters, stupas, special stones, or anything that has a particular blessing. The resulting 
assemblage of artefacts is referred to as kusungthugten (supports for body, speech and mind). In 
bringing together the three aspects of Buddha’s legacy, it is considered the most important part 
of a shrine. Altars can be installed in homes or temples, and are increasingly common in 
galleries of Tibetan art in the West. Those in houses and temples often follow a technique of 
bricolage assembling objects that are readily available, or appropriate, or have particular 
associations. Many arrangements are possible if a few essential elements are present, guidelines 
of spatial organization are followed, and religious affiliation respected. Each assemblage is 
appropriate to its setting and its users. This altar draws together pieces from the Museum’s 
collection, following the advice of Tibetan colleagues and friends. 
The presence of a sacred text stored over the entrance blessed those entering the exhibition, 
as could be read from the labels:  
The current Samding Dorje Phagimo blessing a devotee with a sacred text. Books can also 
convey blessing on those who pass under them, and are often stored over the entrance to a 
shrine so that those who enter may be blessed. You passed under a sacred book as you entered 
this gallery.  
There was an emphatic and scenic effect, as the shrine was exalted and framed by huge 
curtains at the entrance. The exhibition traced the ways in which words transform themselves and 
interact with different contexts, hence the headings into which the exhibit was organised: words 
on the body (amulets, charm cases, reliquaries); words in books; words in motion (e.g. ‘the prayer 
wheels’ or manikhorlo); presence in the landscape (words written on flags, for instance, or legends 
and biographies, ‘biogeographies’ related to famous bodhisattvas); technologies of consecration. The 
exhibition also traced the history of the spread of Buddhist words and texts from India and then 
throughout Asia, and how the previous scholars and curators in Cambridge acquired the books 
displayed. In addition, the exhibition explored books not made for reading (objects of veneration 
and worship); books as luxuries and objects of worship; and book covers, which have become 
separated from their books and regarded as art objects in art galleries and homes’ collectors. 
The materiality of the objects was strengthened by the fact that the labels were situated 
under the shelves, so that the visitor could contemplate the objects before reading the related 
information. Furthermore, space was dedicated to the production of the books and to their 
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digitalisation in contemporary times. 
A young monk uses his mobile phone to take a digital photograph of a page from a 
sacred text, digitised and presented to the monastery from the collection of the British Library 
 
5.4.4 The Tibetan protective chapel of the World Museum 
 
The tone of the exhibition in the Asian section of the World Museum, which we have already 
seen to be characterised by a clear commitment to material culture studies, changes in the Tibetan 
section. Not only is the room surrounded on all sides by amulets, but the internal space of the 
room is also filled on one side by thangkas and on the other side by a reconstruction of a temple, 
more specifically a Gon-Khang or a protective chapel. Each object is inside cabinets, a fact which 
makes the interaction with the temple indirect. Nevertheless, the use of light and dark together 
with sound seems to demarcate a sacred area. The political and commercial ties which explain the 
presence of the artefacts in the exhibition are still described, but they are written at the exit of the 
room. Thus, the special feeling in the principal room is not mitigated; it seems likely that visitors 
might focus more on the labels explaining the ritual functions of the objects and the general 
introductions to the Buddhist religion, rather than the political alliances built during the colonial 
period. The objects were acquired during the Younghusband Expedition (1903-1904) led by Francis 
Younghusband in order to secure British interests in the region. This is confirmed, surprisingly, by 
a quotation of a letter from the Dalai Lama.99 
I understand that many of the objects in the collection were acquired by British Political 
Officers in the course of their duty in Tibet, many of whom showed great sympathy and 
friendship with my people. 
Letter from His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama to Liverpool Museum, 1997 
 
  
                                                          
99 For further information related to the Tibetan collection of the museum see Moore, 2001. 
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5.4.5 The reconstructions of Hindu shrines in the Oriental Museum 
 
In the case of the Oriental Museum, the reconstruction of Hindu shrines was reinforced by 
several tools. The floor was painted with wax kolams (floor decorations) by the museum staff, and 
the children’s activities on this floor were centred on the reconstruction of their patterns. On the 
corner was a reconstruction of a Hindu tree shrine made by a Middlesbrough-based artist. In 
addition, a touch-screen revealed videos taken by the Department of Music of the university 
centred on Hindu religious songs, music and chants. The shrines were situated along one side of 
the exhibition in order to make space for the shrine dedicated to Lakshmi. While the South Asian 
community in the North-East is quite small, the diversity provided by the University and the 
presence of the community made the museum decide to dedicate more space to South-Asia with 
public events, such as the celebration of Diwali. In this case, pūjā towards Lakshmi’s shrine was 
performed and storytelling about the Ramayana was provided for children, as well as space for 
adults to raise questions about Diwali. 
Along with the Lakshmi shrine, there was a small section dedicated to Mughals and another 
on the Indian religion, where each object defined a religion. The other shrines in the exhibition 
were dedicated to Vishnu, to Shiva and Parvati, to Ardhanarishvara, or the composition of Shiva and 
Parvati, to Ganeś, to Santoshi-Maa and to Kali. Separately, there was a palanquin for processional 
images. These shrines and the palanquin were donated by the New Walk Museum in Leicester, 
which hosted an exhibition on the daily rituals of Hindus, Jains and Sikhs based on the fieldwork 
of an American cultural anthropologist, Stephen P. Huyler. The exhibition had shown several 
photos and three videos realised by Huyler, together with a video from the Smithsonian Institution 
and twelve recreated Hindu, Jain and Sikh shrines, intended to be touched by visitors and to 
establish an interactive engagement with them: ‘Feel free to open the doors and please close them 
when you are finished’. They were made in India but they were not consecrated.100 This operation 
meant a realisation of desacralised objects for museum purposes, as in the case of the Museum der 
Kulturen. 
The Oriental Museum emphasised the interactive function of the shrines exhibited. 
Nevertheless, I was able, during fieldwork, to observe a mother warning one of her daughters 
                                                          
100 By looking at the manuscript of the exhibition (Meeting God: Elements of Devotion in India, New Walk 
Museum, Leicester, East Midlands, UK, 27 April to 18 August 2002), it was interesting to note that the shrines 
sometimes presented a collage of different sources, such as representations of deities taken from comic books 
such as Amar Chitra Katha (see chapter 3, section 3.2.3).  
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against touching the Lakshmi’s shrine, by saying that it was a sacred shrine devoted to a Hindu 
goddess. I found myself in a tricky position too. Even though I correctly perceived that the shrines 
were supposed to be touched, since, for instance, the deities’ images inside all the shrines, except 
that of Lakshmi, were photos and the labels were put at the shrines’ level, thus suggesting that the 
visitor kneel in order to read them properly, I did not know how to behave. I did not see any label 
or panel stating this permission. It was only after having talked with the curator that I opened and 
touched the shrines on my own. I experienced another ambiguous situation while observing a pile 
of ceramic faces without any label among MacDonald’s and Hardinge’s collections, as it was not 
clear if they were supposed to be touched or not. Interestingly, in the case of the exhibit at the 
Oriental Museum in Durham, the shrines have been put together with the aim of being touched and 
to create a very direct and interactive relationship with visitors. The curator told me that the 
installation with the ceramic heads was realised by an artist as an experiment, particularly to 
observe if visitors decide whether or not to touch the faces. Of course, there is a museum 
education, well rooted in Western minds, not to touch artefacts, which is so strong that even I, with 
a certain sensitivity derived from my acquaintance with museum studies, was prevented from 
handling the porcelain faces. It is also true, however, that the museum did not highlight the 
peculiar situation, particularly the breaking of one of the museum rules. Although people would 
probably be able ‘navigate which is which’ (from the interview with the curator), this would still 
only be on the premises of the guidance of the so-called museum authority. 
The curator told me that the acquisition of the shrine was a good achievement for the 
museum, as its historical Indian collection mainly consists of weaponry from the colonial period, 
thus rendering difficult its use in the exhibition, due to the contemporary and community-focused 
approach of the museum. Another reason for the curator’s satisfaction with the shrines was related 
to their educational properties. Their description led to the explanation of central concepts in 
Hindu religion and aesthetic philosophy, among them darśan and Śakti. At the same time, the 
shrine was able to highlight contemporary religious practices, as in the case of the shrine dedicated 
to Santoshi-Maa: 
Santoshi-Maa is the mother of contentment, and relatively recent Hindu female divinity. 
She emerged as a deity during late 1950s and early 1960s, and is particularly worshipped by 
women in North India.  
In the early 1960s, Santoshi Maa became popular when she was a star of a Hindi-
language film, Jai Santoshi Maa. With the spectacular success of the film, Santoshi Maa became a 
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major religious figure practically overnight. Today she is thoroughly integrated into the 
pantheon of Hindu deities. 
It has been believed that fasting and praying for her for 16 consecutive Fridays brings 
peace and prosperity in one’s family. The devotees are expected to offer her with flowers, 
incense and a bowl of raw sugar and roasted chickpeas. It has been suggested that these 
inexpensive requirements associated with the worship of Santoshi Maa made her popular with 
devotees throughout India. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Reconstructed shrines are at the confluence between visual means of education about a ritual 
practice and a way of attracting communities of believers. Thus, various forms of worship can be 
observed. In the case of Penn Museum, which alludes in a very explicit way to temple spaces 
because of its Rotunda, some people have requested professional photos of the items on display, 
because the objects stimulated a sort of religious feeling in them. A more silent and not clearly 
attestable form of worship has occurred within museum galleries, particularly deposits of coins, 
offerings of food and occasional touching of some statues of deities, as is attested in two excerpts 
from interviews.  
[…] there is a figure, a Buddha seated […] from Burma and that was placed in one corner 
of the gallery and, certainly, there are regularly deposits of coins and other things which are 
found in the Buddhist appraise alms. We know that those are being touched, occasionally.  
[…] we have the Ganeśa statue in our exhibition and I do not know how it started and 
who started it, but there were more and more offerings to that statue and people were giving 
sweets and money. I observed even in Asian communities, Asian visitors, I was not sure how 
they started this practice, but the museum did not give it away, so we do not throw these things 
away. It happens and this is the way visitors deal with our exhibition. As long as they do not 
throw waste on the objects or things that we have put away because they are organic, they 
would become waste, but sometimes, yes, we have expected, it is what visitors see in the 
objects, O.K., but the museum is not a sacred space. We are very aware and we even want to be 
different space and different place, we do not to be an authentic surrounding of a sort of object, 
we are an abstract of reality. As you know what I mean, we do not want to be a natural 
surrounding of objects. What visitor come and see specialities in our objects and they offer 
something to them, it is O.K., it is very welcomed. 
The idea of offering scientific knowledge, rather than a religious blessing, is not touched by 
these forms of worship born around museum cabinets. As most of the curators intend museums to 
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be an interactive space, these behaviours are generally tolerated and respected. 
A curator expressed to me scepticism about the reconstructed altars, as they are, overall, 
artificial situations which overstress the religious aspect of the artefacts to the disadvantage of 
other important aspects related to the objects. This insight reminds us of the ambivalence of most 
of the curators towards the creation of a so-called authentic environment, a strategy adopted very 
frequently in the past in the evolutionary or encyclopaedic museums, which are reminiscent, to 
some extent, of Sommerville’s Buddhist Altar. 
The shrine is quite complicated for me to think about, because I do not think it is a very, it 
is a soulless shrine, […] there is no sense of practice in that shrine, there are no offerings, […] 
there are relocations there, it is evocative, […] but, actually, it is a very dry representation, I 
think, of a shrine and we have seen visitors using it as a meditative space, but we also have to 
remember that we are a museum, we are not a sacred space, even though we hold objects that 
were previously used in such a way. […] We also have to acknowledge that we are not a sacred 
space per se and the more we wish to show the context in which the objects have been used, the 
sacred context in this particular case, those objects […] have become museum objects, and the 
more we do not want to negate, rub out, scrub out that sacred past at all, and that is why we 
have created the shrine, those objects have also other stories to tell that we do scrub out in order 
to give the spiritual perception […], so, it is interesting for me to see that all the spaces in the 
gallery we have chosen to make […] a sacred space, when many of the objects had been given in 
diplomatic moments, they were very much part of the colonial encounter […] and […] who 
gave them, also, did not expect to see them as sacred objects, […] but we have chosen to recast 
them in a sacred light by putting them within that space.  
Another curator reached similar conclusions by following another route of thought. 
According to this curator, museums are constituted and shaped by the audience, more particularly 
by the relationship between the audience and the objects, therefore the urgency, from a curatorial 
point of view, to stimulate visitors’ engagement. According to this approach, museum objects must 
not be seen just as aesthetically fine works of art, but rather as something imbued by cultural and 
religious values. This determines, consequently, the ambivalent position of the curators, who 
usually construct altars and shrines for didactic and expositive aims without considering the level 
of sacredness stimulated by these actions. The sacred tones of museums are blurred and contested 
areas for the participants. On the one hand, religious reactions are welcomed if they come from 
museum visitors, who are considered the real actors within museum communication. On the other 
hand, museum curators are confused in handling religious objects: if they wish to bring as much of 
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‘the context’ as they can, in this case the religious context, so that temples and religious places 
become inspirational sources, it is also true that they run the risk of turning museums away from 
their institutional role as scientific and didactic tools, which makes them uncomfortable in doing 
experimental works with religious artefacts. 
The theorisation of museums as potentially sacred spaces is shaded by curators’ ambiguous 
perspectives, which reconcile religious places, by advocating the multimediality and didactic 
values of reconstructions of Hindu shrines, and at the same time perceive with suspicion any 
intromission of rituality, e.g. religious response of some visitors, within museum cabinets. 
Rituality is something which must be domesticated on the premise of educational process, the 
primary goal of a museum. Materiality cannot be accepted as such, but rather must be either 
elevated into an undisputed, stately and, then, disembodied beauty, or else not taken into account 
at all, except as a container, a covering of cultural features. In this disruptive process to which 
materiality is condemned, religious and sacred values follow a similar end. The material substance 
itself is what gives sacred aura to an artefact, e.g. the painting of eyes in Hindu religious 
manufacts. Consequently, religious objects represent an even harder challenge to curators than 
that usually entailed by museum objects in general, as materiality cannot be easily put apart. While 
deleting materiality in a day-to-day object would not imply the loss of indexicality expressed by 
the object itself according to the curatorial mind-set, stripping materiality from a religious object 
entails alienation. The religious contents cannot be easily understood by relying only on labels, 
and moreover the religious artefact per se becomes a vacuous object, thereby the even stronger 
aestheticisation of its plastic features, as seen in the previous chapter, otherwise its legitimacy to be 
exposed loses poignancy. The artificial reconstruction of the contexts of usage of religious objects 
denounces and, paradoxically, emphasises the problem posed by a Cartesian evaluation of 
materiality as superfluous phenomena. Fieldwork has demonstrated how much sacred and 
profane are fuzzy and often intertwined concepts, therefore the application of a Durkheimian 
opposition into museum context runs the risk of oversimplifying phenomena and relations 
reflected within gallery spaces. In fact, despite the tenacious conviction of curators that museum is 
a secular parlour, a cultural institution, museum fruition, on an implicit and unconscious level, 
reveals that secular and religious interact with each other more frequently than expected. This is 
easily observable in temple reconstructions, where the curatorial care in given an idea of an 
authentic environment for scientific purposes is often translated in mystical and worshipping 
reactions by visitors.  
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This chapter has argued that the uneasy role of religious objects’ materiality, or of materiality 
more generally, and the impracticality of studying the relations between museums and religious 
phenomena according to the binary paradigm sacred/profane show a conflictual conceptualisation 
of context and humanity. The nonhuman is understood by the Moderns as a projection of the 
human intellect and, thus, subjected to humans, without a will on its own. However, this is far 
from the truth: fieldwork data have shown the difficulties that curators have to face with the 
exhibited artefacts, which elicit unexpected reactions in the visitors. Materiality continues to 
possess an agency hardly reconducible to the notion of personhood: its enchanted power on 
humans is ungraspable via anthropocentric criteria. As has been repeated throughout this thesis, 
Moderns’ approach to materiality has determined scholarly conundrums, where reified intellectual 
categories cannot produce reality and, thus, reinforce the prejudice of the radical difference 
between and separation of mind and intellect. Gell’s theory, with the idea that mind is externalised 
in the distributed person, represents the apex of this contradiction: the nonhuman becomes a 
reified mentalization of the inner Self. The concluding chapter will restate the importance of 
phenomenology for the advancement of dynamic accounts by the social sciences without the 




The main argument of this thesis has been that the concept of materiality relies upon a fictive 
separation between the human and the nonhuman. If, on the one hand, this separation justifies 
human intervention and exploitation of the nonhuman, on the other hand, it does not correspond 
to the hybrid overlapping of the two realms. The symbiosis of material, animal, vegetal, 
superhuman and human elements has been problematised in non-Western religious philosophies 
and ontologies beyond the animation of the material, which is consequential to the Indian theory 
of darśan. A good example of this is offered by Japanese Buddhist doctrines (Rambelli, 2001), 
where the investigation of the permeation of the divine, Buddha’s element in the environment, is 
understood as the sum of the animate with the inanimate, brings to develop ‘a sophisticated 
philosophy of objects’ (Rambelli, 2001, 1). 
The thesis began, in the first chapter, by presenting a theoretical framework of the main 
argumentation, particularly the suggestion of a deconstruction of the idea of materiality in 
analysing contexts, such as that of the darśan, where the material artefacts shape human practices, 
by adopting a phenomenological perspective. That chapter has argued that materiality represents 
a challenge to human intellect, as it does not express itself by the same means of those of human 
being, such as language. The constitution of the concepts of personhood, human and subject has 
risen from this fundamental alterity of materiality respect to the human. Particularly, Merleau-
Ponty’s debate on nature has shown that the opposition between a rational mind and an inert and 
irrational body has historically informed Western ontology.  
This is particularly clear in the anthropological debate on animism, or the belief that 
nonhuman actors possess an inner life or soul. This belief implies, thus, a substantial 
destabilisation of the borders between categories such as subject and object. The persistence with 
which anthropologists consider animism and other practices, according to which materiality is not 
a passive instrument of human goals, as an epistemological tool, running parallel to that of the 
modern scientific method, reflects a Cartesian mind-set, which puts human intellect as the 
parameter of judgement of reality, in other words humanism. What emerges from the scholarly 
understanding of materiality is the idea that it is dependent upon humans: Appadurai and 
Kopytoff’s notion of the biography of things, Miller’s idea of the humility of objects, Paine’s 
description of the curatorial practices reflect the basic assumption that the nonhuman is ancillary 
to the human. The result is that: 
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What we thus get is not a democracy of objects […], but instead a monarchy of the human 
in relation to all other beings where some instance of the human is treated as that which 
overdetermines all other beings and where the primary order of the day is always to determine 
how individual minds relate to other objects or how the social and cultural relates to being 
(Bryant, 2011, 39-40). 
Even in Gell’s work, where materiality is imbued with agency and capable of establishing 
engaging relationships with human actors on its own, the last word is always given to the human. 
To return to the metaphor of the children’s play with dolls, the animation of toys is possible 
because children decide to believe in dolls’ animation. On the one hand, the idea of the distributed 
person testifies human need to project the human Self onto the nonhuman Other in order to make 
sense of the relationship established. On the other hand, this idea continues to consider materiality 
as dependent from human, without a real discussion of the humanist paradigm. Phenomenology, 
by starting from the assumption that knowledge of the Other is informed by the specific perceiving 
of a particular body knotted in space and time, abandons the dicothomy subject/object in favour of 
a fusion between the perceiver and the perceiving. This is particularly clear in the act of seeing, 
where the seer’s internal sensations reflect the thing seen and viceversa. Furthermore, I have 
claimed that post-humanist studies and multispecies ethnography, by focusing on the 
relationships between different actors instead of formulating a hierarchical ontology, can enrich 
and strengthen the phenomenological symbiosis between subject and object, by problematising the 
distinction between the two roles of a passive recipient and an active subject. Phenomenology, 
post-humanist studies and multispecies ethnography complete Gell’s intuition of the human need 
to project human characteristics onto the nonhuman, by explaining the mechanisms and the 
reasons behind that process. 
The second chapter focused on a consequence of the humanist paradigm previously 
examined in the first chapter, particularly the methodology adopted by social sciences in their 
research. Instead of considering a particular social phenomenon as a never-ending process of 
dialogue and interaction between different types of embodiments—those of the researchers and 
those of the participants–social sciences have often decontextualised social realities as self-evident 
facts. Therefore, ethnographic accounts reproduce the Cartesian divide between subject and object 
by creating ontologies, which, as in the case of Durkheim’s categories of the sacred and of the 
profane, reduce empirical data to a single aspect of the phenomenon observed. Phenomenology, 
then, in the rare cases in which has been adopted by social scientists, becomes a mere practicality, 
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without being cognizant of the fact that phenomenological dynamics are always implicit in 
research, specifically in the spatially and temporally situated encounter between the I and the 
Other. In addition, without a clear acknowledgment of the role of phenomenology in social 
research, the dynamics by which researchers reify social phenomena have been neglected. The 
chapter has applied this reflection to my personal approach in conducting research, from the 
organising of the interviews with facing ethical issues. Phenomenology is at the centre of my 
research: my body is the instrument through which verifies how curators have elaborated religious 
concepts such as that of darśan in the exhibitive spaces. 
The third chapter developed the reflections expressed in the first two chapters by analysing 
the phenomenon of darśan and its application to the cases of the pats and paṛs, as well as by 
comparing it to other religious phenomena closer to Western culture, such as Orthodox icons. 
Darśan allows an extreme flexibility and adaptability of religious contents to several contexts, as 
seen in the discussion of the ACK (section 3.2.3), where ritual contact with the divine has occurred 
via Indian mass media and, thus, has experienced a democratisation of its usages. The religious 
phenomenologies of the act of seeing with their characteristic enchanted connection between what 
is present, the visible, and what is absent, the invisible, destabilise what Latour (1993, 14) has 
called ‘the work of purification’, particularly the distinguishing between self-evident facts, or the 
scholarly theories which, in this way, are reified as ontological entities, and everything which 
cannot be explained by theoretical means, what is negatively labelled as fetish or idolatrous. 
Looking-at is the means of the physical coming into contact with the divine, thereby materiality 
shapes and controls the interactions between the human and the superhuman. Seeing as a 
scientific confirmation of researcher’s theories and hypothesis or as the cultural elevation of the 
aesthet or of the museum visitor is, thus, the result of a historical process of secularisation of 
materiality, more and more detached from its enchanted technology, to use a Gell’s (2006) 
expression. 
The fourth chapter traced the historical process through which beauty, aesthetics and 
materiality have been detached from the enchanted and sensuous interaction between human and 
nonhuman, with the subsequent post-secular veneration of arts as cultural enrichment. This 
process of secularisation has given rise to museums as cultural institutions where this intellectual 
elevation is supervised, so that museum experience coincides with an aesthetic activity. The Other, 
thus, from being considered as the totally Other or monster, has been considered as a reification of 
a scientific idea or theory, something, then, which can be measured and objectively determined. 
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The description of three temporary exhibitions during fieldwork has confirmed that the cultural 
background of museology continues to impact curators’ practices: darśan and the material artefacts 
eliciting it are viewed and understood in aesthetic terms, thereby decontextualising the ritual 
engagement between worshipper and materiality. 
The fifth chapter described curatorial practices, responses and difficulties in dealing with 
materiality, more specifically with religious materiality: pats and paṛs represent challenges for the 
curators. The scrolls pose several questions to museum actors on the legitimacy of distinguishing 
between religious and secular places, since the scrolls’ religious materiality cannot be identified by 
a clear dichotomy, but rather is the continuous tension of two intellectually abstract categories, the 
fuzzy location of them. Even though Indian storytelling scrolls have been subjected to 
aestheticisation and musealisation, so that they are considered repositories of a universal ideal of 
beauty or of an anthropological theory, their fruition does not necessarily follow the rules of a 
museum-minded culture: the reconstructions of sacred places, for instance, impact on religious 
and spiritual reactions, which transcend the didactic goal which the curators wish to reach with 
these so-called authentic realisations. The sensuous contact with the museum artefacts principally 
via seeing is unpredictable and hardly controllable. Scholars, thus, require different 
epistemological tools for thinking about materiality, thus, and methods for describing it which are 
not provided in Western scholarly literature as it currently exists.  
In sum, what the research undertaken for this thesis has revealed is that objects and persons 
overlap with each other. During perception, the perceiving and perceived are parts of the same 
phenomenon and are, thus, interchangeable: the researcher is, simultaneously, the observer and 
the context observed. I have been at the same time a museum researcher and a museum visitor. 
Curators’ words also reflect this essentially ambiguous condition of being part of and being 
outside the museum experience. In this view, the act of seeing is paradigmatic: by gazing at the 
Other, we establish a common and shared state of existence. The Hindu worshipper can touch the 
god visually represented in a spiritual and physical fusion: the storytelling scroll is no longer a 
piece of cloth, but rather the incarnated presence of the god, and it continues to be so even in the 
museum context. What the museum recreation or installation of religious spaces has shown is 
precisely the resistance of materiality to human practices: museum artefacts continue to propose 
the fusion with humans, the problematising of any categorical division, of any work of 
purification, to use Latour’s expression, despite curatorial and, more broadly, Western 
aestheticisation of the nonhuman. The unknown, the Other continues to suggest that the human is 
215 
a contradictory juxtaposition between subject and object: the fear of the Other rises precisely from 
the constant possibility of being denied as autonomous actors. The menace of the Other consists of 
the nonexistence of a real subject: ‘sense is a nonexisting entity and, in fact, mantains very special 
relations with nonsense’ (Deleuze, 1990, xiii), because perceiving ‘has no physical nor mental 
existence’ (Deleuze, 1990, 20). I concur with Deleuze in viewing sense as a frontier between things, 
Augé’s matiére brute, and words: perceiving constantly proclaims that the human is born from and 
develops in the contradiction between a perceiving body and a mind creating intellectual, reified 
things, specifically language (Deleuze, 1990, 24). The relation between things and language is 
characterised by an unreal causality, specifically the incapability of words to represent things. 
Therefore, sense is always a reminder of this double nature of the perceived: ‘Sense is always a 
double sense and excludes the possibility that there may be a "good sense" in the relation. Events 
are never causes of one another, but rather enter the relations of quasi-causality, an unreal and 
ghostly causality, endlessly reappearing in the two senses’ (Deleuze, 1990, 33). The material 
artefacts, because of their inertia, more than any other nonhuman actors, reveal the intrinsic 
ambiguity of the identity of the human subject: personhood is a precarious state, and the 
perceiving body cannot be separated from the act of perception, save for an intellectualisation that 
radically transforms perception. Sense leads to amazement: the enchanted vision of a thing which 
the intellect cannot explain the coming-into-existence-of, what Gell calls the enchantment of 
technology. Intellectualisation counterfeits that bewilderment of the senses and introduces 
explanations which should render the thing’s existence logical, a Modern fact. 
Yet we do not cut consciousness off from itself, which would preclude all progress of 
knowledge beyond primary opinion, and especially the philosophic examination of primary 
opinion as the basis of all knowledge. All that is required is that the coincidence of myself with 
myself, as it is achieved in the cogito, shall never be a real coincidence, but merely an intentional 
and presumptive one. In fact, between myself who have just thought this, and myself who am I 
thinking that I have thought it, there is interposed already a thickness of duration, so that I may 
always doubt whether that thought which has already passed was indeed such as I now see it to 
have been. Since, furthermore, I have no other evidence of my past than present testimony and 
yet do have the idea of a past, I have no reason to set the unreflective, as an unknowable, over 
against the reflection which I bring to bear on it. But my confidence in reflection amounts in the 
last resort to my accepting and acting on the fact of temporality, and the fact of the world as the 
invariable framework of all illusion and all disillusion: I know myself only in my inherence in 
time and in the world, that is, I know myself only in ambiguity (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 
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402). 
Therefore, the work of purification operated by the social sciences and Western culture at 
large deprives meaning from context. Instead of being described in its contradictions and nuances, 
e.g. the curators’ loss of control of the museum artefacts, the context is fractured in rigid categories, 
and cannot be really understood for what it is. 
In this way we are drawn away from reflection, and we construct perception instead of 
revealing its distinctive working; we miss once more the basic operation which infuses meaning 
(sens) into the sensible, and which is taken for granted by any logical mediation or any 
psychological causality. The result is that intellectualist analysis eventually makes nonsense of 
the perceptual phenomena which it is designed to elucidate (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945], 39). 
The conflict between perceptual phenomena and intellectualism causes, then, a substantial 
discrepancy between scholarly assumption and fieldwork data. As observed in chapters three and 
four, two types of issues arise from research on the intersection between sacred, religious and 
ritual spaces, and the context of museums and the art world, an encounter stimulated by the 
Indian storytelling scrolls. In epistemological terms, the research has demonstrated a divergence 
between academic studies on religious phenomena in museums and ethnographic data on the 
curatorial usages of religious objects within museum installations. On a cultural-political level, the 
religious contents of the scrolls have been manipulated according to a rhetoric which celebrates the 
identity of the Same. This applies both to the Indian-Hindu nation with the ACK rendition of the 
katha tradition, on the one hand, and to Western culture with a reading of the scrolls as popular-
folk art according to Western aesthetic criteria, on the other hand. In both cases, a binary 
opposition between categories, such as sacred and profane, Self and Otherness, art and folk art 
clashes with a more fluctuating and complex reality, which cannot be rightly understood by means 
of categorical thought.  
The outcome of the research implies three suggestions for further ethnographic practice. 
First, what the thesis proposes is the necessity of regaining the complexity of the perceptual and, 
consequently, of acknowledging that materiality cannot be subjected to an anthropomorphisation. 
This acknowledgement leads to ‘ontological realisms’ (Bryant, 2011, 18) which ‘refuse to treat 
objects as constructions of humans. While it is true, […], that all objects translate one another, the 
objects that are translated are irreducible to their translations’ (Bryant, 2011, 18). It is undeniable 
that intellectualisation requires a projection of the human onto the nonhuman, and Gell’s 
paradigm is a useful tool for navigating the social consequences of the distribution of personhood 
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in the environment, understood as the hybridism between the human and the nonhuman, as post-
humanist studies and multispecies ethnography claim. What shall be important for the social 
sciences, though, is the awareness that materiality is more than that: ‘Metamorphosis (sublimation 
and symbolization) consists, for each thing, in the liberation of an aliquid which is the noematic 
attribute and that which can noetically be expressed, eternal truth, and sense which hovers over 
bodies’ (Deleuze, 1990, 221). The likening of humans with things and things with humans is not a 
metaphor, but, instead, represents the reality in which the social scientist is, to use Korom’s 
expression, engulfed: there is not a distinction, neither ontologically nor existentially. The 
separation of the human and the nonhuman is, in contrast, a metaphor of the intellectual 
incapacity of grasping materiality as it is. To say that the social sciences could recuperate the 
complexity of the perceptual means suggesting the role of phenomenology, understood both as a 
methodological tool and as a theoretical framework, in developing the scholarly debates and 
issues. Because of the coincidence of the social context with the perceptual, the positioning of the 
researcher with her epistemological queries becomes, first of all, a matter of description of a 
perception, thereby the function of phenomenology in establishing a language the closest as 
possible to the confusion and symbiosis between the perceiving and the perceived.  
Second, the data obtained from fieldwork invites a new approach in studying museums and 
museography. As we have seen, museums are more than cultural institutions with the purpose of 
controlling and guiding visitors’ intellectual enrichment or expressing curators’ theories in a way 
similar to the information provided by books. Instead of a linear and hierarchical organisation of 
the relationships between materiality, curators and visitors, what occurs in museum spaces is more 
similar to the phases of osmosis. As in the process of osmosis, external properties (such as the 
parallel between a religious statue in a church, with its aesthetic and, simultaneously, religious 
functions, and the same statue in a museum) impacted curators’ convictions, first of all the idea of 
the museum as a scientific institution, and vice versa. This conviction of the museum as having a 
secular and didactic foundation shapes curatorial practices, by giving restricted expressions to 
visitors’ cultic reactions, for instance. In the heuristic image of osmosis, the relations between 
different identities can be described by Marchesini’s (1996, 17-18) insightful metaphor of the 
threshold, as something which allows the transactions between different subjects by enriching 
their characteristics through an exercise of listening and apprehending Otherness. If we consider 
the nonsense nature of perceiving, with the subsequent overlapping and knotting of the perceived 
and the perceiver, of the human and of the nonhuman, the metaphor of the osmosis gains further 
218 
meaning. As in the concept of rhizome conceived by Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2005, 3-25; see also Ogden, Hall & Tanita, 2013, 10), in the osmosis there is no differentiation 
between the human and the nonhuman, rather an assemblage which transcends the concept of 
species and categories, thus favouring nonhierarchical relationships.101 
Third, what the research proposes is that materiality can be approached in a ‘prepersonal’ 
(Colwell, 1997, 18) way, with a body which extends its desires beyond its physical contours, a body 
fused with the outside and, because of that, a body without organs (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, 149-
166; see also Deleuze, 1990, 189). In this perspective, the categories elaborated by social sciences, 
such as the sacred and the profane, the body and the mind, the human and the nonhuman, the art 
and the nonart represent the contradiction of the intellect in establishing a hierarchy to the 
prepersonal by introducing the notion of personhood as a parameter. In contrast, materiality 
cannot be thought or understood without forging it into a flawed representation: the classification 
of the subject does not coincide with the merging of the perceiver and of the perceived, thus 
signals the intrinsic difficulty of the intellect of grasping that fundamental relationship with 
materiality. Gell’s paradigm represents the first effort to near the prepersonal. However, it 
continues to fall under intellectualism’s tendency to think the material via subjective and human 
terms.  
To conclude, by establishing a fundamental role for phenomenology in the social sciences, 
the research undertaken for the present thesis suggests the enrichment which anthropology and 
religious studies could gain in taking the challenge of materiality to the intellect. The thesis, then, 
suggests possible paths towards the reformulation of anthropology in post-humanist terms, where 
the flexibility of the multispecies assemblage substitutes the rigid dichotomy of human/nonhuman. 
                                                          
101 Latour, in Pandora’s Hope (1999, 304, quoted in Bryant, 2011, 270), substitutes the concept of society, a 
Moderns’ artefact based upon the treatment of the human and of the nonhuman or nature as two distinct 




The collection of Indian storytelling scrolls of the Kulttuurien museo 
 
This appendix fully describes the collection of Indian storytelling scrolls of the Kulttuurien 
museo as the most documented and complete of all the collections I analysed in the course of my 
fieldwork, especially with regards to the pats. Because this collection is quite recent, it does not 
have to contend with any lack of information inherited from past collectors. The collection is not 
exhibited, though, as the Kulttuurien museo has no proper space. Rather, it must negotiate it with 
other cultural institutions in Helsinki. The pictures I took during fieldwork accompany the 
account. 
The museum has a paṛ [images 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5] and two separate collections of pats. The paṛ 
was donated by Oppi Untrachtin, an American who emigrated to Finland because of his marriage. 
He did a lot of fieldwork in India and the majority of his collection went to New York, the Victoria 
and Albert Museum, and the British Museum. There is no record of when it was collected and 
photographed. The first collection of pats consists of four scrolls, painted at the beginning of the 
2000s and purchased by Prof. Lina Fruzzetti and Prof. Ákos Östör in view of an exhibition put on 
in Helsinki in 2005. Two of the scrolls were made in a handicraft centre in Bishnupur. The second 
collection comprises five scrolls from the Midnapur District, which were commissioned by a 
handicraft centre based in Kolkata. The scrolls were sold to the museum by Mr. Rajaditya 
Bandyopadhyay, who also provided the information for their cataloguing, in 1996.  
 
The curator contacted the two professors during my fieldwork, because the curator did not 
have expertise on Bengali scrolls. The information I acquired, then, was a collage of the museum’s 
archival information and some information provided to the curator by the two professors, which 
come from a website database of Prof. Östör’s university 
(http://learningobjects.wesleyan.edu/naya/index.html). 
 
Three scrolls, one from the first collection and the other two from the second, portray the 
goddess Manasa [images 6, 7, 8 and 9]. Manasa, considered Shiva’s daughter, is a goddess of 
fertility and is usually worshipped by the lowest castes and tribes (adivasi) in order to have babies 
and to cure snake bites. Jhapan is the festival for her, arranged for the rainy season, a period where 
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there are, in fact, a lot of snakes. One traditional story connected to Manasa is the tale of a 
merchant, Chand Sadagar, who threatens the goddess. The six sons of the merchant are killed by 
Manasa as an act of revenge. One pat in the museum’s collection depicts a ritual, with a coconut 
filled with water in order to invoke Lakshmi and a shell used to call the gods. Probably, the choice 
of the scene was made to strengthen the cultic value of the story. This quotation, the narration of 
the patua Mayna Chitrakar, provides the full story represented by this type of scroll: 
Jai Manasa, the fairest one, jai Bishahari (the remover of poison), Manasa, the virgin, 
who was born in a lotus. Her ornamental bed was made of snakes; so was her throne. 
Mangala, seated on the back of Barari. 
The merchant (Chand Sadagar) threatens & roars, twisting his beard, with a hental 
(hard wood) stick on his shoulder. If fate allows me to get access to you (Manasa) I’ll chop you 
to pieces.  
Manasa heard the abuse herself & conspired to kill the 6 sons of Chand. Their wives 
became widows, all 6 of them. They couldn’t have any children. But he said he had his youngest 
son, the rare treasure—Lakhindar. He decided to go to Nichhani Nagar to marry him to Behula 
the dancer, the daughter of Amulya Benani (merchant). Old janardan went there to negotiate & 
fixed the marriage. Lakhindar went in a palanquin to wed with a retinue of carriers. Chand had 
arranged a wedding room made of iron where lakhindar went to sleep, tired out. Kalinat (Kal 
nagini—the black deadly snake) entered, as fine as thread. Watching the beauty of Lakhindar 
she started to wonder how & where to bite him on his golden body. What excuse could she give 
when the gods asked her? Invoking the Sun & the moon a witnesses she bit him. Lakhindar 
woke up burning with poison & called his wife—wake up o daughter of Sai Bene. You are 
sleeping like the dead & I’m bitten by kal (Time—death). The girl had been up all night. She 
recognized the snake & threw a betel nut cracker at her which sliced away 2.5 finger width from 
her tail. The snake escaped, wriggling in pain. The servant with the shaved head went running 
to Chand. Your son is dead Sir. The old man started dancing—good, good. Now all my sons are 
dead. When will it be morning. I’ll have burnt fish with stale rice (panta bhat). (Behula tells 
him) O father in law, May you be hit by a thunderclap. Why did you have to fight with Manasa, 
of all the goddesses? You gave me my sankha & sindur. Now take them back. Behula chopped a 
banana trunk into 3, fixed the pieces with bamboo nails & floated away on the banana raft with 
Lakhindar’s body. It floated some distance. Then her 6 brothers came to her & said—why are 
you floating with a rotting corpse. Come back home darling sister. We’ll have our wives serve 
you. I no longer belong to the parental home o brothers. She answered. I don’t care to fight with 
my sisters in law all the time. Consoling her brothers she left. 
(http://learningobjects.wesleyan.edu/naya/scrolls/03_Manasa.html).  
 
The first collection of scrolls, apart from a Manasa scroll a scroll about Durga, have social 
themes, while the second collection has only scrolls with mythological contents. The two social 
scrolls, both coming from the village of Naya, are accompanied by the written narration made by 
two patuas and are centred on the role of females in contemporary patua society. The first one 
concerns the bad treatment of a girl [images 10 and 11], whereas the second one is on the abuse of 
women because of the unsuccessful fulfilment of the dowry (payment of the bride) [image 12]. The 
two stories are recorded below: 
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Listen O Listen please carefully 
Let me tell you something about the Girl Child. 
When a girl child is born 
Her father and mother feel sorry. 
Everyone ignores her. 
Alas! Our understanding that fails to appreciate her! 
 
When a girl child is born 
Why do they neglect her? 
 
The girl child is like a flower 
Dear to my heart. 
 
Soon after the girl child is born 
Start feeding her mother’s milk. 
The female sex is equal to motherhood 
And needed everywhere. 
 
A month after the girl is born 
Take her to the health center 
 
Don’t forget to have her inoculated 
Against polio. 
 
The girl child must be taught 
To read and to write 
She must be allowed to play 
You will bring her up with affection 
So listen to this dear Babus! 
 
When a girl child grows up 
You must think of her as a friend. 
 
O Mothers! You will teach her right and wrong 
And if she makes errors 
You must forgive her. 
 
If you educate the girl child 
She may grow up to be 
A primary or a high school teacher, 
And she will benefit her parents. 
 
Women labour in the fields 
And then they come home and mind the family. 
Why should they be neglected? 
 
Matangini Hajra was once a girl child 
She gave her life for the country. 
 
She drove out the British 
And did good for the common people. 
Listen! O Listen everybody 
Listen carefully! 
O babus! Women are abused for the dowry 
demand. 
In Nadia district 
In the village called Ranaghat 
There dwelt a man called Kalipada. 
Kalipada and Haripada were two brothers, 
Their mother’s name was Durgarani, 
I will tell it all. 
Durgarani was a woman of quality, 
Let me tell you. 
That family of three managed their lives somehow. 
Kalipada and Haripada went to school. 
The elder kalipada passed his MA degree. 
Having passed he went off in search of a job. 
And happened to find a job on the Burdwan 
district. 
After working for some time he visited his home 
And Durga thought she would marry off her son. 
To arrange the marriage Durga got ready to go look 
for a bride. 
And heard that in Baripur there was a suitable girl. 
In Baripur, in the house of Rajen Sarkar 
There was Usha, beautiful to look at. 
Miss Usha was beautiful and fair. 
Miss Usha had passed her MA. 
Kali saw her, liked her, and agreed to wed, 
And the matter of dowry was settled. 
They would give Rs 20,000 in cash and a watch for 
his wrist, 
For the girl they would give a (gold) necklace, 
earrings and bangles. 
The agreement was made, the date was fixed. 
And Kalipada married and went to the nuptial 
chamber. 
In the morning Rajen Sarkar bid them adieu. 
Of the promised 20 thousand rupees, five thousand 
remained due. 
When they heard of this five thousand 
Kali and his mother both abused Miss Usha. 
Usha had to suffer the abuse; her heart nearly broke 
And she thought, “I will not show my face (for 
shame)!” 
Now Kali went off to his job in Burdwan, 
And Usha and Durgarani stayed home. 
She was abused (verbally), and hear O People of 
India! 
In the middle of the night, Usha tied a noose 
around her neck. 




Came to see this and did not know what to do. 
They said, “Durgarani! What happened? 
Please tell us clearly why the bride hanged 
herself?” 
She replied, “I know nothing! I heard nothing! 
Did she have this in mind? 
What sorrow made my daughter-in-law leave for 
the next world?” 
Hearing the news Rajen Sarkar arrived there 
“What made Usha hang herself?” 
He said, “I know everything, Durgarani 
Who are you bluffing? 
Kali pressured her for the remaining money. 
So let’s go to the police station, son-in-law. 
If you don’t accompany me, I will force you to 
come.” 
Father-in-law and groom went to the police station, 
And the police officer in charge recorded a report of 
the incident. 
The police made out a case and came, 
And arrested Durgarani who was hiding in her 
house. 
They arrested and took away that mother and son 
pair. 
And the Judge decreed that they would be jailed. 
I finish my poem here. 
I am Swarna Chitkar. 
 
 
Within the second collection of scrolls, apart from the two Manasa scrolls, one scroll 
represents episodes from the Ramayana and, according to the online catalogue, it is realised as a 
cartoon [images 12, 13, and 14]. Its style, didactic and detailed, made me suspect that it might be 
much older than the rest of the second collection. The second scroll is based on some episodes 
taken from the poem Chandi Mangal Kavya by Kabikankana Mukundaram [images 15 and 16]. The 
main character is Sripati tai Srimata, the rich son of a merchant. He searched for his father, who 
was kept as a prisoner in Sri Lanka by the king Salabanille. Sripatai succeeds at convincing the 
king that Kalidahassa Srimata was the place of the goddess Chandi, sitting on a lotus, swallowing 
and burping out elephants, and as a reward is allowed to marry the daughter of the king and 
obtains the release of his father, who was imprisoned because he did not manage to show Chandi. 
The scroll is propaganda for Chandi becoming more important than Shiva (Chandi, in this case, 
coincides with Durga). I quote, again, a patua’s (Hazry Chitrakar) narration of the story:  
 
Durga, o mother who welcomes sorrow; impossible to vanquish, the daughter of the mountain 
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king (Himalaya). 
You with 10 arms, the third eye shining in the middle of your forehead. 
Oh mother with a garland of hibiscus round your neck & a jasmine nose ring. Your husband 
Shankar calls you—Bhabani from far away. 
Jaya & Bijoya your 2 friends are following, along with Laksmi on your left & Kartik, Saraswati, 
Ganesha, the lion & Asura. 
You favoured him one day & showed Kalketu hidden treasure under the dalim (pomegranate) 
tree. Digging out the treasure Kalketu established a city in Gujarat. 
He took all the riches home to show it to Khullana who was waiting at the door of their hut. 
Srimanta was growing up .He said one day that he wanted to travel. His mother invoked on 
Durga & Chandi arrived. She gave her son to him & he started on his journey with Durga’s 
name. The boat went cruising along when there came a huge storm, who knows why so ill 
fated. Srimanta saw kamala Kamini—a beautiful goddess swallowing a tiny elephant. In Ratan 
Mala ghat. With the sound of drums in the ghat, the city keeper & others started gossiping. 
They were sucking the state dry Shalibahan, the king didn’t look after his kingdom. Srimanta 
came & stood before him & said o king I have seen 
Kamale Kamini in your realm. The king said—show me the scene & I’ll give you half my 
kingdom as well as my daughter. But Srimanta, if you cannot, I’ll have you beheaded at the 
execution ground on the south of my city. 
Srimnata took him to Kalidaha but the goddess didn’t show up. So he was handed over to the 
city keeper & sent to prison. In jail Srimanta started crying & invoking Durga. He said I’m 
dying o mother—where are you? His prayers reached her ears in Kailash & she showed up & 
immediately his bonds came off. When the king ordered him to be retied & hanged, Durga 
displayed herself on the ground with 18 arms. The king said—who has had the good fortune to 
worship you o mother. I am complete today that I can look at you. 
Indra the king of the gods became king—having worshipped you Hazra Chitrakar, village 
Naya, police station Pingla, district West Midnapur. 
(http://learningobjects.wesleyan.edu/naya/scrolls/02_chandi.html) 
 












































A photographic documentation of reconstructions of altars within museum spaces 
 
This appendix focuses on the visual renditions of the reconstructions of shrines and altars at 
the Penn Museum, the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology of the University of Cambridge and 
the Oriental Museum of the University of Durham. The photographs reflect the blurring of 
boundaries, between the sacred and the profane, between religious worship and the museum 
approach, which these reconstructions evoke and stimulate.  
Sommerville’s Buddhist temple is not complete today in the gallery. Nevertheless, the 
amulets and altars which follow one another give an idea of Sommerville’s original idea. In 
addition, the Rotunda, with its arches and frescos, as well as the Chinese crystal ball at the centre, 
reinforces an atmosphere suspended between wonder and mysticism. 
 
The shrine to Ardhanarishvara at the Oriental Museum 
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A drawer with the objects used in the pūjā in the shrine to Ardhanarishvara at the Oriental 
Museum 
The shrine to Ganeś at the Oriental Museum 
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The shrine to Santoshi-Maa at the Oriental Museum 
The palanquin for the processional images at the Oriental Museum 
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The shrine dedicated to Kali at the Oriental Museum 
A particular of the shrine to Kali 
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The shrine dedicated to Lakshmi at the Oriental Museum 
The Hindu tree shrine at the Oriental Museum 
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A kolam on the ground in the Oriental Museum 
‘The Cambridge Altar’ 
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A stupa reliquiary at the Penn Museum 
Part of what remains of Sommerville’s Buddhist Temple in the permanent gallery  
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The Harrison Rotunda  
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